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ABSTRACT 
 
The central question I address is whether the inclusion of a right to subsistence among 
human rights can be justified. The human right to subsistence is conventionally 
interpreted as a fundamental right to a basic living standard characterized as having 
access to the material means for subsistence. It is widely thought to entail duties of 
protection against deprivation and duties of assistance in acquiring access to the material 
means for subsistence (Shue 1996, Nickel, 2004, Griffin 2008). The inclusion of a right 
to subsistence among human rights interpreted in this way has been met with 
considerable resistance, particularly on the part of those who argue that fundamental 
rights cannot entail positive duties (Cranston 1983, Narveson 2004, O’Neill 1996, 2000, 
2005).  
 
My purpose in this dissertation is to consider whether a plausible interpretation of the 
human right to subsistence can succeed in overcoming the most forceful and persistent 
objections to it. My main thesis is that a minimal interpretation of the human right to 
subsistence according to which it is a right not to be deprived of access to the means for 
subsistence provides the strongest interpretation of this right. Although the idea that the 
human right to subsistence correlates with negative duties is not new, discussion of these 
duties has been overshadowed in the literature by debate over the positive duties 
conventionally thought to be entailed by it. I show that the human right to subsistence 
interpreted as a right not to be deprived of access to the means for subsistence makes an 
important contribution to reasoning about the normative implications of global poverty.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
1.1. Central Problems and Aims 
One of the most striking features of the world in which we live is the enormous disparity 
in the living standards of its human inhabitants. Few, if any, of those who read this will 
have ever experienced chronic hunger or thirst; and few, if any, will be personally 
acquainted with anyone who has. Few of us will have faced a lack of clothing or housing 
suitable for the climate. Most of us will have always had access to health care facilities 
and medication, and few will have lost loved ones to preventable illness. Most of us will 
have had at least twelve years of education, and many will have had significantly more. 
And beyond all this, many of us enjoy significant luxuries, or at least have the means to 
spend some of our resources and time on promoting our own pleasure and advancing 
our own projects. Moreover, we enjoy these goods with a high degree of security. We are 
among the global rich. 
It is by now a familiar fact that, by contrast, many people in many parts of the 
world suffer from severe and chronic material deprivations. Exactly how many is hard to 
know; but the most conservative estimates suggest that well over a billion (1000 million) 
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people worldwide (over sixteen per cent of the world’s population) are unable to 
consistently meet their most basic material human needs including food adequate for a 
nutritious diet, clean drinking water, and clothing and housing suitable for the climate.1 
Many more lack access to basic health care and education. These are the global poor. The 
global poor are not merely poor relative to others; they are poor relative to an absolute 
baseline below which anyone is considered poor. I take it that the relevant baseline is the 
threshold for subsistence: the threshold below which a person lacks the material means 
necessary to have any chance of living a minimally decent human life.2  
 
The persistence of global poverty in the face of the feasibility of its eradication, or at least 
its substantial alleviation, is held by some to constitute a violation of human rights. In 
particular, it is held to constitute a violation of the human right to subsistence – a 
universal right of access to a set of basic necessities for living a minimally decent human 
life. The analysis and evaluation of this claim will be the central focus of this dissertation.  
 
Motivation for this project derives from a recent trend of framing the issue of global 
poverty in terms of socio-economic human rights, and in particular the human right to 
subsistence. The human right to subsistence is affirmed by thinkers of various 
persuasions. Many cosmopolitan theorists have made the human right to subsistence 
central to their discussions of global justice.3 The human right to subsistence has equally 
found a central place in some liberal nationalist accounts of global justice.4 Acceptance of 
the human right to subsistence furthermore cuts across many accounts of the grounding 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 A number of different metrics are used for measuring poverty worldwide. The most 
comprehensive resource for statistics on global poverty is the United Nation’s Human Development 
Report published annually since 1990. According to the 2010 report, an estimated 1.44 billion 
people worldwide fall below the World Bank’s income poverty line of $1.25 USD per day (2005 
PPP).  Furthermore, at least 1.75 billion people live in ‘multidimensional poverty’, that is ‘a 
measure of serious deprivations in the dimensions of health, education and living standards that 
combines the number of deprived and the intensity of their deprivation’. All of the Human 
Development Reports so far published are available at <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/> 
2 In what follows, I take ‘poverty’ to refer to absolute poverty unless otherwise specified.   
3 See, for example, Simon Caney, Justice Beyond Borders : A Global Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005); Charles Jones, Global Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999). 
4 See, for example, David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007); and Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2nd edn 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
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of human rights, and is equally common amongst those who reject the need for an 
appeal to foundations altogether in theorizing about human rights.5 
The human right to subsistence does not only find support among professional 
philosophers; it is increasingly invoked by development workers, aid organizations, and 
human rights organizations alike. According to a recent Oxfam briefing paper, for 
example, the various effects of climate change ‘are undermining millions of people’s 
[human] rights to (…) food, water, health, shelter (…)’.6 And according to Amnesty 
International, !
suffering [endured by those subject to severe poverty] should be no more 
inevitable than torture, false imprisonment or censorship. The right to live in 
dignity, with access to health care, education, secure housing and an adequate 
livelihood is fundamental.7 
Furthermore, human rights in general, but especially socio-economic human rights 
including the human right to subsistence were put centre-stage in the United Nation’s 
2000 Human Development Report, and have been invoked in many subsequent publications 
of this document. For example: 
[A] decent standard of living, adequate nutrition, health care and other social and 
economic achievements are not just development goals. They are human rights 
inherent in human freedom and dignity. (p. 73) 
 
The human right to subsistence is conventionally interpreted as a universal moral claim 
not to be deprived of access to the means for subsistence, but also to be protected 
against such deprivation, and to be provided with assistance in gaining access to the 
means for subsistence when one is otherwise unable to secure this for oneself.8  Framing 
the problem of global poverty in terms of this right has appeal in that it serves to 
highlight the urgency and enormity of the problem, and it has great potential to motivate 
action especially on the part of political actors and NGOs. Whatever else human rights !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 See, for example, Charles Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009); Jack Donnelly, Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 2nd edn (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2003). 
6 Kate Raworth, ‘Climate Wrongs and Human Rights’, Oxfam International (2009) 
<http://www.oxfam.org/en/policy/bp117-climate-wrongs-and-human-rights> 
7 Amnesty International’s official website, 
<http://www.amnesty.org.uk/content.asp?CategoryID=11179>   
8 This account draws on Henry Shue’s influential account of the right to subsistence in Basic 
Rights.  
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are, they are matters of urgent international and transnational moral concern. So to 
characterize global poverty as a large-scale violation of human rights implies that its 
eradication is unequivocally an urgent matter of international and transnational moral 
concern. 
But there is no reason to think that all matters of urgent international and 
transnational moral concern involve human rights. Framing the problem of global 
poverty in terms of human rights undoubtedly has a great deal of rhetorical appeal, but 
the inclusion of a right to subsistence among human rights has nevertheless been met 
with considerable resistance. This resistance predominantly takes issue with the positive 
duties of protection and assistance taken to correlate with the human right to subsistence 
on the conventional interpretation outlined above.9  
Skeptics about the human right to subsistence rightly point out that the rhetorical 
appeal of affirming such a right alone provides no good reason in support of the 
affirmation of such a right. In fact, yielding to the temptation to call any matter of urgent 
international and transnational moral concern a human right is what pushes us towards 
greater and greater human rights inflation. This is indeed a chief worry among those who 
reject the human right to subsistence.10  
The worry about human rights inflation is that the more human rights that are 
affirmed without sufficient justification, the less value the ‘currency’ of human rights will 
have. If all we mean when we say that there is a human right to X is that people’s 
enjoyment of X is a matter of urgent international and transnational moral concern, then 
it is not clear what is gained by calling it a human right and not simply an urgent matter 
of international and transnational moral concern. This might be innocuous if not for the 
side-effect it has of degrading the force of other human rights affirmations. It is my aim 
in this dissertation to evaluate the charge against those who affirm a human right to 
subsistence of contributing to human rights inflation, and ultimately to defend the 
affirmation of a human right to subsistence against it. This will involve arbitrating 
between those who affirm and those who deny a human right to subsistence. This task is 
complicated by the fact that multiple interpretations of this right are available. The !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 See, for example, Maurice Cranston, ‘Are There Any Human Rights?’ Daedalus 112 (1983), 1-17; 
Jan Narveson, ‘Welfare, Wealth, Poverty, and Injustice in Today’s World’ Journal of Ethics 8 
(2004), 305-348; Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974); Onora 
O’Neill, ‘The Dark Side of Human Rights’ International Affairs 81 (2005), 427-439; and Richard 
Rorty, ‘Who are We? Moral Universalism and Economic Triage’ Diogenes 173 (1996), 5-15.  
10 See in particular Cranston, ‘Human Rights, Real and Supposed’, in The Philosophy of Human 
Rights, e. Patrick Hayden (St Paul: Paragon House, 2001), pp. 163-173. 
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central question I seek to address, therefore, is whether there is a defensible 
interpretation of the human right to subsistence. I ultimately answer this question in the 
affirmative, although the interpretation of the human right to subsistence that I endorse 
differs from the conventional interpretation in the correlative duties it takes as its focus.  
 
This dissertation divides roughly into three parts; the first and second parts consisting of 
the first and second chapters respectively, and the third part consisting of the third and 
fourth chapters together. The aim of the first part is to present the general problem I 
seek to address. I characterize this problem as an apparent tension between the 
conventional interpretation of the human right to subsistence on the one hand, and on 
the other hand the condition on the existence of rights notably propounded by Onora 
O’Neill that they be claimable. Claimability, on O’Neill’s account, requires that the 
bearers of the duties correlative to the right in question and the content of the relevant 
duties are determinate.11 She objects to the inclusion of a right to subsistence among 
human rights on the basis that it does not fulfil this condition. Whether this objection is 
successful is the central concern of the second and third parts.  
 The positive duties taken on the conventional interpretation to correlate with the 
human right to subsistence are, according to O’Neill’s challenge, not claimable on 
account of being imperfect. A duty12 is imperfect in the sense relevant to O’Neill’s 
challenge if its fulfillment is not owed to any particular individual. If the fulfillment of a 
duty is not owed to any particular individual, no particular individual has a legitimate 
claim to its fulfillment. According to the objection, because the positive duties thought to 
correlate with the human right to subsistence are imperfect, no individual suffering from 
severe poverty has a claim on any other agent to their assistance or protection.  
 O’Neill’s account makes clear why the positive duties taken to correlate with the 
human right to subsistence on the conventional interpretation are not claimable. This has 
to do with the limits on the ability of any given individual to assist those in need. Even !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996); Bounds of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000); ‘The Dark Side of Human Rights’. 
12 In what follows, I use the terms ‘duty’ and ‘obligation’ interchangeably. Sometimes duties are 
distinguished from obligations in that the latter are taken to be more specific than the former. 
For example, the general duty to keep one’s promises might be thought to entail the obligation to, 
for example, tidy the house, assuming that is what one promised to do. Although I think we can 
distinguish between general duties and the more specific duties that derive from them given 
particular circumstances, I see no reason to use the terms ‘duty’ and ‘obligation’ to label this 
distinction given the synonymy of these terms in ordinary usage. 
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the wealthiest people in the world could not succeed in assisting every individual in need. 
As such, no individual in need has a claim on any wealthy individual in particular unless 
institutions are in place that allocate specific duties to specific duty-bearers. That the 
positive duties of individual agents to protect and assist those in need are imperfect, and 
thus not claimable in the absence of institutions is widely accepted, even by proponents 
of the conventional interpretation of the human right to subsistence. What O’Neill’s 
account lacks, however, is a convincing account of why we should accept that 
claimability is a condition on the justified affirmation of rights in the first place. All she 
offers is the thought that rights just are claims; so if no one has a claim against some 
identifiable duty-bearer, then no one has a right. But this overlooks alternative 
conceptions of the nature of rights that do not take claimability as a condition on their 
existence, or so I shall argue.   
 Replies to the sort of challenge levied by O’Neill on behalf of the conventional 
interpretation of the human right to subsistence tend to suffer from a similar deficiency 
in that they either implicitly presuppose or simply assert a conception of rights according 
to which claimability is not a condition on their justified affirmation. My aims in the 
second part of this dissertation are threefold: The first is to expose what is really at stake 
in the debate over the human right to subsistence – namely the very nature of moral 
rights. The second is to show that many of the most influential contributions to this 
debate, on both sides of it, have failed to adequately engage with the fundamental 
questions about the nature of rights. Finally, I offer an argument in support of the 
claimability condition that supplements O’Neill’s account. I argue that the reason that 
rights must be claimable is that unless they are, they fail to make a distinctive 
contribution to practical reasoning.  
 
Given that the human right to subsistence on the conventional interpretation is not 
claimable, O’Neill concludes that we should therefore reject the inclusion of a right to 
subsistence among human rights altogether.  One purpose of the third part of this 
dissertation is to assess this move. I argue that O’Neill’s conclusion is too hasty in that it 
overlooks potentially plausible alternative accounts of the human right to subsistence 
that promise conformity to the claimability condition. A second aim of this third part is 
to evaluate whether any account can make good on this promise while at once offering a 
generally satisfactory interpretation of the human right to subsistence. 
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The central thesis I defend is that the strongest available interpretation of the human 
right to subsistence is one that places primary emphasis on the negative duties correlative 
to it, and in particular on the duty not to deprive people of access to the means for 
subsistence. This represents a departure from the conventional interpretation which 
places at least as much emphasis on the positive duties of assistance and protection. The 
implications of the kind of interpretation I propose are underexplored in the existing 
literature. I aim to show that this represents an unacceptable deficit; I hope to contribute 
to eliminating it. 
 
1.2. Context and Relevance 
The question of whether there is a plausible interpretation of the human right to 
subsistence has been addressed from at least three different, but importantly related 
philosophical perspectives. One is from the perspective of human rights theory. Those 
involved in putting forward full-fledged theories of human rights generally offer an 
account of what specific rights are included among human rights. The most influential 
in-depth theories of human rights all include some treatment of socio-economic human 
rights including the human right to subsistence.13 These theories generally provide an 
account of how we should go about reasoning about which rights are included among 
human rights, and then apply their account in producing a list of human rights.  
 A second perspective from which the question of whether there is a plausible 
interpretation of the human right to subsistence arises is the perspective of theorizing 
about global justice. Human rights are treated by a number of theorists as at least 
minimal principles of global justice. Socio-economic human rights including the human 
right to subsistence on this sort of account provide at least minimal principles of global 
distributive justice.14 This perspective is broader than the perspective of human rights 
theory because it is concerned not only with a theory of human rights, but also with the 
question of how human rights function as principles within a theory of global justice. 
Accounts that take some interpretation of the human right to subsistence as a principle 
of global distributive justice presuppose some account of human rights or other, but they !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 See, for example, Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights; Donnelly, Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 
2nd edn; James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); James W. 
Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights, 2nd edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007).  
14 See, for example, Simon Caney, Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory; C. Jones, Global 
Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism; Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice; and Shue, Basic 
Rights. 
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are largely focused on the implications of the human right to subsistence for questions of 
global justice, such as how wealth and resources should be distributed or redistributed 
globally, and how global social, economic, and political institutions and relationships 
should be structured.   
 Finally, the question of whether there is a plausible interpretation of the human 
right to subsistence can also be asked from the perspective of theorizing specifically 
about the normative implications of global poverty. Theorizing from this perspective 
begins with the observation that a great deal of people are currently suffering from 
absolute poverty while many others enjoy lives of considerable privilege and comfort, 
and goes on to question what, if any, normative implications this disparity has. This is the 
perspective I take in addressing the question of whether there is a plausible interpretation 
of the human right to subsistence. This perspective potentially overlaps with each of the 
other two perspectives so far outlined. It overlaps with the second perspective insofar as 
at least some of the normative implications of global poverty are matters of justice; and it 
overlaps with the first perspective insofar as at least some of the normative implications 
of global poverty derive from human rights.  
I take it that the second and third perspectives, and in particular the second, draw 
on the first and in so doing give purpose to it. For theorizing about human rights to be 
relevant, it has to be relevant to something. My suggestion is that theorizing about 
human rights has relevance with respect to theorizing about global justice and theorizing 
about the normative implications of global poverty. It has relevance in particular to the 
questions of whether and to what extent the alleviation of global poverty is a matter of 
global justice.  
Much of the literature on the normative implications of global poverty avoids 
questions of justice and rights, and addresses instead another set of important questions 
concerning the extent to which individuals among the global rich are morally obligated to 
sacrifice in order to contribute to the alleviation of global poverty.15 By contrast, my 
focus in what follows is not on the specific content of the moral obligations to 
contribute to the alleviation of global poverty, but rather on their nature.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Garrett Cullity, The Moral Demands of Affluence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Tim 
Mulgan, The Demands of Consequentialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Liam B. 
Murphy, Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); and Peter 
Singer, ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 1(1972), 229-243. 
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 Peter Singer famously challenged the view that assisting the global poor is 
morally supererogatory, a matter of mere charity.16 He persuasively argued that there are 
stringent moral obligations to assist the severely poor in attaining a decent living standard 
on the part of those able to do so.17 In questioning whether there is a plausible 
interpretation of the human right to subsistence, I am interested in whether and to what 
extent the moral obligations to contribute to the alleviation of global poverty can be 
characterized as duties of justice as opposed to duties of beneficence.18  
 This is a narrower project than that of providing a full-fledged account of global 
justice. A complete theory of global justice would include principles having to do with 
security, political participation, sovereignty, just war, and so on. It is also potentially 
narrower than the project of providing a full-fledged account of the normative 
implications of global poverty which might also include moral requirements that do not 
count as obligations of justice. Nevertheless, I hope to make an important contribution 
to both of these broader projects.  
 
I take it that the fulfillment of rights is a matter of justice and that the duties correlative 
to rights can be characterized as duties of justice. If there is a human right to subsistence 
then the moral obligations correlative to it can be characterized as duties of justice. How 
does this pertain to reasoning about the normative implications of global poverty more 
broadly? In order to answer this question, I will need to say more about (a) reasoning 
about the normative implications of global poverty, and (b) what being a duty of justice 
implies. I will do this in what remains of this section.  
 
(a) Reasoning about the Normative Implications of Global Poverty 
Questions arising from the fact of global poverty centrally concern (1) its causes and (2) 
its remedy. (1) is an empirical matter whereas (2) has both empirical and normative 
aspects. Remedying global poverty requires knowledge of how this can be done – and in 
particular how it can be done effectively – which is an empirical matter. But which !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’. 
17 Singer, ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’ and Practical Ethics, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), especially Chapter 8.  While many object to the extent of the sacrifice 
Singer thinks is required in order to fulfil our obligations, few reject the view that there are at 
least some stringent moral obligations towards the global poor.  
18 What I refer to here as ‘duties of beneficence’ are also sometimes referred to as ‘duties of 
charity’, ‘duties of humanity’, or ‘humanitarian duties’. I take it that these all refer to the same 
sorts of duties. 
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agents, if any, are morally required to carry out the relevant actions, and which ones, if 
any, are morally required ultimately to bear the associated burdens are normative matters.  
What follows will be concerned exclusively with the normative questions arising 
from the fact of global poverty. The normative question that dominates the 
philosophical literature on global poverty concerns what David Miller has called remedial 
responsibility.19 Remedial responsibility is the forward-looking responsibility to take the 
actions necessary to remedy a bad situation. I will discuss remedial responsibility for 
global poverty in more detail in Chapter 6. My purpose here is just to point out that 
determining which agents are remedially responsible for global poverty is an important 
component of reasoning about the normative implications of global poverty. As such, it 
is something that might be affected by the nature of the relevant obligations. 
 A further concern is how other agents are morally permitted or required to act in 
case remedial responsibilities are not fulfilled. For example, is it permissible for the 
victims of poverty to take what they are owed from those who owe it to them? Is it 
permissible for first and third parties to use coercive force to ensure the fulfillment of 
these obligations on the part of second parties? I argue that it is with respect to these and 
other related questions that the nature of the obligations makes a difference. This, I 
argue in the next sub-section, is because duties of justice are enforceable. Therefore, if 
there is a human right to subsistence, whatever remedial duties correlate with it will be 
enforceable.  
 
(b) Duties of Justice and Duties of Beneficence 
Many of those who deny that there are fundamental duties of justice to assist those in 
need nevertheless hold that there are stringent duties of beneficence to do so. In order to 
access the reasons for thinking that assistance is either a duty of justice or a duty of 
beneficence, it is important to grasp what is at issue in drawing this distinction. A view 
that seems to motivate much of the literature in defence of the human right to 
subsistence is that duties of justice are stronger than duties of beneficence; that to violate 
a duty of justice is morally worse than to violate a duty of beneficence.20 If this were the 
case, then the nature of the duties to protect and assist the global poor would affect their 
strength. We have, I think, little reason to hold this to be true as such. Although we !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 National Responsibility and Global Justice, Chapter 7.  
20 See, for example, Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, p. 248; although he concedes 
that there might be some duties of beneficence that are stronger than duties of justice.  
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might observe that duties of justice tend to be weightier than duties of beneficence, we 
would need some principled reason to think that duties of justice must be weightier than 
duties of beneficence in order for this claim to be convincing.21 If the difference between 
duties of justice and duties of beneficence is just their relative strengths, we would need 
some account of where to draw the line between the two. Presumably there are not just 
two strengths of duty: Some duties of justice are stronger than other duties of justice, and 
some duties of beneficence are stronger than other duties of beneficence. Given an 
ordinal ranking of duties, the question remains of where to draw the line between duties 
of justice and duties of beneficence. But if the only difference between duties of justice 
and duties of beneficence is their relative strength, then we are left with nothing to 
appeal to in determining at what point a duty is strong enough to qualify as a duty of 
justice. This indicates that the claim that duties of justice are (or tend to be) stronger than 
duties of beneficence relies on some other feature that distinguishes duties of justice 
from duties of beneficence.  
A widely accepted view, and one that I endorse, is that duties of justice can 
correlate with rights while duties of beneficence cannot. Rights necessarily correlate with 
duties: for each right, there is some correlative duty. It is not, however, the case that for 
each duty there is a correlative right: some duties are not owed to anyone in particular.22 
When a duty correlative to a right is violated, that is, when someone is deprived of the 
object of her right, it is appropriate to say that an injustice has occurred. As such, the 
duties correlative to rights can be properly called duties of justice, since their fulfillment 
is a matter of justice. Since any duty whose fulfillment is a matter of justice is a duty of 
justice, all duties correlative to rights are necessarily duties of justice. A duty of 
beneficence will never, therefore correlate with a right.  
The observation that a duty of justice is one that correlates with a right does not 
get us very far in establishing what something being a duty of justice implies. What we 
need is an account of what conditions must be satisfied in order for a particular duty to 
be said to correlate with a particular right. We can begin to see what might be required !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 For further criticism of the claim that duties of justice are necessarily weightier than duties of 
beneficence, see Debra Satz, ‘What Do We Owe the Global Poor?’ Ethics & International Affairs 
19, no. 1 (2005), 47-54 (p. 52); and Tom Campbell, ‘Humanity before Justice’ British Journal of 
Political Science 4 (1974), 1-16 (p.14). 
22 O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, p. 134-136, concludes from this that recipient-based 
perspectives are therefore deficient. This is true only insofar as we are confined to one 
perspective or another. I do not see why we cannot consider moral relationships from both the 
perspective of recipients and obligation-bearers.  
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for a particular duty to be said to correlate with a particular right by considering why 
something’s being a duty of justice matters from the perspective of practical reasoning. 
The fact that duties of justice can (and perhaps must) correlate with rights while duties of 
beneficence cannot is not very interesting unless this makes some actual difference to the 
way we think about and treat these types of duties respectively. Another widespread view 
about the distinction between duties of justice and duties of beneficence that I also 
endorse is that duties of justice are enforceable whereas duties of beneficence are not. 
This claim requires some unpacking.  
 
The concept of enforceability requires some elucidation. First, I take the relevant sense 
of enforceability to be coercive enforceability. We can understand enforcement in a 
broader sense including social sanctions. John Stuart Mill, for example, thought that what 
distinguished morality from mere expediency was that transgressions of it deserved 
punishment. But punishment for Mill was not restricted to subjection to coercive force, 
but also reproach by one’s peers and even one’s own conscience.23 It may be true that 
morality can be delineated in this way, but what we are interested in here is what 
distinguishes duties of justice from other moral duties. The suggestion is that duties of 
justice are enforceable in the sense that those who bear them may be coerced into 
fulfilling them.  
Second, enforceability in the sense relevant here needs to be distinguished from 
the capacity for enforcement.24 For something to be enforceable in the sense that the 
means of enforcement of that duty are available does not imply that there is sufficient 
justification for the enforcement of that duty. But to base the distinction between duties 
of justice and other moral duties on enforceability in this respect would make the 
criterion for a duty being a duty of justice contingent on facts about the means of 
enforcement available in a given place and at a given time. It is unclear why a moral 
distinction should rely on such arbitrary and contingent non-moral facts. The relevant !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 According to Mill, ‘We do not call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person 
ought to be punished in some way or other for doing it; if not by law, by the opinion of his 
fellow-creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience. This seems the real 
turning point of the distinction between morality and simple expediency.’ Utilitarianism, ed. by 
Roger Crisp (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 1998), Chapter 3. 
24 These must both be distinguished from actual enforcement. I will not take up here the line of 
argument according to which rights and duties of justice only exist insofar as they are, as a matter 
of fact, enforced. For a persuasive refutation of this view, see John Tasioulas, ‘The Moral Reality 
of Human Rights’ in Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes what to the very Poor?, ed. by 
Thomas Pogge, UNESCO (Oxford: Oxford University Press, UNESCO, 2007), pp. 75-100. 
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sense of enforceability must be moral since what we are interested in is whether 
something being a duty of justice makes any difference from the perspective of morality. 
What we are therefore interested in is justifiable enforceability. A duty might be justifiably 
enforceable in the absence of the means necessary for actual enforcement. The morally 
relevant distinction is between duties which it would be justifiable to enforce if doing so 
were practicable and those which it would not be justifiable to enforce even if doing so 
were practicable.   
A third clarificatory point about the relevant sense of enforceability is that it is 
left open who might justifiably enforce a duty. It may be the case that a particular duty is 
justifiably enforceable by some but not others.25 All that is relevant for our current 
purposes is that the duty is justifiably enforceable by at least one agent. The claim is that 
duties of justice are justifiably enforceable in this sense whereas duties of beneficence are 
not.  
Finally, it is important to note that to say that a duty is enforceable in the sense 
relevant to the present discussion is not to say that it must be enforced, that it necessarily 
will be enforced, or even that, all things considered, it ought to be enforced. What it 
means here to say that a duty is enforceable is that there is prima facie justification to 
enforce it. There might be practical impediments to its enforcement, or there might be 
reasons that countervail against its enforcement making it ultimately unjustified. 
 
The view that duties of justice can be distinguished from duties of beneficence on the 
basis of their justifiable enforceability has been queried by Allen Buchanan.26 He argues 
that it can be justifiable to enforce duties of beneficence. Notably, he thinks it is 
justifiable to enforce duties of beneficence in order to solve collective action problems, 
particularly with respect to duties of beneficence to contribute to collective goods. This, 
Buchanan points out, is true even in the case where the collective good in question is not 
something to which people have an antecedent moral right. He argues that ‘some 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Locke, for example, thinks that the duties correlative to natural rights are justifiably 
enforceable by individual right-holders themselves in a state of nature, but that individual right-
holders forfeit their individual right to enforcement upon entering civil society. Second Treatise of 
Government, in Classics of Modern Political Theory: Machiavelli to Mill, ed. by Steven M. Cahn (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 213-292 (Chapter II and Chapter VII). The justifiably 
enforceability of a particular duty by a given agent will therefore depend on the socio-political 
circumstances. 
26 ‘Justice and Charity’, Ethics 3 (1987), 558-575 (pp. 562-569).  
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collective goods are of sufficient importance that enforcement seems justifiable if that is 
what it takes to secure them’ (p. 564).  
 One possible reply is that if this is the case, then the good in question actually is 
the object of a fundamental moral right, and that the duties in question, therefore, are 
duties of justice. But this is not necessarily the case. We can think of collective goods that 
are clearly not the objects of fundamental moral rights, the duties to contribute to which 
might nevertheless be justifiably enforceable. Take, for example, public libraries. Suppose 
the members of a particular community agree that it would be desirable to have a public 
library. For the sake of argument suppose that the members of this community 
unanimously agree to contribute their fair share (whatever they collectively decide that is) 
to the establishment and maintenance of a public library. Now, the members of this 
community are aware of the potential for free-riding, that is, some members failing to 
contribute their fair share on the grounds that the library project will still go ahead 
without their contribution, and so they can benefit from the good of having a public 
library without paying the cost. Seeing as they all recognize that they themselves are 
susceptible to temptation by this line of reasoning, and that if a number of them 
succumb, the project will fail, they unanimously decide that enforcement of the duty (of 
beneficence) to contribute to the establishment and maintenance of the public library is 
in order. The community council thus sets up a coercive scheme of taxation to ensure 
that the library project succeeds.   
 I think that Buchanan is right to think that enforcement in this kind of case is 
justifiable. But his intention is for this kind of case to provide a counter-example to the 
claim that duties of beneficence are never justifiably enforceable, whereas duties of 
justice are. A possible reply is that the duty to contribute to collective goods, if it is a 
duty at all, is not a duty of beneficence. It could plausibly be argued that the duty to 
contribute to collective goods only applies to those who partake, or who might partake at 
some future point, in those goods. Duties of beneficence are duties to act in the interest 
of others. While the promotion of collective goods is in the interest of the other 
members of the collective, the motivation to promote them is not generally beneficence, 
but rather self-interest. As such, once a duty is characterized as a duty to promote a 
collective good, it is hard to see how this can at once be considered a duty of 
beneficence.  
 I do, however, think that Buchanan’s argument can be adapted in such a way as 
to refute the claim that duties of beneficence can never be justifiably enforced. We can 
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imagine a case in which the members of a community recognize that they all hold some 
duty of beneficence towards others who are not part of the community. They also 
recognize that the most efficient and effective way of discharging these duties is for them 
to pool their efforts. Recognizing also the potential for free-riding, the members of the 
community might agree to subject themselves to the enforcement of these duties. In this 
case, even though the good to which the individual agents are contributing is not a 
collective good in the sense that they will not benefit from it, it seems that enforcement 
is indeed justifiable. I therefore agree with Buchanan that the claim that duties of 
beneficence are never justifiably enforceable while duties of justice are does not provide 
a plausible way of distinguishing between duties of justice and duties of beneficence. I 
argue, however, that there is a morally relevant difference between duties of justice and 
duties of beneficence that has to do with justifiable enforceability.  
What Buchanan’s account misses is something important about the distinction 
between the justifiability of enforcement of duties of justice and duties of beneficence 
respectively. In both the examples above, I take it that the reason that enforcement of 
the duty to contribute is justifiable is because everyone subject to the enforcement has 
consented to it. The use of coercive force is therefore justified on the basis of the 
consent of all those who are subject to it. The original duty in the first example is 
justifiably enforceable, but not on account of the value of the collective good in question. 
And the duty of beneficence in the second example is justifiably enforceable, but not on 
account of being a duty of beneficence. In both cases, the duties are justifiably 
enforceable on account of the consent of those subject to the enforcement.  
I argue that the morally relevant distinction between duties of justice and duties 
of beneficence is that the former are justifiably enforceable as such, whereas the latter 
require some additional justificatory feature such as consent in order to be justifiably 
enforceable. The examples above do not provide counter-examples to this claim since 
the justifiability of enforcement in them is based on consent.  
 It might be replied that the consent of all those upon whom a duty of 
beneficence is enforced is not in fact necessary for the enforcement to be justifiable in 
every case. Some goods are of sufficient importance to justify the enforcement of the 
duties to contribute to them. Take, for example, national security. This is a highly 
desirable collective good, but not clearly one to which people have a fundamental right. 
However, many agree that the duty to contribute to national security is justifiably 
enforceable, even without the explicit consent of all those subject to enforcement. But to 
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say that it is justifiable to enforce this duty on the basis of the importance of the 
collective good in question is simply to beg the question against those who think that 
only duties of justice are justifiably enforceable. Some further ground must be provided.27 
What I hope to have shown is that while Buchanan is right to argue that there 
can be grounds for enforcing duties that are not duties of justice, he does not succeed in 
showing that there is no morally relevant distinction between duties of justice and duties 
of beneficence on the basis of justifiable enforceability. Justification is always owed to 
those subject to coercive enforcement. As Buchanan implies, there are multiple 
acceptable grounds for enforcement. The difference between duties of justice and duties 
of beneficence is not that the former are justifiably enforceable and the latter are not; 
rather it is that the former are justifiably enforceable as such, while the latter always 
require some further justificatory feature. This, I take it, is because duties of justice stem 
from the legitimate demands of individuals. What it means to have a right is partly to 
have a demand. What distinguishes demands from requests is that the addressee is 
morally obligated to comply with a demand, but not with a request. Requests, unlike 
demands, can be considered and permissibly denied. Demands morally must not be 
denied. Since addressees are required to comply with the demand then, prima facie, 
enforcement is justifiable. My claim here is not that the bearers of duties of beneficence 
are not required to comply with those duties. They are, or else it would be strange to 
speak of them as being duties. My claim is that in the case of duties of beneficence, the 
most that a potential beneficiary of the fulfillment of the duty can make against the duty-
bearer is a request. The duty-bearer must fulfil her duty, but she is not bound to comply 
with the request of any particular potential beneficiary. For this reason, duties of 
beneficence are not justifiably enforceable as such.  
 
I have so far argued that the nature of the moral obligations associated with global 
poverty makes a difference with respect to what sort of action is justifiable on the part of 
first and third parties in anticipation of or in response to failures on the part of second 
party duty-bearers to fulfil their duties. In particular, I have argued that when these 
obligations are duties of justice, there is prima facie justification for their enforceability. 
There might also be justification for the enforceability of some duties of beneficence, but 
a duty of beneficence will never be prima facie justifiably enforceable as such. So if the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 This further ground might, for example, appeal to the notion of tacit consent, or perhaps 
rational consent under ideal conditions.  
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affirmation of a human right to subsistence can be justified, then it follows that the 
duties correlative to it will be duties of justice and therefore prima facie enforceable. 
Whether the affirmation of a human right to subsistence is justified therefore has 
important implications for reasoning about the normative implications of global poverty 
in this respect.  
 This provides both the context of the discussions to follow, but it will also figure 
into one of the main arguments that I will advance. I have so far suggested that the 
human right to subsistence contributes to reasoning about the normative implications of 
global poverty with respect to the justifiable enforceability of duties. This is not meant 
merely as a descriptive claim, but as a normative one. If the affirmation of the human 
right to subsistence does not contribute to reasoning about the normative implications of 
global poverty in the way that I have suggested, it is not clear what theoretical purpose it 
serves.28 It might be thought to serve a purely practical purpose in motivating and 
mobilizing support for the cause of poverty relief. But this would be to succumb to the 
charge that the human right to subsistence is empty rhetoric. In order for the affirmation 
of the human right to subsistence to be justified, I argue that it must make a distinctive 
contribution to reasoning about the normative implications of global poverty. It 
promises to do so by offering prima facie justification for the enforcement of at least some 
remedial and preventive duties. Whether it can make good on this will be evaluated in the 
chapters to follow.  
 
1.3. Project Overview 
It is not the proliferation of human rights itself that leads to human rights inflation. 
There is nothing about human rights that suggests that there should be few of them. 
There could be any number of human rights, but the affirmation of each must be 
justified in order to avoid the devaluation of human rights affirmations overall. To 
defend the affirmation of a human right to subsistence against the charge of human 
rights inflation, it must therefore be shown that there is sufficient justification for it. 
This, of course, requires an account of the justification of human rights.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Simon Hope bases his argument in support of the claimability objection on a similar point in 
‘Subsistence and Imperfect Duties’, unpublished manuscript, presented at the workshop on 
Human Rights and Subsistence at the University of Stirling, 4-5 March 2011. I am grateful to 
Simon for a number of conversations about this and a number of related matters over the last 
few years that have helped shape several of the arguments that I advance in what follows.  
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In Chapter 2, I begin in §2.1 by outlining the sort of justification conventionally 
offered for the human right to subsistence. On this sort of account, human rights are 
grounded in fundamental human values. While there are multiple and conflicting 
accounts of the fundamental human values that underpin human rights, the most 
prominent accounts converge on the fundamental value of having access to the means 
for subsistence. We therefore find widespread convergence within the conventional 
interpretation of human rights on the justified inclusion among them of a right to 
subsistence.   
In §2.2, I outline what I take to be the four most prominent and persistent 
philosophical objections to the inclusion of a right to subsistence among human rights. 
Each one raises a challenge to the justification offered in support of the human right to 
subsistence on the conventional account. None directly challenges the idea that human 
rights are grounded in fundamental human values, but each one suggests that some other 
condition for the justified affirmation of a human right cannot be fulfilled in the case of 
the human right to subsistence. These conditions are (1) that the fulfillment of the right 
for all right-holders must be feasible, (2) that the duties correlative to the right must not 
be excessively demanding, (3) that the duties correlative to the right must be only in the 
first instance negative, and (4) that the duties correlative to the right must be claimable. I 
argue that the first condition can be met by the human right to subsistence and that there 
are good reasons to reject the second and third as conditions on the justified affirmation 
of rights. My focus in the chapters to follow is largely on the fourth condition. The 
reason for this is that it is inadequately addressed in the literature in defence of the 
human right to subsistence, or so I shall argue.  
My aim in the Chapter 2 is therefore to set out the central problem that I seek to 
address in what follows. The central question that I seek to answer is whether there is 
reason to reject that claimability is a condition on the existence of rights, or whether 
there is a plausible interpretation of the human right to subsistence that conforms to this 
condition.  
In Chapter 3, I argue that some of the most influential defences of the human 
right to subsistence fail to take seriously the objection on the basis that the human right 
to subsistence is not claimable – what, following John Tasioulas, I refer to as the 
‘claimability objection’.29 I argue that this is because they presuppose without adequate 
argument a conception of moral rights according to which claimability is not a condition !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 ‘The Moral Reality of Human Rights’. 
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on their justifiable affirmation. In §3.1 I locate the claimability condition among the 
various debates within rights theory. I argue that one way that claimability can be 
understood is as a condition imposed by the Will Theory of the function of rights. 
Another way it can be understood is as a condition imposed by an account of the logical 
structure of rights according to which rights express deontic relations between right-
holders and duty-bearers.  
In §3.2. I discuss two influential lines of argument in defence of the human right 
to subsistence against the claimability objection. According to one, the enjoyment of 
access to the means for subsistence is necessary for the enjoyment of any other right 
including civil and political human rights, and so it too must be the object of a human 
right. This kind of argument has been advanced notably by Henry Shue, and a variation 
of it has recently been proposed by Elizabeth Ashford. According to the second line of 
argument, the interest of all humans in having access to the means for subsistence is 
sufficient to justify the affirmation of a human right with this as its object. Variations of 
this argument have been advanced notably by Jeremy Waldron and John Tasioulas. Both 
of these lines of argument involve an outright rejection of the condition that rights must 
be claimable. I argue that both accounts are intolerably incomplete in that neither 
provides support for a conception of rights according to which claimability is not a 
condition on the justified affirmation of rights.  
In §3.3 I consider what sort of justification might be offered in support of both a 
conception of rights according to which claimability is a condition on their justified 
affirmation, and a conception of rights according to which it is not. My aim is more 
modest than to resolve this dispute altogether. Rather, I focus only on the human right 
to subsistence. I argue that if the human right to subsistence is not claimable, then it fails 
to make a distinctive contribution to reasoning about the normative implications of 
global poverty. I conclude that there is a fundamental and irresolvable tension between 
the conventional interpretation of the human right to subsistence and the claimability 
condition, and that there is reason to prefer the claimability condition.  
In Chapter 4, I turn to the question of whether there is an alternative conception 
of the human right to subsistence according to which it is claimable. I discuss and 
ultimately reject three proposals before going on in the next chapter to defend a fourth. 
According to the first (§4.1) human rights are held primarily against the coercive social 
institutions imposed upon us. On this account, the claimability condition poses no 
problem since it is given that the human right to subsistence, like all other human rights, 
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is claimable in the first instance against the coercive social institutions imposed upon 
oneself. According to the second proposal (§4.2), the positive duties correlative to the 
human right to subsistence are borne, not by individuals, but by the collective of all those 
in a position to make some contribution to the alleviation of global poverty. Although 
the duties of individuals on this account are imperfect and thus not claimable, the duties 
of the collective are perfect, and thus fulfil the claimability condition. Finally, according 
to the third proposal (§4.3), the duties correlative to the human right to subsistence are 
not primarily imperfect duties of assistance and protection, but rather perfect duties of 
consideration. On this account, although the duties of assistance and protection are not 
claimable, this does not affect the human right to subsistence.  
Despite the failure of each of these proposals, I argue in Chapter 5 that we 
should not abandon the human right to subsistence. I argue that to do so would be to 
overlook the negative perfect duties correlative to it. In particular, I argue that an 
interpretation of the human right to subsistence built on the duty not to deprive others 
of access to the means for subsistence can overcome the claimability objection and make 
an important contribution to reasoning about the normative implications of global 
poverty.   
Finally, in Chapter 6, I discuss some of the implications of the duty not to 
deprive, as well as some of the applications that a human right to subsistence based on it 
has.  
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—2— 
THE HUMAN RIGHT TO SUBSISTENCE:  
FOR AND AGAINST 
 
 
 
 
Evaluating the affirmation of a human right to subsistence is complicated by the fact that 
there are multiple interpretations of this right. Whether the affirmation of a human right 
to subsistence is justified will depend on what is meant by it. I begin with what is the 
most conventional interpretation of the human right to subsistence, at least among 
philosophers. In the second section of this chapter, I discuss four prominent objections 
to the human right to subsistence on this interpretation. 
 
2.1.  The Conventional Interpretation of the Human Right to Subsistence 
In this section, I outline the central features of the human right to subsistence as it is 
conventionally interpreted. My focus will be on the nature, substance, and normative 
content of the human right to subsistence on this interpretation, but I will also say a bit 
about the sort of justification offered in support of it. On the conventional 
interpretation, the human right to subsistence is (1) a fundamental right (2) to a basic 
living standard characterized by having access to the material means for subsistence that 
entails (3) duties not to deprive people of access to the material means for subsistence, 
(4) duties to protect others against deprivations of access to the material means for 
subsistence, and (5) duties to assist those who cannot acquire the material means for 
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subsistence for themselves.30 The human right to subsistence on this interpretation is 
conventionally justified by appeal to the paramount value for all humans of having access 
to the means for subsistence. Let us look at each feature in turn. 
 
2.1.1.  Human Rights are Fundamental Rights 
Human rights are conventionally taken to be fundamental rights. Fundamental rights are 
held in virtue of some necessary feature of the right-holder. They are rights that beings 
who possess the relevant features necessarily have. Fundamental rights can be contrasted 
with special rights.  Special rights derive from special relationships or arrangements that 
the right-holder has with other moral agents. Special rights, unlike fundamental rights, 
are therefore contingent on the existence of particular relationships between moral 
agents.   
That human rights are fundamental rights is widely accepted, but reasons in 
support of this view are seldom offered.  I do not, however, think that this is a problem. 
This is because, as Griffin has argued, theorizing about human rights is best approached 
from the bottom up rather than from the top down.31 A ‘top-down’ approach takes as its 
starting point a general account of value, then a full-blown moral theory, and finally an 
account of human rights as they pertain to and describe aspects of that theory. This sort 
of approach begins with high-level moral principles and derives an account from them. A 
‘bottom-up’ approach, by contrast, starts with human rights as they appear in practice, as 
used by ‘politicians, lawyers, social campaigners, as well as theorists of various sorts’.32 
Bottom-up approaches then go on to establish which higher-level moral principles must 
be invoked in order to explain the normative force of human rights.  
Although Griffin does not repudiate top-down approaches, he provides two 
reasons for preferring a bottom-up approach in theorizing about human rights. One is 
that in taking a bottom-up approach, we may not need to rise all the way up to highly 
abstract moral principles. We can potentially reach agreement about the content and 
normative force of human rights despite disagreement about high-level moral principles. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 This account is largely based on Shue’s account of the human right to subsistence as he 
presents it in Basic Rights. Shue’s account has been influential among theorists of human rights. 
Even those who reject his ‘indirect’ justification of the human right to subsistence (which I will 
discuss in more detail in section 3.2), many have adopted some version of his typology of duties 
correlative to the human right to subsistence.  
31 On Human Rights, pp. 29-30. 
32 Ibid., p. 29. 
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This is advantageous because people tend to be highly divided over abstract moral 
theories and the fundamental values that underlie them. Griffin thinks that a bottom-up 
approach allows us to circumvent many of these disagreements and yet still make use of 
human rights in our day-to-day moral discourse. As we shall see over the course of the 
following chapters, however, it seems that we cannot get very far with a bottom-up 
approach before running into higher-level moral disagreement. For this reason, I think 
that Griffin’s second reason in favour of a bottom-up approach is more persuasive. He 
argues that we should prefer the bottom-up approach because a theory of human rights 
must be able to provide some explanation of how the notion of human rights is used in 
social life. We are prompted to ask questions about human rights, their content and their 
normative force, on account of their ubiquitous invocation in a variety of social realms 
including both domestic and international politics, international law, and in ordinary 
morality. Griffin argues that top-down approaches risk changing the subject.33 By starting 
with a high-level moral theory and attaching the term ‘human rights’ to some entities 
within it is, on Griffin’s account, stipulative. If we do not take into account how the term 
is used in practice, we would have no reason for thinking that the term should attach to 
any entity in particular within our moral theory.34  
On a bottom-up approach, the basis of the affirmation that human rights are 
fundamental rights is that this is how they appear in practice. This can be disputed, but 
common usage of the term ‘human right’ would seem to favour interpreting it as a 
fundamental right.  
 
The fundamentality of human rights entails that they are moral rights. To say that a right 
is a moral right is to say that it exists morally. This means that its normative force comes !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 Ibid., p. 3. 
34 What Griffin refers to as a bottom-up approach should be distinguished from another sort of 
‘bottom-up’ approach recently taken by a number of theorists following Rawls’s lead. The most 
extensive argument for this approach comes from Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights, who argues that 
in seeking to answer questions about the content and normative force of human rights, we need 
not start with a theory about the nature and justification of human rights. He argues instead that 
we can seek to understand human rights by thinking of them as practical principles governing 
conduct within a specific arena. In particular, he argues we should understand the question of 
what human rights are as a request for an account of the meaning of the term within the ‘public 
normative discourse of global politics’, p. 103. Theorizing about human rights in this way leads 
Beitz to reject the conception of human rights as rights that all humans have in virtue of their 
humanity as a starting point for answering questions about the content and normative force of 
human rights. I will discuss this approach in more detail in Chapter 4. 
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from morality and not, for example, from positive law. To violate a moral right is to 
violate a moral requirement, regardless of whether there are corresponding legal 
principles. There is a question of whether legal rights have moral force in addition to 
legal force: I set this question aside here since we are primarily concerned with rights that 
are not necessarily enshrined in law. A separate question concerns whether it makes 
sense to speak of such rights. I take this up in the next sub-section.  
 Fundamental rights are necessarily moral rights since they exist in virtue of some 
necessary feature of the right-holder, and not in virtue of contingent facts about 
particular legal arrangements. As such, insofar as human rights are fundamental rights, 
they must also be moral rights. Not all moral rights are fundamental rights. Special rights 
can also be moral rights. For example, the right of a child to care from her parents is a 
special right, but one that exists whether or not it is enacted in law. This right is 
contingent on the special relationship that holds between parents and children, and so it 
is not fundamental; but as its existence is not contingent on particular legal arrangements, 
it is a moral right.  
Just because a right is not enacted in any particular legal system does not mean 
that it cannot be justified as a moral right. Likewise, even though a particular right is 
enacted in some legal system, it does not follow that it also exists independently as a 
moral right. Therefore, from the inclusion of versions of the human right to subsistence 
in the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and several subsequent 
international covenants and treaties, we cannot infer that there is such a right.   
 
The fundamentality of human rights also entails that they are universal, at least in one 
sense. The universality of a right can refer to the scope of its holders or of its 
corresponding duty-bearers. To make clear this distinction, we can speak of a right being 
universal in scope, meaning that it is held by all right-holders (or all right-holders of a 
certain kind), or we can speak of a right being universal in obligation, meaning that it is 
held against all moral agents. A right that is universal in scope need not be universal in 
obligation, and vice versa. It could be that a right is held by all right-holders, but only 
against certain duty-bearers. It could also be that a right is held by only some right-
holders, but against all duty-bearers.  
The fundamentality of human rights entails that they are universal in scope 
because since they are rights held in virtue of some necessary features of humans, all 
humans, regardless of their nationality, race, ethnicity, culture, sex, or other accidental 
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features, must hold them.35 An important question concerns whether human rights are 
temporally universal in the sense of being held by all humans regardless of when they 
exist. I will leave this question aside for the time being, however. For our present 
purposes, we need not adopt more than the moderate view that human rights are held 
universally by at least all humans existing within the current historical context.36  
 A further question concerning the universality of human rights is whether their 
universality in scope implies universality of obligation. There is disagreement on this 
matter amongst proponents of the conventional interpretation of the human right to 
subsistence.37 I will return to this matter in section 2.2. 
 
It is worth noting briefly that there is disagreement among theorists as to the relationship 
between fundamental (and therefore moral and universal) rights on the one hand and 
human rights on the other. Some theorists take the set of fundamental rights and the set 
of human rights to be identical.38 Others take human rights and fundamental rights to be 
distinct, but potentially overlapping sets.39 And others take human rights to be a sub-set 
of fundamental rights.40 On this last account, being a fundamental right is a necessary, 
but not sufficient condition for being a human right. Further conditions must be fulfilled 
in order for fundamental rights to count as human rights. I reject the second account of 
the relationship between fundamental rights and human rights for reasons I will discuss !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 An important philosophical question concerns the sense of ‘human’ relevant to delineating the 
scope of human rights. I briefly discuss this point in section 2.1.4. 
36 This is far from satisfactory, and I think it is important for theories of human rights to include 
an account of the sense in which human rights can be understood to be universal. Nevertheless, 
this issue is beyond our present concern. For illuminating discussions of the possibility of the 
temporal universality of human rights, see Griffin , On Human Rights, pp. 48-51; and John 
Tasioulas, ‘Human Rights, Universality and the Values of Personhood: Retracing Griffin’s Steps’, 
European Journal of Philosophy 10 (2002), 79-100 (pp. 86-88); and Tasioulas, ‘Taking the Rights out 
of Human Rights’, Ethics 120 (2010), 647-678 (pp. 667-672). 
37 Griffin, for example, claims that human rights are ‘doubly universal’ in that they are held by all 
human agents against all other human agents, On Human Rights, pp. 101-104. Tasioulas, by 
contrast, denies the need for symmetry in the scope and obligations of human rights, ‘The Moral 
Reality of Human Rights’, p. 77.   
38 See, for example, Tasioulas, ‘The Moral Reality of Human Rights’. 
39 This seems to be the view espoused by Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights. Beitz is concerned 
exclusively with human rights, but there is nothing in his account that precludes at least some 
human rights also being fundamental rights, and indeed some of the rights that he includes 
among human rights are widely included among fundamental rights. The important point is that 
on Beitz’s account, whether a right is a human right does not depend on it being a fundamental 
right.  
40 See, for example, John Skorupski, ‘Human Rights’ in The Philosophy of International Law, ed. by 
Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 357-373. 
 26!
in Chapter 4. In what follows I remain indifferent between the first and last accounts. In 
so doing I leave open the possibility that the fundamental right to subsistence, insofar as 
it can be defended, lacks the relevant features to be considered a human right.  This is 
not a great concern, however, since the most persistent objections to the inclusion of a 
right to subsistence – namely the four I discuss in the next part of this chapter – concern 
its status as a fundamental right. A successful defence of the fundamental right to 
subsistence will go at least most of the way towards the complete defence of a human 
right to subsistence.   
 
2.1.2.  A note about moral rights 
As a prelude to our discussion of the justification of human rights, I want to 
acknowledge and address a potential concern about moral rights in general. I have noted 
that there is widespread consensus on the view that human rights, whatever else they 
might be, are moral rights in that their justification is independent of their 
institutionalization. To affirm a human right is not to say that it is part of any positive 
law, but rather that the duties it entails are justified and required by morality. If existing 
positive law in some way contravenes human rights, then there exists a strong and (in the 
vast majority of cases) overriding moral reason to reform the law.  
Some skeptics about human rights question whether a right can be justified 
independent of its institutionalization.41 The suggestion here is that a right cannot pre-
exist its implementation. A right comes to be justified only when it is implemented in 
some institutional structure. Prior to the institutional implementation of a right, there is 
only the goal of having a right and not a real right. While there is perhaps some 
plausibility to the legal positivist view that a right’s institutionalization can serve as its 
justification even if the right has no moral grounds, the view that it is only through 
institutionalization that rights can come to be justified is seriously at odds with the 
ordinary understanding of rights. Take, for example, the case of arbitrary imprisonment. 
It would be strange to suggest that a person who is arbitrarily imprisoned in a society that 
has not enacted any law against arbitrary imprisonment has had no right violated. To say 
that there is a moral right against arbitrary imprisonment is not simply to say that it 
would be a good idea for each society to implement such a right. It is to say that even !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 For a notable challenge to this effect, see Jeremy Bentham’s Anarchical Fallacies, in Nonsense upon 
Stilts: Bentham, Burke, and Marx on the Rights of Man, ed. by Jeremy Waldron (New York: Methuen, 
1987), pp. 46-76. 
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when such a right has not been implemented, it can nevertheless be violated; that even 
where there is no positive law against arbitrary imprisonment, the arbitrary imprisonment 
of any person is nevertheless an injustice.  
 A second skeptical concern is that even if some sense can be made of 
institutionally-independent moral rights, it is not clear what value such rights have if they 
are not institutionalized given that the institutional implementation of rights precedes 
their enforcement. But although moral rights are intended in some sense to protect some 
value for the right-holder, they need not do this in a direct way. Moral rights are tools of 
moral, political, and legal discourse. They provide reasons for acting in certain ways and 
abstaining from acting in other ways. They provide (at least partial) justification for their 
own implementation and coercive enforcement. Peter Jones has forcefully articulated 
what it is to have a moral right: 
Rights are things which it is appropriate to ‘assert’ or ‘demand’. (…) Our rights are 
what, morally, we must be accorded. When we assert that we have a right to 
something, we do not merely request it, nor do we simply suggest that it would be 
a ‘good thing’; nor, again, are we merely putting ourselves forward as deserving 
cases. We are saying that we are entitled to it, that it is rightfully ours and that, 
morally, others are obligated to act in ways which respect that entitlement. (…) 
Correspondingly, when we are denied our rights, we typically respond with 
indignation or outrage, rather than with mere disappointment; we conceive 
ourselves as being the victims of an injustice rather than as mere unfortunates who 
have been denied the milk of human kindness.42 
The idea is that moral rights entitle right-holders and those acting on their behalf to act 
and respond in certain ways towards the addressees of those rights. They license 
demands and a certain set of attitudes towards the addressees when they fail to fulfil their 
duties. And, as I argued in the first chapter, they provide prima facie justification for their 
coercive enforcement.   
 
2.1.3.  Justifying Human Rights  
This account of the force of moral rights provides a point of entry for a discussion about 
their justification. Recall that to have a right in the sense we are interested in entails 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 Peter Jones, Rights (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1994), pp. 49-50. For a similar account, see 
also Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy (Engelwood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1973), pp. 58-59.  
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having a legitimate demand on some other agent(s) that they act or refrain from acting in 
certain ways. To justify a right thus involves justifying the requirement to act or not act 
in a particular way on the part of some agent(s). There can, however, be justified moral 
requirements without corresponding rights. There might, for example, be a general moral 
requirement to be kind, and yet no moral right to be treated kindly. So justifying a moral 
requirement is not sufficient for the justification of a right. In order for a right to be 
justified, not only must there be a justified moral requirement on some other agent(s) to 
act or refrain from acting in certain ways, but the justification must stem from some 
person’s legitimate demand that the agent comply with the requirement in question. This 
in turn justifies the set of responses to a failure on the part of the addressee to fulfil her 
duty.  
Justifying moral rights therefore requires an account of why the morally 
permissible actions of an agent are restricted in a particular way, and why another agent 
can demand compliance with that restriction. In the case of special moral rights, the 
justification of the right rests on the special relationship that gave rise to it. In the case of 
fundamental rights, justification will refer to the feature of the right-holder in virtue of 
which they are thought to hold the right(s) in question. Since human rights are thought 
to be held universally by all humans, in seeking justification for particular human rights, 
the first step will be an account of what it is about being human that entails that we have 
human rights.  
There are a number of different accounts of the features of humans that give rise 
to human rights. These notably include theories according to which human rights are 
grounded in personhood,43 needs,44 and interests.45 What is common to all of these 
theories is that they purport to identify features inherent in all humans that justify duties 
on the part of at least some moral agents to act or refrain from acting in certain ways 
towards them. These features represent the values that human rights are taken to protect, 
and so an account of what human rights there are will depend on what the relevant 
values are taken to be. Because different conceptions of human rights differ with respect 
to what the relevant values are, there is some disagreement concerning what human 
rights there are. Nevertheless, as we shall see in the following sub-section, competing !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 See Griffin, On Human Rights. 
44 See, for example, Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, Chapter 7.  
45 See, for example, Tasioulas, ‘Human Rights, Universality and the Values of Personhood’; and 
Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities 
and Reforms (Cambridge: Polity Press in association with Blackwell Publishers, 2002), Chapter 1. 
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accounts of the relevant aspects of humanity that ground human rights converge on the 
human right to subsistence.  
 The above description of the justification of human rights is not meant to 
suggest that there is a direct path from the grounding values of human rights to the 
existence of particular human rights. The existence of particular human rights is widely 
taken to be mediated by what Griffin refers to as ‘practicalities’.46 Practicalities are 
considerations beyond the grounding values of human rights that help to shape the 
substance and normative content of human rights, and in some cases to limit what 
human rights there can be. Griffin refers to practicalities as a ‘ground’ of human rights, 
but there is an important difference between the role of practicalities in the justificatory 
process and the role played by what I refer to as the ‘grounding values’ of human rights. 
The grounding values of human rights provide reason for thinking that some right exists. 
The value of human life, for example, might be thought to ground a human right to life. 
But presumably this does not entail that one is entitled to someone else’s kidney if this is 
what is required to stay alive. Moreover, values that ground uncontroversial human rights 
such as the right against arbitrary arrest can plausibly be seen as comparable in strength 
to other values that are not widely thought to ground human rights, such as the value of 
being loved. The reasons that the right to life is generally not thought to entitle us to the 
use of other people’s organs, and that there is no right to be loved have to do with 
practicalities. 
Practicalities are practical considerations that help to determine and constrain the 
shape that particular human rights take. They include considerations such as whether 
what would be required to promote a particular value can be provided by human agency, 
whether it is the sort of thing that can be demanded of other human agents, whether it 
would conflict with other human rights, and whether it is feasible given the availability of 
relevant resources.47 Practicalities help to determine the specific substance and normative 
implications of human rights, and also to explain why certain values, despite their 
importance do not entail human rights. I mention this in part because some of the 
objections discussed in section 2.2 can be interpreted as flagging a problem with respect 
to practicalities. I will return to this point later.  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 On Human Rights, pp. 37-39. 
47 These are the four practicalities that Miller identifies and discusses in National Responsibility and 
Global Justice, pp. 185-194. 
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2.1.4.  The Conventional Interpretation of the Human Right to Subsistence 
There is widespread agreement among theorists of human rights that having access to 
the means for subsistence is of sufficient importance for all humans as to be protected 
by a human right. On some accounts this is because lacking access to the means for 
subsistence impedes the exercise of our normative agency while on others it is because 
lacking access to the means for subsistence leads to pain and misery and vulnerability; 
but all agree that having access to the means for subsistence is of paramount importance 
to all humans. But to identify a value that is of sufficient importance to warrant 
protection by a right does not on its own entail all of the characteristics of the relevant 
right. To identify life, or security, or subsistence, and so on as values of sufficient 
importance as to warrant protection by rights does not tell us much about what the rights 
to life, security, subsistence, and so on entail. A complete account of a given right will 
include specifications of (a) the substance of the right and (b) the normative content of 
the right. The substance of a right is what the right is a right to. The normative content 
of the right includes the duties correlative to the right and what the right entitles the 
right-holder to do. In the following two sub-sections, I will outline what the 
conventional interpretation has to say about each.  
   
(a) Substance 
Subsistence is generally taken to refer to a threshold living standard. An initial problem 
comes in determining the metric by which living standards should be assessed.48 Then, 
there is the challenge of figuring out where the threshold lies. I argue that a relatively 
high level of indeterminacy concerning the substance of the human right to subsistence 
is tolerable for our current purpose. 
Accounts of the substance of the right to subsistence tend to be both minimal 
and lacking specificity. Shue, for example, takes the means for subsistence to include 
‘unpolluted air, unpolluted water, adequate food, adequate clothing, adequate shelter, and 
minimal preventive health care’, where what counts as adequate is determined by ‘what is 
needed for a decent chance at a reasonably healthy and active life of more or less normal 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 An insightful discussion of the metric problem for measuring living standards is found in 
Amartya Sen’s The Standard of Living (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). Sen 
proposes that the relevant metric for judging living standards takes into account ‘the various 
living conditions we can and cannot achieve (...), and our ability to achieve them’, p. 16. Sen 
refers to these as ‘functionings’ and ‘capabilities’ respectively.  
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length, barring tragic interventions’.49 But what does it mean to have a ‘decent chance at 
a healthy and active life’? And how long is a life of ‘more or less normal length’? These 
refer to the threshold living standard mentioned above, but do not provide any 
information useful in specifying it except to suggest that health, activity, and lifespan are 
relevant.  
Although many defenders of the human right to subsistence do not provide a 
complete account of the substance of this right, the fact is that so many people in the 
world are so badly off that, although it may not be clear where the threshold lies, we can 
say with certainty that many millions of people fall well below it. Whatever the upper 
limit turns out to be, surely someone who is highly prone to illness because she is 
persistently dehydrated, malnourished, and exposed to the elements falls below it. And 
there are so many people in this situation that we can sensibly question whether their 
situation constitutes a human rights violation without establishing whether people who 
are better off than they are, but still quite badly off are also victims of a human rights 
violation.  
For our present purposes, it is sufficient to say that subsistence on the 
conventional interpretation refers to a minimum living standard that includes at least 
access to food sufficient to avoid malnutrition, clean drinking water sufficient to avoid 
dehydration, clothing and shelter sufficient to avoid exposure to the elements, and basic 
health care including minimal preventative treatments such as vaccinations against 
malaria and tuberculosis, as well as basic emergency medical care including the setting of 
broken bones and treatment of infections.50  
 
(b) Normative content 
Most accounts of the human right to subsistence jump from the right-grounding value of 
subsistence to the existence of a claim to assistance in acquiring the means for 
subsistence when one is otherwise unable to do so. Although it is uncontroversial that 
the human right to subsistence, like all human rights, imposes negative duties on others, 
it is also widely thought that an important feature of the human right to subsistence is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 Basic Rights, p. 23. 
50 Shue’s account outlined above includes only preventive health care, but as Nickel points out, 
this is too minimal, ‘Poverty and Rights’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 55(2005), 385-402 (pp. 386-
388). 
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that it additionally entails positive duties at least to provide for those who cannot, 
through no fault of their own, provide for themselves.  
 It is also thought by a number of defenders of the human right to subsistence 
that this right entails duties to protect others against deprivation. Shue’s tripartite 
typology of duties corresponding to the human right to subsistence has found favour 
with a number of defenders of this right. He argues that the right to subsistence entails 
(1) duties not to deprive, (2) duties to protect against deprivation, and (3) duties to assist 
those who have been deprived or are, for other reasons, unable to access the means for 
subsistence. These duties will be explored in detail in the following chapters. 
 
This brings us back to our original statement of the central features of the conventional 
interpretation of the human right to subsistence, namely that it is (1) a fundamental (and 
therefore institution-independent and universally-held) right (2) to a basic living standard 
characterized by having access to the means for subsistence that entails (3) duties not to 
deprive people of access to the means for subsistence, (4) duties to protect others against 
deprivations of access to the means for subsistence, and (5) duties to assist those who 
cannot acquire the means for subsistence for themselves. The human right to subsistence 
is justified, on the conventional interpretation, on the basis of the tremendous 
importance of having access to the means for subsistence for all humans. While the value 
for all humans of having access to the means for subsistence can hardly be denied, some 
have argued that it is nevertheless not sufficient for the justified affirmation of the 
human right to subsistence. In the following section, I discuss four arguments that have 
been advanced in opposition to the inclusion of a right to subsistence against human 
rights.  
 
 
2.2.   Against the Human Right to Subsistence: Four Objections 
I have provided a general outline of what I have called the conventional interpretation of 
the human right to subsistence. An endorsement of this right entails that global poverty 
constitutes a serious and widespread injustice. Casting the problem of global poverty in 
terms of human rights has several virtues. It serves to emphasize the gravity, urgency, 
and enormity of the situation. Also, human rights are part of the vocabulary of 
international political morality. Expressing the problem of global poverty terms of 
human rights therefore has potential to incite global political action. 
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 Proponents of the conventional interpretations of the human right to subsistence 
are right to signal that the values protected by human rights are extremely important and 
should therefore be considered matters of international concern. But it cannot simply be 
because a value is extremely important that it implies the existence of a human right. 
While we can infer from the justified affirmation of a human right that the substance of 
that right is of great importance to all persons, we cannot infer from something being of 
great importance to all persons that there is a corresponding human right with that as its 
substance. This is because human rights are rights, and must therefore conform to 
certain constraints imposed by the nature of rights. Although it is hard to deny that the 
value for all humans of having access to the means for subsistence is of the order of 
values that uncontroversially ground human rights such as physical security and liberty, 
opponents of the human right to subsistence argue that there are constraints on what can 
count as a human right that preclude the inclusion of a right to subsistence among 
human rights, at least on the conventional interpretation of this right.   
In what follows, I will discuss four objections that have been raised against the 
inclusion of a right to subsistence among human rights. The first three can be seen as 
based on ‘practicalities’ as discussed in the previous section, while the fourth is based on 
a structural constraint imposed by the nature of rights. The first objection I will discuss 
below deals with the practical concern that such a right could not feasibly be fulfilled for 
everyone, and therefore cannot be a universal human right. I call this the ‘feasibility 
objection’. The second holds that even though it is feasible to fulfil the human right to 
subsistence for everyone, doing so would place excessive demands on many people. I call 
this the ‘demandingness objection’. I argue that neither of these objections succeeds in 
providing sufficient reason to reject the inclusion of a right to subsistence among human 
rights. The third and fourth objections that I discuss share the premise that human rights 
can only have negative duties as their correlates, and so the conventional interpretation 
of the human right to subsistence must be rejected. On the libertarian version of this 
argument, only negative duties can correlate with human rights because fundamental 
positive duties of justice would constitute a violation of the fundamental (and overriding) 
right to liberty. I call this the ‘liberty objection’. On the Kantian version, the reason that 
only negative duties can correlate with human rights is that positive duties are imperfect, 
and thus not claimable. Since claimability is taken, on this account, to be an existence 
condition on rights, the human right to subsistence understood as correlating with 
positive duties of protection and provision must be rejected. Following Tasioulas, I refer 
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this the ‘claimability objection’. I argue that the claimability objection poses the most 
serious challenge to the human right to subsistence.  
 
2.2.1.  The Feasibility Objection 
Human rights necessarily correlate with duties. It is widely held that in order for a duty to 
exist, its fulfillment must be feasible. This is expressed by the familiar dictum that ‘ought’ 
implies ‘can’. If the duties correlative to a right cannot be fulfilled, then there in fact are 
no such duties, and therefore no right. One objection to the human right to subsistence 
takes this as its starting point and argues that the fulfillment of the duties required in 
order for everyone to be guaranteed access to the means for subsistence is infeasible. An 
example of this kind of argument has been advanced by Maurice Cranston. In support of 
his objection to the inclusion of a right to subsistence and other socio-economic rights 
among human rights, he points out that  
For a government to provide social security it (...) has to have access to great 
capital wealth, and many governments in the world today are still poor. The 
government of India, for example, simply cannot command the resources that 
would guarantee each one of the 480 million inhabitants of India ‘a standard of 
living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family’.51 
What Cranston says has some truth. Some governments – though perhaps not many – 
are unable to guarantee access to the means for subsistence to their subjects due to a lack 
of resources. On Cranston’s account, this makes the fulfillment of a human right to 
subsistence impracticable, and therefore bunk. In order to evaluate this claim, the 
concept of impracticability, or infeasibility, requires some elucidation. I will argue that, 
contrary to Cranston’s claim, the realization of the human right to subsistence is feasible 
in the sense relevant to its justification.  
 The concept of feasibility, though little analysed, is far from straightforward. 
Pablo Gilabert has recently provided an illuminating discussion of feasibility in which he 
points out that feasibility can vary according to type, domain, and degree.52 With respect 
to type, feasibility can refer to a number of different kinds of constraints. What Gilabert 
refers to as ‘hard’ constraints on feasibility include logical, physical, and biological !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 Cranston, ‘Human Rights, Real and Supposed’, pp. 170; quoted in Gilabert, ‘The Feasibility of 
Basic Socioeconomic Human Rights: A Conceptual Exploration’, The Philosophical Quarterly 
59(2009): 659-681 (p. 660). 
52 ‘The Feasibility of Basic Socioeconomic Human Rights: A Conceptual Exploration’. 
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possibility. These pose the most straightforward constraints on acceptable normative 
principles. But when feasibility is invoked in normative contexts, it frequently refers to 
relatively ‘soft’ constraints including economic, political, and cultural constraints. These 
constraints are soft on Gilabert’s account because, unlike the hard constraints, they are 
malleable, at least to some degree.  
 The fulfillment of the human right to subsistence does not seem to be impeded 
logically, physically, biologically, or by any other ‘hard’ constraint. The suggestion in 
Cranston’s argument is that there are economic constraints on the fulfillment of the 
human right to subsistence. There are, however, at least two reasons to doubt this point. 
First, in many cases it is not a lack or resources that prevents governments from 
guaranteeing access to the means for subsistence to their citizens; rather the realization 
of subsistence rights is impeded by social and political factors such as government 
corruption and incompetence, a lack of functioning infrastructure, and entrenched 
cultural practices. These nevertheless function as constraints, however soft, on the 
feasibility of the realization of the human right to subsistence and will need to be 
addressed.  
A second reason to doubt Cranston’s point is that, while it is true that some 
governments do not command sufficient resources to guarantee access to the means for 
subsistence to all of their citizens, there is little reason to think that the duties correlative 
to the human right to subsistence are held exclusively by governments towards their 
citizens. In fact, as Gilabert rightly flags, this idea runs contrary to international human 
rights doctrine and practice which take human rights in general, including the human 
right to subsistence, as matters of international concern and responsibility, whose full 
realization will in many cases require the cooperation of multiple individual and 
institutional agents.53  
 The economic feasibility of the eradication of global poverty is supported by the 
fact that the resources needed to eliminate global poverty are far surpassed by the wealth 
commanded by the global rich.54 But just because there are sufficient resources to enable 
the eradication of global poverty does not entail that doing so is feasible. It might be that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 Gilabert, ‘The Feasibility of Basic Socioeconomic Human Rights: A Conceptual Exploration’, 
p. 665. 
54 Pogge offers the following statistical support for this point: The aggregate shortfall from the 
World Bank’s $2 PPP a day poverty line of all those below it ‘amounts to some $300 billion 
annually or just 1.2 percent of the aggregate annual gross national incomes of the high-income 
economies’, World Poverty and Human Rights, p.7. 
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there is a lack of infrastructure to carry out the relevant transfers of resources. This 
would make the eradication of global poverty inaccessible. Accessibility is one of the 
domains that Gilabert discusses across which feasibility can vary. The eradication of 
global poverty might be inaccessible at this time due to a lack of political infrastructure, a 
lack of motivation on the part of the global rich to part with some of their wealth, or 
both. I will return to this point after a brief word about the other domain across which 
feasibility can vary, namely stability.  
If the realization of a right is unsustainable, then it is unstable and thus infeasible. 
An example of an objection to the human right to subsistence along these lines is the 
sort of neo-Malthusian argument advanced by Garrett Hardin according to which the 
redistribution of resources with the aim of eradicating global poverty would actually have 
the effect of making future generations much worse off.55 There are good empirical 
reasons not to take this sort of  argument seriously.56 This leaves accessibility as the main 
constraint on the feasibility of the fulfillment of the human right to subsistence for all.  
This brings us to the final dimension of feasibility that Gilabert discusses, namely 
degree. In any given set of circumstances and at any given time, the fulfillment of a 
principle in those circumstances and at that time is either possible or not. But because of 
the malleability of the ‘soft’ feasibility constraints discussed above, the fulfillment of 
some principle, p, that is not possible in one set of circumstances, c-1, at one time, t-1, 
can become possible in another set of circumstances, c-2, and at another time, t-2. If 
there is reason to think that p could not be realized in any circumstances – for example, if 
the realization of p is logically impossible – then we could say that p is completely infeasible. 
And if there is reason to think that the fulfillment of p is always possible in any 
circumstances, then we could say that p is completely feasible. In between complete 
infeasibility and complete feasibility, there are various degrees of partial 
feasibility/infeasibility. For example, if the realization of p is impossible in c-1 at t-1, but 
would be possible in c-2 at t-2, and if c-2 can feasibly be brought about, then we could 
say that p is partially feasible to the degree to which the bringing about of c-2 is feasible. 
By the same reasoning we can order different principles by degree of feasibility. If the 
realization of another principle, q, is also impossible in c-1 at t-1, but would be possible !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55 Hardin, ‘Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor’, Psychology Today, September 
(1974), 38-40, 123-124, 126. 
56 See, for example, Kai Nielsen, ‘Is Global Justice Impossible’, in his Globalization and Justice 
(Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2003), pp. 243-280 (pp.247-248). 
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in c-3 at t-2, if c-3 could be brought about more easily than c-2, then we could say that q 
is more feasible than p.  
An important question concerns the degree to which the fulfillment of a right has 
to be feasible in order for the affirmation of that right to be justified. Of course if its 
fulfillment is completely infeasible, there can be no such right; but Gilabert rightly holds 
that complete feasibility, on the other hand, is too strong. Part of the purpose of talk of 
human rights is ‘to orientate political action aimed at the expansion of currently feasible 
sets’;57 so the partial infeasibility of a human right at this time cannot as such be a 
constraint on its justification. Gilabert’s suggestion is that the fulfillment of a right is 
sufficiently feasible for that right to be justified at least when its realization in an ample 
majority of cases can be made possible in the foreseeable future. Of course, this account 
requires sharpening: How far away is the foreseeable future? What constitutes an ‘ample 
majority’? How likely does the realization of the relevant circumstances have to be?  
The question of how feasible the realization of a right must be in order for the 
affirmation of that right to be justified, and the question of how feasible the realization 
of the human right to subsistence is are important questions that require more attention 
than I can afford them here.58 There is, however, good prima facie reason to reject 
objections to the human right to subsistence on the basis that it cannot be fully realized 
right now. I have argued that the constraints on the feasibility of the realization of the 
human right to subsistence are all soft constraints. They include the sorts of social and 
political constraints mentioned above as well as constraints based on the motivation (or 
lack thereof) to make the necessary changes. These sorts of constraints are all malleable, 
and in some cases highly so. To commit ourselves to the view that these constraints 
make the realization of the human right to subsistence sufficiently infeasible as to 
warrant its rejection is not only to overlook the progress – slow though it might be – that 
has been made towards the alleviation of global poverty so far, but also the considerable 
moral progress that has been achieved historically and that relied on overcoming similar 
kinds of constraints.59  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57 ‘The Feasibility of Basic Socio-Economic Human Rights’, p. 675. 
58 Fruitful discussions of these issues have been provided by Nickel, ‘Poverty and Rights’; Sen, 
‘Elements of a Theory of Human Rights’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 32(2004), 315-356; and 
Gilabert, ‘The Feasibility of Basic Socio-Economic Human Rights’.  
59 As Pogge has pointed out, ‘Slavery, autocracy, colonialism, and genocide – practiced openly in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and for millennia before – are now outlawed and widely 
regarded as paradigms for injustice. Apparently, at least, humanity has made substantial moral 
progress in its response to these and other forms of conduct and social organization’, World 
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I have not provided conclusive support for thinking that the realizability of the 
human right to subsistence is feasible. My suggestion, however, is that the feasibility 
objection comes across as convenient, despairing, and in need of a great deal more 
substantiation. Given the malleability of the constraints on the realization of the human 
right to subsistence, it seems reasonable to suppose that the impediments to the 
fulfillment of the human right to subsistence for all can be overcome. I suggest, then, 
that the onus is on proponents of the feasibility objection to provide further support for 
their view.    
 
2.2.2.  The Demandingness Objection 
A second objection to the inclusion of a right to subsistence among human rights is that 
the fulfillment of the right to subsistence for all would place excessive demands on the 
relevant duty-bearers. It is important to distinguish this objection from the feasibility 
objection discussed in the previous section. The demandingness objection accepts the 
feasibility of the fulfillment of the right to subsistence for all, but objects that this would 
be excessively burdensome on those required to make sacrifices.  
Feasibility is one thing, and desirability another.60 This distinction is helpful in 
better understanding the demandingness objection. The fulfillment of a principle might 
be desirable but not feasible. Proponents of the feasibility objection generally accept that 
the fulfillment of the human right to subsistence for all is desirable, but not feasible. The 
fulfillment of a principle can also be feasible without being desirable. It might, for 
example, be entirely feasible for the government of a country to enforce a strict national 
dress-code, but an enforced strict national dress-code is not desirable. Proponents of the 
demandingness objection seem to be making the latter kind of claim with respect to the 
human right to subsistence. The claim is that although the fulfillment for all of the 
human right to subsistence is feasible, and although the eradication of poverty worldwide 
is in itself desirable, the overall result of eradicating poverty and thereby fulfilling the 
human right to subsistence for all would be on balance undesirable. This is because the 
demands that the fulfillment of this right would place on the relevant duty-bearers would 
be so great that their fulfillment would be sufficiently undesirable – not just for them, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2008), p. 2.  
60 Gilabert draws this distinction in ‘The Feasibility of Basic Socio-Economic Human Rights’. See 
also G. A. Cohen, Why Not Socialism? (Princeton, NJ” Princeton University Press, 2009). 
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but in some more general sense – as to outweigh the desirability of the eradication of 
global poverty.  
An example of this kind of objection comes from Richard Rorty who suggests 
that the redistribution required to eradicate global poverty would render the global rich 
unable to recognize themselves and lead them to no longer think their own lives worth 
living.61 Rorty’s argument presupposes that the eradication of global poverty would lead 
to the demise of our own culture, and that this would provide sufficient reason to reject 
any requirement to do so.  
This kind of objection fails for at least two reasons. First, as Pogge rightly points 
out, there is little reason to think that the eradication of global poverty would in fact 
devastate our culture.62 Just 1.2 per cent of the aggregate annual gross national incomes 
of the world’s high-income economies would be required in order to elevate the global 
poor above the World Bank’s poverty line.63 To think that this would endanger the 
capacity of the global rich to recognize themselves is to overlook the enormous wealth 
wielded by the world’s high-income economies.  
Secondly, even if the eradication of global poverty were very costly to the global 
rich, it is doubtful upon close examination that this would, on its own, provide sufficient 
reason to reject the human right to subsistence. Liam Murphy has raised a number of 
serious problems with the demandingness objection of which the following is an 
example.64 In order to make sense of the demandingness objection, we need to know 
against which baseline demandingness is to be measured. Murphy suggests that the 
demandingness of compliance with a moral principle is determined based on how much 
well-being is given up on the part of the complying agent relative to the factual status 
quo, namely ‘how things are now and how they can be expected to be in the future’ (p. 
35). The demandingness objection to the human right to subsistence would then hold 
that compliance with the correlative duties would, to an unacceptable degree, result in 
complying agents being worse off than they were before and could have reasonably 
expected to otherwise remain.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 Rorty, ‘Who Are We?’. 
62 Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, p. 7-8. 
63 This is not to imply that the best way to eradicate global poverty is through a straightforward 
transfer of resources from rich to poor. Rather, this is just meant to highlight that the necessary 
sacrifice on the part of the global rich in order to eliminate global poverty would be relatively 
small.  
64 Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory, Chapter 3. 
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An initial problem comes in trying to establish what counts as an unacceptably 
high demand. One option is to rely on very strong intuitions. For example, we might 
think that any moral principle that requires someone to give up all her luxuries is too 
demanding. But Murphy points out that if the relevant baseline is the factual status quo, 
then on this account it would be unacceptably demanding to require a thief to return all 
of the stolen goods if this would amount to her having to give up all of her luxuries. The 
implausibility of this might motivate us to look for a baseline other than the factual status 
quo.  
A tempting alternative is to use a baseline determined by entitlements. The thief 
is not entitled to what she stole and it cannot, therefore, be unacceptably demanding to 
require that she return the stolen goods. Using entitlements as a baseline, however, 
requires an account of entitlement. Murphy argues that this poses an insurmountable 
challenge. Entitlements can be worked out either within or outwith a given moral theory, 
and neither provides a workable account. If we establish entitlements from within a 
moral theory, we end up defining away the very notion of demandingness. This is 
because we cannot be entitled to that which we are required to give away. If a moral 
theory includes a principle requiring people to give up all their luxuries, they are not, on 
this theory, entitled to their luxuries. But if the baseline relative to which demandingness 
is to be measured is that to which agents are entitled, then no principle will ever impose 
any demands at all.    
On the other hand, if we determine entitlements based on principles external to 
the moral theory in question, then we simply beg the question against that moral theory. 
The suggestion, for example, that compliance with a principle, P, according to which we 
must give up all of our luxuries is unacceptably demanding is parasitic on some 
competing moral theory. If we have reason to accept this other moral theory, then the 
objection to P is not that it is very demanding (which, at any rate, they are not), but that 
it contradicts what morality actually requires. If we do not have independent reason for 
accepting this other moral theory, then to use its account of entitlement as the relevant 
baseline is simply question-begging.  
This leaves us with the factual status quo as the baseline relative to which the 
demandingness of compliance with a moral principle should be measured. However, this 
precludes anything inherently objectionable about demandingness as such. In order to 
defeat the human right to subsistence, it is therefore not sufficient to show that the 
demands that its realization requires are unacceptably high for the global rich. Even if 
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this were true, we would need further reason to think that the relevant duties do not in 
fact apply. In the following two sections, I will discuss two such arguments. Although 
both are compatible with there being potentially demanding requirements of beneficence 
on the global rich, they both deny that these requirements can be considered duties of 
justice.  
 
2.2.3.  The Liberty Objection 
The Liberty Objection relies on the distinction between negative and positive duties. 
Negative duties are those whose fulfillment requires only forbearance on the part of the 
duty-bearer. The fulfillment of positive duties, by contrast, requires that the duty-bearer 
make some sort of provisions to the right-holder. On a libertarian conception of justice, 
fundamental duties of justice can only ever be negative. Since the duty to assist those 
who cannot acquire access to the means for subsistence themselves is a positive duty, it is 
not, therefore, a fundamental duty of justice on the libertarian account.  
The libertarian view accepts the view I argued for in the first chapter according 
to which duties of justice are characterized by the fact that they can justifiably be 
enforced. The claim that duties of justice are necessarily negative is supported on the 
libertarian account by the view that the only thing that can justify coercive intervention in 
the exercise of another’s liberty is the unjustified interference, or imminent threat of 
interference, on their part with the liberty of others. This claim is derived from the idea 
that there is a fundamental right to liberty. The relevant sense of liberty here is negative 
in Berlin’s sense.65 That is to say that the right to liberty is in the first place a right to 
non-interference. As such, the appropriate understanding of the right to liberty is not 
merely as a liberty right in the Hohfeldian sense according to which it is a right simply to 
do what one pleases. The right to liberty is, at root, a claim according to which others are 
correspondingly duty-bound not to interfere with the exercise of one’s liberty.  
As I mentioned in the section 2.1, Miller argues that one ‘practicality’ that 
constrains the normative content of human rights is that their correlative duties cannot 
conflict with the human rights of the duty-bearers. On Miller’s account, this is why the 
right to life cannot have as its correlate the requirement that someone give up their 
organs to save the life of another. The liberty objection can be interpreted along these 
lines as the view that any positive duties thought to correlate with a human right will !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
65 Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1969). 
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necessarily be in conflict with the fundamental and overriding right to liberty of the duty-
bearers and so must be rejected. 
The existence of a universal right to liberty is generally justified based on the 
moral status of persons. On this account, individual liberty is intrinsically valuable and 
should therefore never be violated in the name of promoting other goods, except in very 
exceptional circumstances.66 The inviolability of the individual is supported on traditional 
libertarian accounts by the idea that all persons are self-owners. What it means to own 
something is to have the exclusive right to do with it as you please (within the bounds of 
respect for other people’s rights). Since persons are self-owners, no-one but themselves 
has the right to do with them as they please. The only exception to this being 
interference with the exercise of another’s self-ownership rights in order to prevent him 
from violating the rights of another.   
Nozick, perhaps the most prominent proponent of the fundamental right to 
liberty, draws inspiration from the Kantian dictum that persons must always be treated as 
ends in themselves.67 Insofar as we accept this, he thinks that we are committed to 
thinking of rights as side-constraints on the pursuit of goals, even when those goals are 
in the interests of others, and even when those goals involve the promotion of the 
greater good. What it means to have a right on Nozick’s account is to be inviolable in 
some respect. He argues that persons should be treated as ends in themselves because 
they can form conceptions of what a good life for them would be and act in pursuit of it. 
Because persons can act in pursuit of their own conceptions of the good life, they should 
be left to do so to the greatest extent possible.  
Nozick concludes that the only time anyone is justified in interfering with 
someone’s pursuit of their own conception of the good life is when their doing so 
interferes with someone else’s similar pursuit. In this we glimpse something that has long 
characterized the debate between Nozickean libertarians and defenders of (liberal and 
socialist) egalitarian theories, namely that they are founded on conflicting intuitions (or 
perhaps considered judgements) about when coercive intervention is permissible. In this 
respect, there is some warrant in Allen Buchanan’s criticism of Nozickean libertarianism 
on the grounds that it simply begs the highly debated question of whether there are any 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66 Nozick, for example, seems open to the possibility that individual rights can be violated in 
order to avoid ‘catastrophic moral horror’, although he does not elaborate on this point, Anarchy, 
State, and Utopia, p. 30.  
67 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, pp. 26-35. 
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fundamental rights with positive duties as their correlates.68 On his view, the libertarian 
thesis that duties of justice are necessarily negative is stipulative, or at best supported by 
some questionable intuitions about when it is justifiable to enforce duties. Nevertheless, 
we must not ignore the fact that many egalitarian arguments in support of duties of 
justice to assist those in need are equally culpable of relying on intuitions that may or 
may not be correct or broadly shared. 
Jan Narveson has notably attempted to overcome the apparent impasse that has 
been reached in the debate between libertarians and egalitarians by resting his libertarian 
theory on contractualism rather than mere intuition. He agues that a morality derived 
from agreement about mutual benefit yields the libertarian ‘principle of right’ according 
to which the use of coercive force is only justified in order to prevent unjustified 
infringements of liberty or to exact rectificatory action in case of the violation of this 
principle. The reason Narveson provides for this is that a situation in which this principle 
is not recognized would be worse for all.69  
Narveson’s account has, however, been subject to a number of forceful 
criticisms. For example, Larry Temkin has noted that, far from overcoming the reliance 
on intuitions, Narveson’s account simply shifts it to the level of decision methods for 
arriving at principles by assuming that mutual-benefit contractualism is the right one.70 
Even more damaging is Gilabert’s objection that the proper execution of Narveson’s 
approach is self-defeating. He notes that Narveson wavers with respect to the matter of 
the respective bargaining positions of the parties to the social contract; but Gilabert 
points out that whatever account Narveson chooses will ultimately yield an outcome that 
misses the libertarian mark. If the parties to the contract are ignorant of their positions in 
society (as they are on Rawls’s contractualist theory), then they will rationally opt for at 
least a minimal set of enforceable principles of redistribution – perhaps not Rawls’s 
Difference Principle, but presumably something more than what libertarians are willing 
to endorse. On the other hand, if they are aware of their respective bargaining positions, 
then the very wealthy and powerful will reject such principles. This does indeed seem to 
be Narveson’s view. However, Gilabert rightly points out that it would be equally 
rational for the wealthy and powerful parties to the contract on Narveson’s account to 
also reject enforceable principles that require them to forbear from harming those less !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
68 ‘Justice and Charity’, p. 559-560. 
69 ‘Welfare and Wealth’, pp. 321-322. 
70 ‘Thinking about the Needy: A Reprise’, Journal of Ethics 8 (2004), 409-58. 
 44!
wealthy and powerful: ‘if we grant bargaining agents full appeal to their ex ante power, the 
bargaining game need not yield “social contracts” prohibiting all forms of significant 
harm’.71 This goes further in the direction of deregulation and moral permission than the 
libertarian will ordinarily accept.   
This leaves the liberty objection reliant on the intuition that the use of coercion is 
only ever permissible in order to prevent or exact compensation for the unjustified 
infringement of liberty. I think we have strong reason to doubt both the correctness and 
pervasiveness of this intuition, not least because a principle based on it will clearly 
advantage those who are already very well-off relative to other feasible schemes. 
Nevertheless, the interpretation of the human right to subsistence that I ultimately 
defend is compatible with at least most versions of libertarianism. As such, I will not 
dwell on the topic here.    
 
2.2.4.  The Claimability Objection 
The claimability objection was originally advanced by Onora O’Neill. It is founded on 
the premise that ‘Any right must be matched by some corresponding obligation, which is 
so assigned to others that right-holders can in principle claim or waive the right (or 
where not competent to do so, that others be able to claim it on their behalf)’.72 I refer to 
this as the ‘claimability condition’. According to O’Neill, the human right to subsistence 
fails to fulfil this condition, and so it must be rejected.  
As we saw in the previous section, the human right to subsistence on the 
conventional interpretation constitutes a claim to assistance in gaining access to the 
means for subsistence when one is unable to do so oneself. As Joel Feinberg has pointed 
out, (claim) rights have two components. On the one hand, they involve ‘claims to’; on 
the other hand, they involve ‘claims against’.73 Rights on this account express relations 
between claimants, objects, and addressees. A claim right is therefore not fully justified 
until some account is given of who the relevant duty-bearers are and what it is that is 
required of them.  
The justification outlined in the previous section for the human right to 
subsistence only fills in the ‘claim to’ side. In order for the human right to subsistence to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
71 Gilabert, ‘Basic Positive Duties of justice and Narveson’s Libertarian Challenge’, The Southern 
Journal of Philosophy 40(2006): 193-216. 
72 Towards Justice and Virtue, p.129. 
73 Feinberg, ‘Duties, Rights, and Claims’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 3 (1966), 137-144 (p. 137). 
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be fully justified, we need an account of the ‘claim against’ component. What we are 
looking for here is primarily an account of who the relevant duty-bearers are. And here is 
where O’Neill thinks that a defence of the conventional interpretation of the human 
right to subsistence runs into trouble. Until very recently, relatively little attention has 
been paid in the literature on the human right to subsistence to the question of who 
bears the corresponding duties. O’Neill’s objection is sometimes interpreted as simply 
drawing attention to this deficiency and the need to remedy it. As such, some have 
sought to quell O’Neill’s concern by turning their focus to the provision of an account of 
the ‘claim-against’ side of the human right to subsistence. This is, of course, no 
straightforward task. It is widely acknowledged that, unlike negative duties that can be 
borne by all, the positive duties of assistance associated with the human right to 
subsistence cannot be distributed in such an even-handed way. As discussed in the first 
chapter, a number of factors will affect which agents are required to protect and assist 
which potential beneficiaries and to what extent.  
Simon Caney thus interprets O’Neill’s concern as being that there is ‘no easy or 
obvious answer (…) to the question of who has the duty to protect positive rights’.74 But, 
he argues, the fact that it is neither easy nor obvious should not stop us trying to find the 
answer to the question. Caney does not, however, say anything about how these duties 
should be distributed. James Nickel goes further than Caney in sketching a plausible 
pattern of deliberation about the duties connected with human rights.75 He suggests the 
following four types of duties associated with human rights: 
A. Primary duties or responsibilities 
1. Duties of individuals and institutions everywhere to refrain from violating rights. 
2. Duties of governments and other regional institutions to uphold (protect and 
provide for) rights. 
B. Secondary duties or responsibilities 
1. Responsibilities of the residents of a country to create, maintain, support, and 
participate in institutions that will respect and uphold rights. 
2. Responsibilities of other governments and international institutions such as the 
United Nations and the World Bank to discourage rights violations and to 
encourage efforts to uphold rights.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
74 Caney, ‘The Case for Positive Duties’, in Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes what to 
the very Poor?, ed. by Thomas Pogge, pp. 275-302 (p. 278). 
75 Nickel, ‘How Human Rights Generate Duties to Protect and Provide’, Human Rights Quarterly, 
15 (1993), 77-86. 
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This looks like a sensible and feasible proposal for how the duties corresponding to the 
human right to subsistence could be allocated. But both it and Caney’s reply miss 
something important in O’Neill’s objection. Nickel and Caney both hold that a set of 
moral principles could be provided that, when applied, would yield a determinate set of 
addressees for any given poor person’s human right to subsistence.  According to Nickel, 
‘if there are two or more alternative addressees for a right, there must be principles for 
choosing between them’ (p. 83). This, of course, is not necessary in the case of negative 
duties since they can unproblematically be fulfilled by everyone at the same time. Positive 
duties of assistance, however, are not owed by each person to all others. There might be 
any number of people able to assist a given person suffering from poverty; but it does 
not follow that each of them must provide something to the victim. According to 
Nickel’s and Caney’s approaches, although it may be very difficult and complicated to 
establish precisely who owes precisely what to precisely whom, this can be determined 
through the application of the appropriate moral principles. This is precisely what 
O’Neill denies. We might be able to narrow the class of potential addressees for any 
given individual’s right on the basis of, say, their ability to help; but in many cases, there 
will still be a number of potential addressees of any given person’s alleged claim. For any 
given person in dire need, there are millions of people each of whom are able to assist or 
at least contribute to assisting. Furthermore, there are multiple ways of distributing the 
responsibility to assist that are equally effective and fair. From the perspective of the 
person in need, it does not matter which of these distributions is chosen. But O’Neill’s 
point is that until it has been decided which of these distributions will be applied, the 
person in need does not have a claim on any moral agent in particular to assistance. On 
O’Neill’s account, institutions are required in order to decide on and apply a particular 
distribution of duties, and so in the absence of institutions, no one has a claim to 
assistance.  
As we shall see in more detail in the following chapter, what is at issue with 
respect to the claimability objection is the extent to which the corresponding duties and 
duty-bearers must be identifiable in order to have justification for the affirmation of a 
right. The interpretation of O’Neill’s concern to which both Caney and Nickel reply 
provides only a partial characterization of her objection. On O’Neill’s view, it is not just 
that there is no easy or obvious answer to the question of who owes the duties 
corresponding to the human right to subsistence, but rather that there is no fact of the 
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matter, and therefore no answer at all, at least until the relevant institutions have been set 
up.  
 It may initially be surprising that O’Neill endorses the view mentioned in section 
2.1 that fundamental rights, and so human rights, must be doubly universal. If this holds 
true, then it appears that there is no problem filling in the ‘claim against’ side of the 
human right to subsistence: insofar as subsistence is a human right, it is owed by each to 
all. The trouble is that this comes at the cost of the ‘claim to’ side. This is because it is 
not clear what it could possibly mean for everyone to owe to everyone else access to the 
means for subsistence. The claimability condition is straightforwardly fulfilled by 
universal rights to forbearance on the part of all others. This is why O’Neill thinks that 
so-called liberty rights such as the right against torture and the right to freedom of 
expression are unproblematic. These rights are commonly thought to entail only negative 
duties on the part of others to, for example, not torture others or not prevent others 
from expressing themselves. It is clear, at least in the vast majority of cases, what it 
means for everyone to owe to everyone else forbearance in these cases.76 As such, taking 
the claim to be against everyone does not compromise our understanding of what it is a 
claim to.  
 The claimability condition is equally fulfilled by special rights since they are, by 
their very nature, held to something specific and against specific others. It is universal 
rights that entail positive duties that encounter difficulty fulfilling the claimability 
condition. It is certainly not the case that everyone has a claim on everyone else to 
provide them with access to the means for basic subsistence. Proponents of the 
conventional interpretation of the human right to subsistence accept this. First of all, not 
everyone is in a position to be able to provide anything at all. Even if we narrow the class 
of duty-bearers to only those able to make some contribution, it is not clear what it is 
that any given individual can be said to owe to any other individual. As Henry Shue 
nicely expresses it, ‘I could not give a penny to each hungry child, even if that were a 
good idea – I do not even have the time to give one minute’s thought to each hungry 
child’.77 If universal rights are held against all others, or at least against all others in a 
position to do something, and if there is a human right to subsistence, it follows that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
76 There are, of course, disagreements about what constitutes torture, and likewise what it means 
to prevent someone from expressing herself. While there are undoubtedly borderline cases of 
both and indeed of other paradigm ‘liberty rights’ violations, large classes of actions are 
unambiguously ruled out by these rights.  
77 Shue, ‘Mediating Duties’, Ethics, 98 (1988), 687-704 (p. 690). 
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those who fall below the threshold living standard have a claim on most of us – that is, 
myself and probably anyone reading this, since given that we have the luxury of being 
able to spend time writing or reading philosophical dissertations, there is probably some 
contribution we could make to help alleviate at least some poverty. The question is, to 
what is this claim? What can a Malawian woman dying of malnutrition-related causes 
justifiably demand of me? I might be able to help her, but that might exhaust my 
resources so I would not be able to help her neighbour who is also dying of poverty-
related causes. Even if helping one person does not exhaust my resources, my resources 
are not enough to help everyone in need.  
 
This last thought raises the central problem with the duties that are supposed to correlate 
with the human right to subsistence. The central reason that they are thought to fail to 
fulfil the claimability condition is that they are imperfect duties. The distinction between 
perfect and imperfect duties comes from Kant, but can been interpreted in various ways 
and so it is worth saying a few words to clarify the sense relevant to the discussion at 
hand.78  
 One way of understanding the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties is 
that perfect duties prescribe or prohibit particular actions whereas imperfect duties 
prescribe the adoption of certain maxims.79 An example of a perfect duty on this account 
is the universal perfect duty not to torture. This is an action that is categorically and 
universally prohibited. An example of an imperfect duty is the duty to adopt the maxim 
of beneficence. This means adopting the happiness of others as an end. What it means to 
adopt something as an end involves taking a certain attitude towards it and taking certain 
actions in certain contexts that exhibit one’s attitude towards the end in question. The 
specific actions that must be taken in particular contexts in order to fulfil an imperfect 
duty are not directly prescribed.  
Both perfect and imperfect duties on this account can admit of greater or lesser 
discretion in their fulfillment. This is most apparent in the case of imperfect duties which 
can often be fully discharged through many different patterns of action. It is, however, 
equally true of perfect duties. Although a perfect duty might prescribe a specific action, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
78 A helpful discussion of various interpretations of imperfect duties can be found in Hope, 
‘Subsistence and Imperfect Duties’.  
79 See, for example, Thomas Hill Jr., Human Welfare and Moral Worth, Kantian Perspectives (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 203-204; and ‘Kant on Imperfect Duty and Supererogation’, 
Kant-Studien, 61 (1971), 55-77. 
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in many cases, there are a number of different ways of performing that action. To 
borrow Thomas Hill’s example, if a perfect duty requires you to keep valid contracts, and 
you are under a valid contract to pay someone a certain amount of money, unless 
otherwise specified in the contract, you can discharge this duty by paying them the 
requisite amount with a cheque, cash, direct deposit, and so on.  
I argue that this is not the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties that is 
most relevant to the claimability objection. This is because it is not clear why, on this 
account, only perfect duties are claimable. I will return to this point in Chapter 4. For 
now, I argue that in order to make sense of the claim that only perfect duties are 
claimable, we must refer to O’Neill’s characterization of the distinction between perfect 
and imperfect duties. According to O’Neill,  
When we have an obligation, we are required to do or omit some type of action. 
Sometimes we are required to do or omit this type of action for all others. 
Sometimes we are required to do or omit it for specified others. Sometimes we are 
required to do or omit the action for unspecified others, but not for all others.80  
According to O’Neill, the first two sorts of obligations are perfect while the third is 
imperfect. As on the previous account, perfect duties on this account are duties to some 
specified act or forbearance. Furthermore, they are owed to specific others – either all 
others or some specified others. Universal duties can be perfect so long as they are 
negative since universal negative duties can be owed to everyone else, because 
forbearance can be demanded by everyone else. Likewise, special duties that are either 
negative or positive can be perfect since they are owed to specific others and whatever 
the agreed upon content is can be demanded.  
Imperfect duties, though no less stringent than perfect duties, admit of discretion 
in their fulfillment. As we have seen, this is true in one sense of both perfect and 
imperfect duties in that the specific action prescribed by a perfect duty can sometimes be 
performed in a number of different ways. However, what is specific to imperfect duties 
on O’Neill’s account is that the fulfillment of an imperfect duty, although it will usually 
benefit some persons, need not benefit any person(s) in particular. There might be a 
number of persons who could potentially benefit from the fulfillment of an agent’s duty; 
but if the agent is not required to benefit all those who might be benefitted by her action 
(usually because she is unable to, but perhaps because this would require an unreasonable !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
80 ‘Children’s Rights and Children’s Lives’, International Journal of Law and the Family, 6 (1992), 24-
42 (p. 26). 
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sacrifice), then her duty is imperfect and it is left up to her which potential beneficiaries 
will ultimately benefit from the fulfillment of her duty. This is why, on O’Neill’s account, 
imperfect duties cannot correlate with rights: ‘so long as the recipients of the obligation 
are neither all others nor specified others, there are no right-holders, and nobody can 
either claim or waive performance of any right’.81    
According to O’Neill’s Kantian account, only perfect duties can correlate with 
rights. Universal duties of assistance are imperfect; and so a universal duty to assist those 
who cannot acquire access to the means for subsistence for themselves does not 
correlate with any right. An individual might have a duty to alleviate some poverty, but 
he cannot alleviate the poverty of everyone suffering from poverty – even by a tiny 
amount – and so, absent institutions, it is up to him who will benefit from the fulfillment 
of his duty. This means, however, that absent institutions no particular potential 
beneficiary has a claim against him that he benefits them in particular, and therefore, on 
O’Neill’s account, no one has a right to his assistance.  
This is not to deny that imperfect duties can be perfected. Perfecting imperfect 
duties involves setting up institutions that match duty-bearers with right-holders thus 
giving rise to rights. In the case of poverty relief, perfecting imperfect duties involves 
setting up systems of transfer that coordinate the contributions of wealthy individuals 
and channel their efforts towards specific persons in need. The reasoning involved in 
deciding on the structure of these institutions might be something along the lines of the 
sort of strategic reasoning that Nickel has in mind. O’Neill’s point, however, is that until 
an imperfect duty is perfected, there are no rights corresponding to it. Whereas Nickel 
and others following him hold that the strategic reasoning about addressees and their 
responsibilities can take place subsequent to the affirmation of a right, O’Neill holds that 
in the case of the human right to subsistence and other socio-economic rights, the rights 
come to be only through the conclusion of these reasoning processes and establishment 
of the relevant institutions. This is because only through institutionalization do such 
duties become perfect. On O’Neill’s account, to have a right is to have a claim, but 
where duties are imperfect, no one has a claim.  
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
81 ‘Children’s Rights’, p. 27. 
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2.3.  Summary  
It is with the claimability objection that I will be predominantly occupied over the next 
two chapters. The reason for this is that I do not think that the most influential 
arguments in defence of the human right to subsistence have succeeded in providing an 
adequate reply to it. 
I have characterized the problem raised by the claimability objection as one of 
balancing the ‘claim to’ side of the human right to subsistence with the ‘claim against’ 
side. The problem is that if the human right to subsistence is understood as a claim to 
assistance when one cannot secure access to the means for subsistence for oneself, then 
it cannot be held against every other moral agent. In section 2.1, I left open the question 
of whether fundamental rights must be universal both in scope and in obligation. 
According to proponents of the claimability objection, fundamental rights must be 
‘doubly universal’ in this sense since if a right is not held against every other moral agent, 
then it must be contingent on some non-essential feature of the right-holder that allows 
us to identify, at least in principle, who the relevant duty-bearers are and what the 
content of their duty is. If this is true, then there can be no human right to subsistence 
interpreted as a fundamental right correlating with positive duties of assistance and 
protection since these duties are not owed by each moral agent to all others.   
There are, broadly, two approaches to overcoming the claimability objection. 
One is to deny the claimability condition. The other is to grant the claimability condition 
and show that there is in fact a plausible conception of the human right to subsistence 
which fulfils. In Chapter 3, I discuss arguments of the first kind. In Chapter 4, I discuss 
arguments of the second kind. I conclude that the strongest argument in defence of the 
human right to subsistence deviates from the conventional interpretation in emphasizing 
the negative duties correlative to it, and in particular the duty not to deprive others of 
access to the means for subsistence. In Chapter 5, I offer a detailed conceptual analysis 
of this duty, and in Chapter 6 I explore some of the implications it has for reasoning 
about the normative implications of global poverty.   
 52!
 
 53!
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
—3— 
CLAIMABILITY AND THE NATURE OF RIGHTS 
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In this chapter, I begin by arguing that the debate over the claimability condition is 
ultimately a debate about the nature of moral rights. In section 3.2, I argue that this is not 
sufficiently appreciated by defenders of the conventional interpretation of the human 
right to subsistence who tend to simply assume a conception of rights according to 
which claimability is not a condition. In order to provide a complete defence of the 
conventional interpretation, reasons are needed to prefer the conception of rights that 
underlies it. I argue in the final section, however, that this conception struggles to explain 
how rights constitute a distinctive moral category, and so it struggles to show that the 
human right to subsistence can make a distinctive contribution to reasoning about the 
normative implications of global poverty.  
 
3.1.  Debates about Rights 
Three debates dominate the literature on rights theory. It will be helpful to briefly look at 
each in order to better understand where the claimability condition fits in. Although I 
show that it can be interpreted as deriving from the Will Theory of the function of rights, 
I argue that it is best understood as a constraint imposed by the logical structure of claim 
rights.  
 
3.1.1.  The Justification of Moral Rights 
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In Chapter 2, I discussed the justification of moral rights. The discussion there 
concerned how particular moral rights are justified. Here, I am concerned not with the 
justification of particular rights, but rather with the justification of the normative force of 
moral rights in general. A great many moral theories employ the concept of rights, but 
there are important differences between how the normative force of rights is justified.  
 According to status-based theories of rights, the normative force of rights comes 
from the moral status of right-holders. On this sort of account, there are certain ways in 
which it is categorically impermissible to treat a person. Status-based theories typically 
juxtapose themselves with consequentialist theories of morality, and especially 
utilitarianism. According to the status-based approach, rights are ‘side-constraints’ on the 
permissible exercise of personal liberty and, importantly, on the pursuit of the aggregate 
good. As Ronald Dworkin puts it, rights trump the pursuit of maximum aggregate 
utility.82 The motivation for this kind of approach is Kantian in nature. The central idea is 
that there are certain ways in which we must not treat people, even if this will yield 
greater overall good. This is because doing so would involve treating the person as a 
mere means to an end (the end of maximizing some good), and that this ought not to be 
done.  
 Rights, however, are not necessarily incompatible with consequentialism. Some 
consequentialists incorporate rights into their moral and political theories, and indeed 
some hold them in very high regard. The difference between status-based accounts and 
consequentialist accounts is that the justification for the normative force of rights on the 
latter sort of account is instrumentalist. On instrumentalist conceptions, rights have the 
same features as they do on status-based conceptions, but their normative force derives 
from considerations of the consequences that widespread respect of rights would have. 
This is notably how Mill supports the existence of individual rights. On his account, 
widespread respect for individual rights will actually serve to maximize utility.  
I will not pursue a discussion of the debate over the justification of moral rights 
here seeing as the claimability condition does not figure into the debate between status-
based theorists and instrumentalist theorists about rights. Whether or not claimability is a 
condition on the justified affirmation of a right will not bear on how moral rights in 
general are justified. Defending one approach or the other will not therefore settle the 
matter of the plausibility of the conventional interpretation of the human right to 
subsistence.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
82 Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978).  
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3.1.2.  The Function of Rights 
A second important debate in the philosophical literature on rights concerns their 
function. Noticing that the term ‘a right’ is used in a variety of different ways, the legal 
theorist Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld famously provided a typology of rights according to 
which the term extends to the following four ‘incidents’:83 (1) Privileges. To have a 
privilege is to have no duty not to perform a specified action. (2) Claims. To have a right 
in this sense is to have a claim to some substance held against some other agent(s). 
Claims are always held against some other agent or agents. (3) Powers. To have a power is 
to have the ability within a set of rules to alter one’s own or another’s Hohfeldian 
incidents. (4) Immunities. To have an immunity is to lack the ability or for others to lack 
the ability within a set of rules to alter one’s Hohfeldian incidents. On Hohfeld’s account, 
all rights are privileges, claims, powers, immunities, or some combination thereof. 
However, we might notice that not all privileges, claims, powers, immunities, and 
combinations thereof count as rights.  
A long-running and ongoing debate concerns what distinguishes those 
Hohfeldian incidents and combinations thereof which are rights from those which are 
not. Two theories have dominated the scene: Will Theory and Interest Theory. More 
recently, several theorists have offered hybrid theories that attempt to combine the best 
features of the two.84  
 
The Will Theory takes the function of rights to be the empowerment of the right-holder 
with respect to the actions of other agents.85 What distinguishes rights from other 
Hohfeldian incidents on this account is that they confer upon the rightholder the power 
to demand, waive, or enforce the corresponding duties. The Interest Theory, by contrast, 
takes the function of rights to be the protection and promotion of very important 
interests.86 As such, according to this theory, what distinguishes rights from other 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
83 ‘Some Fundamental Legal Concepts as Applied to Juridical Reasoning’, The Yale Law Journal, 23 
(1913), 16-59. 
84 See, for example, Rowan Cruft, ‘Rights: Beyond Interest Theory and Will Theory?’, Law and 
Philosophy, 23 (2004), 347-397; and Leif Wenar, ‘The Nature of Rights’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 
33 (2005), 223-252. 
85 See, for example, H. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: oxford University Press, 1961). 
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Hohfeldian incidents is that they serve to protect or promote the interests of the right-
holder.  
 
This is a rather blunt characterization of the Will and Interest Theories, of which there 
are a number of nuanced variants. It nevertheless provides us with one way of 
interpreting the claimability condition, namely as a constraint imposed by the Will 
Theory. According to the Will Theory, because the function of rights is to empower the 
right-holder, all rights must additionally include a power of claim or waiver. We might, 
then, interpret the claimability condition as a limit imposed by the Will Theory as 
follows. In order for a right-holder to have power over the duties of another, he must be 
able to identify who that other is and what her duties are. Or put negatively, in the 
absence of identifiable duties and duty-bearers, so-called right-holders lack the power to 
claim or waive their so-called right. According to the Will Theory, in order for the 
human right to subsistence to properly constitute a right as opposed to just an abstract 
claim, it must contain the power of claim or waiver. Because in the absence of relevant 
institutional structures we lack sufficiently specific information about the duties entailed 
by the claim to subsistence, it does not meet the claimability condition thus understood, 
and therefore fails to include the necessary power of claim or waiver that is required by 
the Will Theory in order for it to constitute a right.  
 Because the Interest Theory only requires that a claim must fulfil some interest of 
its holder in order to be considered a right, it poses no problem for the conventional 
interpretation of the human right to subsistence. The fulfillment of the duties correlative 
to a claim to access to the means for subsistence is clearly in the interest of the claim-
holder, and so the condition imposed by the Interest Theory for it being a right is 
fulfilled.  
 The suggestion here is that we might interpret the debate over the status of the 
right to subsistence as a human right as reducing to the question of whether the Will 
Theory, the Interest Theory, or some alternative theory offers the best theory of the 
function of rights. In seeking to resolve the dispute, then, we would need to seek 
resolution to the debate between these theories.  A successful defence of the human right 
to subsistence would at least have to show that a right can exist despite the right-holder !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
86 See, for example, Neil MacCormick, ‘Rights in Legislation’, in Law, Morality and Society: Essays in 
Honour of H.L.A. Hart, ed. by P. Hacker and J. Raz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 
189–209; David Lyons, ‘The Correlativity of Rights and Duties’, Nous, 4 (1970), 45–57; and 
Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), especially Chapter 7. 
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lacking the powers of waiver or enforcement. While I think that there is good reason to 
reject such an account,87 I will not embark on a discussion of this here. This is because I 
do not think that seeing the claimability condition as a condition imposed by the Will 
Theory of the function of rights provides any helpful insight into what is really at stake in 
the debate over the human right to subsistence. The reason for this is that Hohfeld’s 
analysis was an analysis of legal rights, whereas we are interested in the status of the right 
to subsistence as a moral right.  
As Peter Jones has pointed out, Hohfeld’s taxonomy was based on observations 
about the way the term ‘right’ is used within a legal context.88 Although his taxonomy can 
be applied to moral rights, it is not central to theorizing about moral rights. This is 
because the way that the term ‘right’ is used in the context of morality does not 
correspond exactly with the ways in which it is used in the legal context. As such, the 
question of what makes something a moral right as opposed to a claim, privilege, power, 
or immunity may not be the same as what makes something a legal right as opposed to a 
claim, privilege, power, or immunity. Indeed Hart, who was one of the most influential 
Will Theorists, eventually conceded that the Will Theory does not apply to moral rights 
which, he suggested, could focus on peoples needs rather than their choices.89  
 The debate between Will Theorists and Interest Theorists has long dominated 
the literature on rights theory, and so it is helpful to understand how the question of 
whether there is a human right to subsistence relates to it. My purpose in this section has 
been to argue that, although the claimability condition can be interpreted as a condition 
on the existence of rights imposed by the Will Theory of the function of rights, because 
this is a theory about the function of legal rights, interpreting the claimability condition in 
this way does not provide any insight into whether and why claimability might constitute 
a condition on the existence of moral rights.  
 
3.1.3.  The Logical Structure of Rights 
In this section, I argue that the claimability condition is best understood as a condition 
imposed on the existence of moral rights by a particular account of the logical structure !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
87 For some forceful arguments for the rejection of the Will Theory as I have characterized it 
here, see Cruft, ‘Rights: Beyond Interest Theory and Will Theory?’, and Wenar, ‘The Nature of 
Rights’. 
88 Rights, pp. 47-48. 
89 Hart, Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1982), p. 192-3. Discussed in P. Jones, Rights, p. 35-6. 
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of rights. I argue that the conventional interpretation of the human right to subsistence 
presupposes an account of the logical structure of rights which is at odds with the 
account that supports the claimability condition. My claim is that the debate over the 
human right to subsistence is, at root, a debate about the logical structure of rights.  
It will be helpful to begin by noting a terminological ambiguity in the literature. 
Some theories of rights are characterized as ‘interest-based’. This, I argue, can mean at 
least three different things. In one sense, an account of rights being interest-based can 
refer to the sort of justification offered in support of moral rights in general. This would 
imply an instrumentalist justification according to which the normative force of moral 
rights is justified on the grounds that widespread respect for rights promotes the 
fulfillment of interests overall. To refer to a conception of rights as being ‘interest-based’ 
can also imply the Interest Theory of the function of rights discussed in the previous 
section. It is important to note, however, that the interest-based justification of rights is 
logically distinct from the interest-based account of their function. These are distinct 
since the former concerns the normative force of moral right, and the latter the function 
of legal rights.   
I want to suggest now that there is a third sense in which a conception of rights 
can be interest-based. This sense has to do with the logical structure of rights, and of 
claim rights in particular. I have in mind the sort of view espoused by Raz according to 
which ‘“X has a right” if and only if X can have rights, and, other things being equal, an 
aspect of X’s well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other 
person(s) to be under a duty’.90 We should note that Raz’s is an account of the nature of 
moral rights. He is sometimes interpreted as advancing the Interest Theory of the 
function of rights, but as I have argued, the question of the nature of legal rights is 
distinct from that of moral rights.  
Raz’s account includes, importantly, an account of the logical structure of rights. 
My central claim in this and the next section is that proponents of the conventional 
interpretation of the human right to subsistence rely on a Razian account of the logical 
structure of rights that is a odds with the more traditional account of the logical structure 
of rights that supports the claimability condition. In order to make this case, I will begin 
by providing a brief outline of Raz’s account and contrast it with the sort of account that 
underlies the claimability objection.  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
90 The Morality of Freedom, p. 166. 
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According to Raz, ‘rights are grounds of duties in others’ (p. 167). Rights and duties are 
not just two sides of the same coin. To affirm a given right is not just to affirm a specific 
duty or a set of duties on the part of others. The existence of certain duties can be 
derived from the affirmation of a right, but the affirmation of that right is something 
different from the affirmation of the specific duties that it grounds. 
Rights on the Razian account are logically prior to duties. They do not merely 
correspond to duties; they serve to justify the existence of certain duties. For this reason, 
I will refer to this account of the logical structure of rights as the Logical Priority 
Account, or the LPA for short. What it means to have a duty on Raz’s account is to have 
a reason of ‘peremptory character’. The existence of a right does not depend on the prior 
existence of some corresponding duty; rather the existence of some duties is justified by 
the existence of certain rights. What, then, justifies the existence of particular rights? 
According to Raz, rights are justified by the interests of persons. This strand of moral 
reasoning on Raz’s account therefore moves from observations about the interests of 
persons to the affirmation of rights to the assignment of duties; and, importantly, it 
cannot go in the other direction. We cannot infer from the existence of a duty that there 
is a corresponding right. This is because duties can be justified on other grounds besides 
rights.91 A right according to Raz is an intermediate moral conclusion in an argument 
from the interests of an individual to duties on the part of other moral agents: 
[Rights] are, so to speak, points in the argument where many considerations 
intersect and where the result of their conflicts are summarized to be used with 
additional premises when need be. Such intermediate conclusions are used and 
referred to as if they are themselves complete reasons. (p. 181)  
It is important to note that rights on Raz’s account add nothing new to an argument; 
they merely summarize the argument to that point. An important question for Raz 
concerns whether rights really serve any important function in moral reasoning, given 
their apparent role as mere place-holders. To this, he replies that  
The fact that practical arguments proceed through the mediation of intermediate 
stages so that not every time a practical question arises does one refer to ultimate 
values for an answer is (…) of crucial importance in making social life possible, 
not only because it saves time and tediousness, but primarily because it enables a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
91 Raz is explicit that while all rights correlate with duties, not all duties correlate with rights. 
Rights, on Raz’s account, provide one sort of justification for duties; but there are other 
justifications available, for example, the promotion of public goods. See Raz, The Morality of 
Freedom, Chapter 8. 
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common culture to be formed round shared intermediate conclusions, in spite of 
a great degree of haziness and disagreement concerning ultimate values. (Ibid.)  
 
I will return to a discussion of the relative merits and demerits of an interpretation of the 
human right to subsistence according to LPA in section 3.3. My purpose here is simply 
to flag an important difference between the LPA and the account that supports the 
claimability condition, which I will discuss shortly. As we have seen, on the LPA, rights 
justify holding others to be under duty to perform or abstain from some action. Rights, 
however, are not the only reasons that must be taken into consideration when 
determining whether someone is under duty. Considerations about the specific 
circumstances including potential conflicts between rights, but also non-rights 
considerations such as the feasibility and desirability of certain actions must be taken into 
account.92 As such, a given right does not, taken on its own, entail the existence of any 
duty in particular. This leads Raz to reject the claimability condition: 
[O]ne may know of the existence of a right and of the reasons for it without 
knowing who is bound by duties based on it or what precisely are these duties. 
(p. 184) 
This is because  
the implications of a right, (…), and the duties it grounds, depend on additional 
premises and these cannot in principle be wholly determined in advance’. (p. 185) 
 
The account of the logical structure of rights that underlies the claimability objection 
allows that there can be moral duties that are entailed by rights whose bearers and 
content can not be wholly determined in advance. These include duties to implement 
rights and duties to protect people’s enjoyment of their rights in general. As we shall see, 
however, in order to be justified in affirming a right on this account, at least one 
correlative duty must be determinate. This is because, on this account, rather than rights 
grounding duties, rights are understood as expressing deontic relationships between 
specific duty-bearers and specific right-holders. As such, I will refer to this account of 
the logical structure of rights as the Deontic Relationship Account, or DRA for short. 
Rights are not logically prior to duties on this account, and neither are duties logically 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
92 According to Raz, ‘Which duties a right gives rise to depends partly on the basis of that right, 
on the considerations justifying its existence. It also depends on the absence of conflicting 
considerations’, The Morality of Freedom, p. 183. 
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prior to rights. This is because rights and duties are just two sides of the same coin. 
According to O’Neill 
From a normative view of rights, obligations and claimable rights are just two 
perspectives on a single normative pattern: without obligations there are no 
rights.93   
This stands in stark contrast to the Razian view that, since rights are logically prior to 
duties, although they will in many cases justify the existence of duties, there is nothing 
conceptually problematic about the situation in which there is a right with no identifiable 
duties or duty-bearers.  
 
Another way of understanding the distinction between the two accounts of the logical 
structure of rights that I have in mind has to do with the relationship between the 
substance of a right and its correlative duties. The logical structure of a claim right is 
usually expressed as ‘R has a claim to s against A’, where R is the right-holder, A is the 
addressee, and s is the substance of the right. This expression of the structure of rights is 
neutral between two competing accounts. On the one hand, some theories treat the 
required action(s) or abstention(s) as identical with the substance of the right, s. Rights 
on this account might be expressed as ‘R has a claim that A s’, where s is both the 
substance of the right as well as the specific action or abstention required of A. This is 
the kind of account O’Neill seems to endorse. We might alternatively regard the action(s) 
or abstention(s) required by a right as distinct from its substance. On this model, a claim 
right can only be expressed as ‘R has a claim that A s’ in case the substance of the right 
and the action or abstention required of A in fact are identical. Whereas this must be the 
case on the first model, on this alternative model the substance of the right could be 
something other than a specific action or abstention on the part of a duty-bearer. On this 
model, it follows from every claim right that there are some actions or abstentions 
required of A in order to bring it about that R enjoys the substance of her right; but the 
right is not a claim to those actions or abstentions, but rather to what it is those actions 
or abstentions are meant to bring about. This seems to be the sort of account endorsed 
by Raz.94  
To further illustrate the difference between LPA and DRA, let us take as an 
example a paradigmatic claim right: the right against torture. On DRA, the substance of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
93 ‘The Dark Side’, p. 431. 
94 Amartya Sen makes what I think is the same distinction in ‘Rights and Agency’, p. 16.  
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the right against torture is the abstention from torture on the part of all addressees. By 
contrast, on LPA, the substance of the right against torture is freedom from torture. 
Surely this will involve the abstention from torture of all other agents, but this abstention 
is not itself understood as the substance of the right; rather, it is a necessary condition for 
the fulfillment of the right. On DRA, the content of the duty is identical to the substance 
of the right whereas on LPA, they need not be the same.  
The difference is even more apparent in the case of socio-economic rights. To 
have a right to subsistence (positively construed) on DRA is to have a claim that some 
specific addressee provides you with access to the means for subsistence when you 
cannot otherwise acquire this. The right to subsistence on this account is therefore a 
claim to provision. On LPA, by contrast, to have a right to subsistence is to have a claim to 
have access to the means for subsistence. This will provide justification in certain cases 
for holding some other(s) to be under a duty to provide you with such access; but on this 
account, your claim is not to their provision, but rather to the access.  
DRA and LPA express two different ways in which we can think about the 
relationship between the substance, s, of a right and its addressee(s), A.  On DRA, the 
addressees of the right must be determinate in order for the substance of the right to be 
determinate since the right is to their acts or abstentions.  On LPA, by contrast, the 
substance of a right can be determinate without it being determinate who the addressees 
are, or what is required of them. Seeing the claimability objection as predicated on DRA 
may therefore help to explain why claimability would be taken as an existence condition 
on rights.  On this model, if it is indeterminate against whom your right is held and what 
it requires of them, then so is the substance of your right. Where institutional 
mechanisms are required to specify and allocate duties, on DRA, the substance of so-
called rights is indeterminate in the absence of such mechanisms. And surely to assert a 
right with an indeterminate substance is, at best, empty rhetoric. This is why claimability, 
understood as being able to identify the addressees of the right and the content of their 
duties, is an existence condition on rights on DRA. The reason the same is not true of 
LPA is that it takes the substance of a right to be a state of affairs enjoyed by the right-
holder. Many states of affairs can be brought about in a number of different ways; and 
what matters for the fulfilment of a right is just that the relevant state of affairs is 
brought about, not how or by whom it is achieved (except in cases where the state of 
affairs is partly constituted by some action or abstention on the part of some particular 
agent(s).).  
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In what follows, I will show that two of the most influential lines of argument in defence 
of the conventional interpretation of the human right to subsistence against the 
claimability objection simply assume LPA. I will argue that the trouble with this is that it 
fails to provide a satisfactory response to the claimability objection which rests on DRA. 
Looked at another way, proponents of the claimability objection are equally culpable of 
failing to address what is really at issue by simply presupposing DRA. The point is that 
the conflict between the conventional interpretation of the human right to subsistence 
and the claimability objection can only be truly resolved by settling the debate over the 
nature of rights. Although I will not endeavour anything so ambitious here, in this and 
the following chapters, I will explore some potential ways of moving the discourse about 
the normative implications of global poverty forward despite enduring tensions.  
 
3.2.  In Defence of the Human Right to Subsistence 
This section constitutes a discussion of various attempts to overcome the claimability 
objection. As we have seen, according to this objection, a moral right cannot be at once 
universal, fundamental, and have as its correlates positive duties of assistance. The 
central reason for this is that the positive duties in question are imperfect since it cannot 
be the case that every person able to provide assistance owes assistance to every person 
in need of assistance. According to the objection, imperfect duties cannot correlate with 
rights because what it means to have a right is to have a claim on some specific agent or 
agents; but where the duties of agents are imperfect, they are not owed to anyone in 
particular. The fulfillment of the duty to contribute to poverty relief will inevitably have 
some beneficiaries, but since no one agent can assist all those in need, no particular 
person in need has a claim on any particular agent to their assistance. And as such, no 
particular person can be said to have a right to assistance.  
 It is on account of the claimability condition that both the ‘claim to’ and the 
‘claim against’ side of rights must be determinate in order for the affirmation of a right to 
be justified. The approach to avoiding the claimability objection I will discuss in this 
chapter denies that the ‘claim against’ side needs to be determinate in order to justifiably 
affirm a right. While proponents of this sort of account emphasize the importance of 
working out the deontic implications of human rights, they hold that we can justifiably 
affirm human rights prior to establishing who the relevant duty-bearers are. This chapter 
will explore the reasons given in support of the denial of the claimability condition. I 
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shall argue that the most plausible arguments all hinge on a rejection of the traditional 
picture in which perfect duties must be negative or special, and positive universal duties 
must be imperfect. I will discuss in detail the work of Henry Shue who urges us ‘both be 
ready to use the above distinctions where they help and be ready to modify this simple 
picture of interlocking dichotomies if it turns out to be a conceptual straightjacket’.95  
The approaches to defending the human right to subsistence discussed in this 
chapter do indeed take the picture of interlocking dichotomies to be a conceptual 
straightjacket and so opt to modify it. As such these approach to overcoming the 
claimability objection rest on a different conception of rights than the one that O’Neill 
presupposes. In particular, my claim is that these approaches rest on an account of the 
logical structure of rights according to which rights are logically prior to duties (LPA), 
while the claimability objection rests on an account of the logical structure of rights 
according to which rights express deontic relationships between duty-bearers and right-
holders (DRA). The debate over the legitimacy of the claimability condition therefore 
rests on a more fundamental disagreement about the very nature of rights.  As we shall 
see, both arguments outlined in what follows simply assume LPA. But this is simply to 
assume, at least in part, what they have set out to prove. In order to effectively challenge 
the claimability objection by rejecting the claimability condition, reasons must be given in 
support of LPA. I will turn to an evaluation of the human right to subsistence 
understood according to LPA in section 3.3. 
 
3.2.1.  The Basic Rights Argument 
The first argument I discuss is the Basic Rights Argument. This argument was initially 
advanced by Henry Shue, and has more recently been adapted by Elizabeth Ashford in 
light of some objections to it.96 The Basic Rights Argument has two main elements. One 
is an argument for the deontic pluralism or rights. The second is an argument for the 
linkage between subsistence rights and all other rights. Let us discuss each in turn.  
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
95 ‘Mediating Duties’, p. 689. 
96 ‘The Alleged Dichotomy Between Positive and Negative Rights and Duties’, in Global Basic 
Rights, ed. by Charles R. Beitz and Robert E. Goodin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
pp. 113-155. 
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(a) Deontic Pluralism  
Shue’s first target is the traditional distinction between ‘liberty rights’ and ‘welfare 
rights’.97 He argues that this distinction is false and outdated.  According to this 
distinction, ‘liberty rights’ are those that entail only negative duties, whereas ‘welfare 
rights’ entail positive duties. This bifurcation of rights is at the root of the distinction 
drawn in contemporary international human rights doctrine between ‘first-generation 
human rights’ which include the civil and political rights, and ‘second-generation human 
rights’ which include the social, economic, and cultural rights. This distinction saw the 
ratification of human rights in two separate covenants in 1966: The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Social, 
Economic, and Cultural Rights.  
Shue’s basis for rejecting the traditional view is what can be called the deontic 
pluralism of rights, namely the idea that any given right actually corresponds to a plurality of 
duties, some negative and others positive. Shue highlights the frequently overlooked 
negative duties associated with so-called (positive) welfare rights. He points out that the 
right to subsistence is not merely a right to be provided with assistance when one cannot 
secure access to the means for subsistence for oneself, but also, and at least as 
importantly, it is a right not to be deprived of access to the means for subsistence. 
Furthermore, he argues that so-called (negative) liberty rights entail positive and often 
very onerous duties. On Shue’s view, the right to, for example, physical security is not 
fulfilled simply in virtue of people refraining from threatening the physical security of 
others; rather, the fulfilment of this right requires that systems are in place to provide a 
reasonable guarantee of physical security to right-holders. These systems will likely 
include police forces, criminal courts, a penal system, and all the subsidiary requirements 
for making these effective. These systems tend to be incredibly costly and require 
enormous contributions of time and resources. 
 Shue’s blurring of the distinction between liberty rights and welfare rights on the 
grounds of deontic pluralism rests on his account of moral rights. According to Shue, ‘A 
moral right provides (1) the rational basis for a justified demand (2) that the actual 
enjoyment of a substance be (3) socially guaranteed against standard threats’ (p. 13). On 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
97 Basic Rights, especially Chapter 2. Parenthetical references to page numbers in this section will 
hereafter refer to this text.  
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this account, in order for any moral right to be fulfilled, including liberty rights, it will not 
be enough that others refrain from behaving in certain ways; right-holders must also 
have a reasonable98 social guarantee that others will refrain from treating them in certain 
ways. On Shue’s account, all moral rights entail both positive and negative duties, all of 
which must be discharged in order for the right to count as fulfilled. We begin here to 
feel the tension between the respective conceptions of rights that underlie Shue’s defence 
of the human right to subsistence and the claimability objection.  
 
(b) Linkage  
The second stage of Shue’s argument builds on the widespread commitment to civil and 
political human rights by emphasising an important link between civil and political 
liberties and social and economic security. It is founded on the observation that an 
expression of a commitment to the promotion of civil and political liberties rings hollow 
if not accompanied by a concern for the socio-economic conditions necessary to 
meaningfully enjoy and exercise those liberties. The promotion of civil and political 
liberties through civil and political human rights is motivated by the values of agency and 
autonomy; but agency and autonomy are equally threatened by poverty and socio-
economic insecurity in general. It is argued that we must take a holistic approach to the 
promotion of these values.  
It does not, however, follow from this that insofar as there are civil and political 
human rights grounded in the values of agency and autonomy so too must there be 
socio-economic human rights such as the human right to subsistence. More needs to be 
said about the nature of the connection between civil and political rights and socio-
economic rights in order to make the argument from one to the other. According to 
Shue, the secure enjoyment of subsistence is necessary for the actual enjoyment of the 
substance of all other rights including civil and political rights. This is because lack of 
secure enjoyment of subsistence poses a standard threat to the enjoyment of any other 
right. One reason that Shue provides for thinking this is the case is lacking access to the 
means for subsistence will have the effect of physically weakening individuals to the 
point at which they are incapable of exercising their rights (pp. 24-25). For example, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
98 A social guarantee on Shue’s account is reasonable insofar as it protects against standard threats. 
Protection against all possible threats is too much to require, but in many cases certain threats to 
people’s enjoyment of the substance of their rights are highly predictable. For a detailed 
discussion of social guarantees against standard threats, see Basic Rights, pp. 6-17 and pp. 29-33.   
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freedom of assembly cannot actually be enjoyed by those who are too sickly to assemble. 
Whether this is true for all rights is not clear. Some rights, it seems, can be enjoyed even 
by those who are too weak to act. Enjoyment of the right to physical security of equality 
before the law, for example, do not seem to require persons to be strong enough to act. 
The second reason Shue offers is therefore more convincing. He argues that where 
people’s subsistence needs are not met, their vulnerability to coercion constitutes a 
standard threat to the enjoyment of other rights (pp. 185-87, note 13). This, he contends, 
is true for any other right.    
Shue offers the following example in support of the latter claim: The widely-
accepted human right against torture, he argues, cannot be fully enjoyed by those who 
cannot meet their subsistence needs because they will always be vulnerable to offers of 
subsistence goods in exchange for submitting to a limited amount of non-fatal torture. 
The central claim is that subsistence is so fundamentally important to all human beings 
that without it, we cannot enjoy any other right because the susceptibility to this sort of 
trade-off constitutes a standard threat to the enjoyment of other rights. As such, Shue 
holds that insofar as we are committed to the fulfillment of any rights at all, we must give 
high priority to the right to subsistence because there is a necessary connection between 
this right and the fulfillment of any other right.  
Shue’s claim is that the enjoyment of subsistence rights is ‘inherently necessary’ 
for the enjoyment of all other rights (p. 27). What he means by ‘inherent necessity’, 
however, is somewhat vague. A plausible way of interpreting the claim that A is 
inherently necessary for B in light of what Shue says is that there is a conceptual 
connection between A and B. Shue is explicit that ‘an ”inherent necessity” needs to be 
distinguished carefully from a mere means to an end’. His suggestion is not merely that 
subsistence is a means to the enjoyment of other rights; rather, his claim is that part of 
what it means to enjoy any other right is that one has access to the means for subsistence 
(Ibid.). 
But the idea that there is a conceptual connection between the secure enjoyment 
of all rights and the secure enjoyment of the right to subsistence falls prey to the 
following powerful objection: It is in fact possible to securely enjoy other rights while 
suffering severe shortfalls in subsistence goods.99 It is possible, according to the critic, to 
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99 Shue attributes this objection to Mark Wicclair, Basic Rights, p. 184, note 13. Thomas Pogge 
makes a similar point in ‘Shue on Rights and Duties’, in Global Basic Rights, ed. by Charles R. Beitz 
and Robert E. Goodin, pp. 119-121.  
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securely enjoy freedom from torture as a right despite being severely malnourished. It 
may be the case, as Shue suggests, that those who do not have secure enjoyment of 
subsistence are liable to agree to compromise their other rights in exchange for 
subsistence goods; but then these sorts of contracts could simply be outlawed. If the 
rules against torture are strictly enforced as are rules against such torture contracts as 
have been described, then it seems that people do in fact securely enjoy their right 
against torture even if they do not have secure enjoyment of subsistence. Therefore, the 
objection goes, securely enjoying the right to subsistence is not necessary in order to 
have socially guaranteed freedom from torture, among other rights. 
The claim that there is a conceptual connection between the secure enjoyment of all 
rights and the secure enjoyment of the right to subsistence is, then, surely misguided 
since there is nothing conceptually incoherent about the possibility of enjoying, say, one’s 
right against torture despite suffering severe malnourishment so long as effective 
enforcement mechanisms are in place to guarantee that people do not engage in torture 
as well as to guarantee that people do not enter into torture contracts.   
 
Elizabeth Ashford has offered a more plausible variation on Shue’s original linkage 
argument.100 According to Ashford, the connection between subsistence and the 
enjoyment of other rights is not conceptual, but rather substantive. Although it is 
conceptually possible to securely enjoy one’s right against torture while lacking the means 
for subsistence, this would require the banning of torture contracts. Banning torture 
contracts, Ashford rightly notes would, however, be against the interests of people who 
lack the means for subsistence. The reason that a person would be willing to enter into a 
torture contract in the first place is that the interest in subsistence is so important as to 
outweigh the interest in not being tortured. That is to say that lacking access to the 
means for subsistence and not being tortured is worse for a person than having the 
means for subsistence and submitting to (a limited amount of non-fatal) torture. As such, 
denying someone who lacks access to the means for subsistence the option of the torture 
contract would make her worse off than she would be if such contracts were available to 
her; if it were not, there would be insufficient motivation for her to enter into the 
contract in the first place, and so such contracts would not constitute standard threats.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
100 ‘The Alleged Dichotomy between Positive and Negative Rights and Duties’, especially pp. 95-
100. 
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Ashford goes on to argue that if we hold the plausible view that, at the very least, 
the secure enjoyment of a right should not thwart the very fundamental interests of the 
right-holder, banning the torture contract in order to uphold the right against torture 
would fail to be an appropriate measure. The only way to ensure that torture contracts 
and other perverse trade-offs do not constitute a threat to the enjoyment of rights is 
therefore to annihilate the incentive for entering into them in the first place. This entails, 
inter alia, guaranteeing access to the means for basic subsistence. So while we can perhaps 
conceive of the enjoyment of the right against torture, among other rights, independent 
of guaranteed access to the means for subsistence, this kind of situation is morally 
inconsistent in light of the needs that human beings actually have and the social 
circumstances in which they actually exist. Ashford concludes that having guaranteed 
access to the means for subsistence is thus a necessary condition for the enjoyment of 
any other right; and so the right to subsistence can be derived from the existence of any 
other moral right. Therefore, insofar as we think that there are any human rights at all, 
the right to subsistence must be among them. Or so the argument goes.  
 
3.2.2.  Trouble With the Basic Rights Argument 
The Basic Rights Argument provides a challenge to the claimability condition since if it is 
right, it implies either that the claimability condition holds and there are no rights at all, 
since all rights entail at least some positive, imperfect duties; or that there are rights, 
including the human right to subsistence, and the claimability condition does not hold. I 
argue, however, that this sets up a false dichotomy. It overlooks the possibility that there 
is a plausible conception of rights according to which the claimability condition holds 
that is compatible with the existence of  at least some rights.  
 
The Basic Rights Argument was originally intended by Shue as a challenge to American 
foreign policy-makers who affirmed both universal liberty rights and universal welfare 
rights, but systematically treated the former as more important.101 In this respect, it 
should be read not as an attempt to justify a universal right to subsistence, but rather as 
an effort to emphasize its importance. The Basic Rights Argument is, nevertheless often 
taken as an argument for the existence of a universal right to subsistence. I argue that it 
can only succeed in this capacity insofar as Shue’s conception of moral rights is taken for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
101 Basic Rights, pp. 5-8.  
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granted. Because Shue’s conception of moral rights is at odds with the one that underlies 
the claimability objection, presupposing it does not therefore provide a satisfactory 
defence of the human right to subsistence.  
Recall that, according to Shue, rights are deontically plural. If the right against 
torture were simply a right that others not torture you, then there would be no reason to 
think that this right could not be enjoyed in the absence of secure access to the means 
for subsistence. But social guarantees against standard threats to the enjoyment of rights, 
which are obviously desirable and probably morally required, do not count as conditions 
for the fulfillment of moral rights on all accounts. That the substance of a right is securely 
enjoyed is a feature of Shue’s account of moral rights, but notably not O’Neill’s. If it turns 
out that social guarantees against standard threats are not conditions on the fulfillment of 
moral rights, then even Ashford’s more plausible variation of the linkage argument will 
fail.  
Shue, however, offers very little in support of his conception of rights. He 
acknowledges the relative ‘thickness’ of it and he anticipates the objection that his 
account conflates purely negative liberty rights with rights to the protection of one’s 
liberty rights. According to this sort of account, the latter rights are positive and 
therefore special, whereas the former are negative and can therefore be universal. Shue, 
however, argues that we should resist dissecting rights in this way since, even if there is a 
meaningful line to be drawn between enjoyment of the substance of a right and the social 
guarantees of that enjoyment against standard threats, the former is of little interest to 
persons living in the sorts of social conditions in which they currently live (and have 
lived for much of human history) in the absence of the latter. Taking again the example 
of the right to physical security, Shue argues that  
in an organised society, insofar as there were any such things as rights to physical 
security that were distinguishable from some other rights-to-be-protected-from-
assaults-upon-physical-security, no one would have much interest in the bare 
rights to physical security. (p. 38) 
 
Shue is certainly right that the secure enjoyment of physical security is of greater interest 
to right-holders than merely not having one’s physical security violated contingently. This 
observation on its own cannot, however, support his conception of moral rights against 
its opponents, including those who endorse the claimability condition. Just because 
having guarantees against violations of our physical security is of greater interest to us 
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than merely not having our physical security violated as a matter of contingency does not 
give us any reason to think that there is no morally relevant distinction to be drawn 
between the two. Furthermore, the inference from the enjoyment of some substance 
being of great interest to right-holders to the existence of a right to that substance can 
only be drawn on LPA, and not DRA. As such, Shue’s account seems to presuppose 
LPA.  
 Shue’s point, it seems, is that, given the importance of secure enjoyment of the 
substances of rights, insofar as we take rights seriously, we should not downplay the 
importance of the duties to protect right-holders against standard threats to the 
enjoyment of the substance of their rights. I think this is a point of crucial importance in 
thinking about the implementation of rights. I doubt, however, that it is sufficient to 
support Shue’s conception of moral rights and his defence of the human right to 
subsistence. In order to support his conception of moral rights along these lines, it would 
have to be the case that the importance of the secure enjoyment of rights, and so the 
importance of the duties to protect right-holders against standard threats to their 
enjoyment of the substance of their rights, cannot be adequately captured by competing 
conceptions of moral rights, in particular DRA, according to which only perfect duties 
can correlate with rights. I will argue in what follows that this is not the case.  
 
We have seen that in support of blurring the distinction between ‘liberty rights’ and 
‘welfare rights’, Shue argues that the we have a very strong interest not only having the 
substance of our rights, but also protection of that substance. The question I will address 
here is whether this really counts as a point in support of his view that there is no 
morally relevant distinction between ‘liberty rights’ and ‘welfare rights’. I will argue that it 
does not. I will argue that DRA is compatible with a qualified version of the account of 
the deontic pluralism of rights that underlies the rejection of the distinction between 
‘liberty rights’ and ‘welfare rights’. As we shall see, however, the version of deontic 
pluralism that the proponent of DRA could endorse does not support the rejection of 
the distinction between ‘liberty rights’ and ‘welfare rights’. I argue, however, that it is just 
as adept as the version of deontic pluralism  on LPA at accounting for the truth of 
Shue’s claim about the importance of the protection of rights.  
 
DRA is clearly compatible with deontic pluralism understood simply as the idea that the 
fulfillment of a given right can entail the discharging of duties on the part of multiple 
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agents. As we have seen, the right against torture on DRA entails negative duties on the 
part of  all other moral agents to refrain from torture. In order for this right to be 
fulfilled, all of the agents against whom it is held must discharge their duties. If so much 
as one person engages in torture, the victim’s right against torture goes unfulfilled. This is 
equally true on LPA, but the proponent of LPA would add that the fulfillment of a right 
can include the discharging of duties with different content, some held against all other 
agents and others held against particular agents.  
This too, however, is compatible with DRA. There is no reason that DRA should 
preclude rights whose substance is a conjunction of different acts or abstentions on the 
part of multiple others. A spectator might have a right to a musical performance by 
Simon and Garfunkel on the basis of having purchased a ticket to their show. This is a 
right to Simon singing along with Garfunkel and Garfunkel singing along with Simon. 
Simon therefore has a duty to sing along with Garfunkel and Garfunkel has a duty to 
sing along with Simon, and if either of them defects, then the spectator’s right to a 
musical performance by Simon and Garfunkel goes unfulfilled. These sorts of rights, that 
is, rights with conjunctive substances, are what Pogge has referred to as ‘programmatic 
rights’.102 A programmatic right can be decomposed into a number of rights, each with a 
non-conjunctive substance. In order for the assertion of a programmatic right to be 
meaningful, we must be able to make good on each of the individual components of its 
substance by providing justification for the claim and by identifying the relevant duty-
bearers and the content of their duties.  
The upshot of this condition is that, while having a right to physical security and 
protection against assaults to one’s physical security may be extremely important to 
people, in the absence of the relevant institutions, only the former conjunct is the 
substance of a fundamental right on DRA. People certainly might have the right to 
physical security and the right to have their right to physical security protected, and 
indeed many do in societies with effective institutional mechanisms for securing rights to 
physical security. But absent the relevant institutional mechanisms, the duty to protect 
people’s rights to physical security is imperfect, and is therefore not the substance of any 
right on DRA.  
Although very important interests can and do ground rights, just because there is 
a very important interest in some substance does not entail that there is a right to that 
substance on DRA. This, as we have seen, is because what rights there are is constrained !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
102 ‘Shue on Rights and Duties’, p. 124. 
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at least by the logical structure of rights. While DRA is compatible with deontic 
pluralism, this does not change the fact that the relevant addressees and the content of 
their duties must be determinate in order for there to be a right. So just because there is 
an important interest not just in enjoying the substance of one’s right, but in enjoying it 
securely does not entail that there is a fundamental right to have the enjoyment of one’s 
right socially guaranteed.  
I began by suggesting that Shue is right in saying that having the right to a 
substance without having the enjoyment of that right securely is not of great interest to 
right-holders as compared to having the right to the substance socially guaranteed. Given 
what I have just said about how DRA makes sense of deontic pluralism, is it compatible 
with this claim? I argue that it is. There is a further addition to DRA’s account of deontic 
pluralism that is relevant here. It involves distinguishing between duties entailed by a right 
and those correlative to it.103 On this view, a duty that is correlative to a right is one that is 
directly entailed by it; it is one whose violation constitutes the violation of the right. 
Other duties may be indirectly entailed by the right in two ways: First, the reasons that 
support the existence of the right might equally support other rights that themselves 
entail correlative duties. In this sense, the existence of a first right entails the existence of 
a second right, and thus indirectly entails the existence of the duty correlative to the 
second right. 
Alternatively, the reasons supporting the existence of a right might entail the 
existence of other duties that do not correlate with any particular right. So in the example 
of the human right against torture, we might understand the duty to enforce the duty to 
abstain from torture as a duty that is correlative to a right to the enforcement of the duty 
to abstain from torture; or we might understand it as an imperfect duty that is justified 
on the same grounds as the right not to be tortured (namely the interest in enjoying 
freedom from torture), but that does not correlate with any right to the enforcement of 
the duty to abstain from torture. Either way, proponents of this account will deny that 
the fulfillment of the duty to enforce the duty to abstain from torture is necessary for the 
fulfillment of the right against torture.  
On the kind of account just described, we might distinguish between the broad 
deontic implications of a right which include all those duties directly or indirectly entailed 
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103 Pogge makes this distinction in ‘Severe Poverty as a Human Rights Violation’, in Freedom from 
Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes What to the Very Poor?, ed. by Thomas Pogge (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press and UNESCO, 2007), pp. 11-53 (p. 20). 
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by the right, whether they correlate with other rights or not, and the narrow deontic 
implications of a right which are confined to its one correlative duty (which could, 
however, be held by any number of agents). We might say that the right is respected insofar 
as its narrow deontic implications are satisfied, and that it is enjoyed insofar as its broad 
deontic implications are satisfied. This is compatible with both DRA and LPA. Although 
Shue is right to emphasize the importance of enjoyment, his conflation of what I am 
calling respect with enjoyment is unnecessary to ensure that enjoyment is taken seriously. 
The proponent of DRA can agree that the enjoyment of a right is incredibly important; 
but she will also point out that the enjoyment of a right might require actions on the part 
of agents to which there is no correlative right. The deontic implications of a right could 
include imperfect duties that are themselves not correlative to any right.  
This is not intended as an argument for preferring DRA over LPA. Rather, it is 
just meant to point out that LPA enjoys no particular advantage over DRA with respect 
to its capacity to account for the importance of the enjoyment of rights. I have argued 
that DRA can accommodate the idea that the enjoyment of rights is of greater interest to 
right-holders than the mere respect of them. Furthermore, it is compatible with there 
being stringent moral requirements to promote the enjoyment of rights where they exist. 
But the proponent of DRA will insist that, while it may be the case that all rights give rise 
to reasons to promote their enjoyment, in order to give rise to such reasons the right 
must be justified in the first place. O’Neill argues that this condition is not met in the 
case of universal welfare rights but that it is in the case of liberty rights. The version of 
deontic pluralism compatible with DRA still allows for a meaningful distinction between 
these two kinds of rights. Both sorts of rights may well be understood as programmatic 
rights. But when it comes to fundamental moral rights, only those conjuncts in the 
substance of the right can be maintained which are claimable in the absence of 
institutions. Whereas something recognizable remains in the case of liberty rights, in the 
case of welfare rights we are left just with the claim held against all others that they not 
deprive us of access to the means for subsistence. I will eventually argue that this is 
worth more attention than it typically receives; but for the moment, the important point 
is that this precludes the conventional interpretation of the human right to subsistence. 
The point of this section has been to show that LPA has no obvious advantage 
over DRA with respect to accounting for the highly plausible claims that what people 
care about most is securely enjoying their rights. I have argued that much hinges on the 
distinction between the fulfillment of rights and their enjoyment. The arguments 
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discussed earlier in this chapter tend to blur this distinction. In particular, they assume 
that something that is necessary for the enjoyment of a right must also itself be the 
substance of a right.  
 
I have so far shown that the Basic Rights Argument in assuming LPA assumes a 
conception of rights that is at odds with the conception of rights that underlies the 
claimability objection, namely DRA. Without providing reasons for preferring LPA over 
DRA, the Basic Rights Argument fails to provide an adequate response to the 
claimability objection. In section 3.3 I will discuss whether an interpretation of the 
human right to subsistence based on LPA can be vindicated, but in the meantime I will 
turn to another influential argument offered in defence of the human right to subsistence 
that I argue suffers from similar shortcomings to the Basic Rights Argument.  
 
3.2.3.  The Interest Argument 
The claimability condition, as we have seen, precludes the correlation of imperfect duties 
with rights. A convincing argument showing that imperfect duties can correlate with 
rights would therefore provide a strong case against the claimability condition. Jeremy 
Waldron has attempted to advance such an argument.104  
 
Waldron acknowledges that the duties of assistance correlative to the human right to 
subsistence are imperfect, at least until institutions have been put in place; but he does 
not see this as a problem in affirming a human right to subsistence. Waldron’s argument, 
like Shue’s, plays on controversy at the level of rights theory. Waldron’s argument makes 
explicit what is implicit in the Basic Rights Argument: that we should not take for 
granted the orthodoxy according to which only perfect duties correlate with rights.  
Waldron’s argument rests on the observation that there is some morally relevant 
variation among imperfect duties. He argues that this variation can be expressed in terms 
of rights. In particular, he argues that the morally relevant difference between some 
imperfect duties and others is that some correspond to rights while others do not. 
Waldron asks us to consider and compare two cases.  In the first case, (1), we encounter 
Smith who is drawing up his will. Although he is inclined to give the value of his entire 
estate to a charity for dogs, he recognizes some moral obligation to leave at least some !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
104 ‘Rights and Duties: Two Sides of the Coin’, in his Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 1981-1991, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 1-34 (pp. 14-17). 
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money to some member of his family. Insofar as he has this obligation, and insofar as 
there is no morally relevant reason to prefer leaving the inheritance to any particular 
family member, Smith’s duty is imperfect. Smith may therefore choose at random which 
of his family members will be his heir. Smith’s duty to leave some money to a family 
member is imperfect since none of his family members has a claim on him that he leave 
money to them in particular, and his duty is fulfilled insofar as he leaves at least some 
money to at least one of his family members.  
 Waldron contrasts this case with (2), the case of Jones who is a wealthy 
philanthropist.105 Although Jones recognizes that he has a moral obligation to help 
people in need, he also recognizes that his wealth is not sufficient to help all those in 
need. Jones’s duty, like Smith’s, is therefore imperfect since no particular person in need 
has a claim to receive assistance from Jones. Jones’s duty is fulfilled insofar as he helps as 
many people as his resources allow (taking into account whatever the relevant limits are 
on the extent of required sacrifice), but he is free to choose from among those in need 
which ones he will assist.  
 Despite Smith and Jones both having imperfect duties, Waldron argues that there 
is an important difference between these two cases. The difference, he argues, has to do 
with what can be said about those who do not benefit from the fulfillment of the duty in 
question, but who might have. According to Waldron, in (1) if Smith does not fulfil his 
duty to benefit at least one of his family members, each of his family members has cause 
for complaint. Their complaint in this case would not be that he has not benefitted them 
in particular, but that he has not benefitted anyone from among the group of potential 
beneficiaries of which each plaintiff is a member. But once Smith has fulfilled this duty, 
Waldron notes that those who were not benefited no longer have cause for complaint 
even though they themselves received no benefit.  
Waldron goes on to argue that all those in desperate need who could have been 
helped by Jones likewise have cause for complaint if Jones fails to fulfil his duty to 
benefit at least some of them; but in contrast to the Smith case, Waldron argues that 
those who are not benefited by the fulfillment of Jones’s duty but who might have been 
retain their cause for complaint. This, he thinks is on account of their having moral !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
105 What Waldron refers to as a ‘wealthy philanthropist’ is perhaps better characterized as 
someone who is able (taking into account whatever the relevant limits are on the extent of 
required sacrifices) to make some contribution to alleviating the plight of those suffering from 
severe poverty. Such people are wealthy at least relative to those they might assist, but they need 
not be philanthropists in order to bear duties of assistance. 
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standing not just as potential beneficiaries of Jones’s imperfect duty, but also as potential 
beneficiaries of the imperfect duties of the many other wealthy philanthropists of the 
world. So even when Jones has fulfilled his duty, the persistence of severe poverty 
suggests that others have not fulfilled theirs, giving those who remain in desperate need 
cause for complaint.  
Waldron argues that the moral difference between these two cases can be 
expressed in terms of rights. He thinks the reason that the potential beneficiaries of the 
Smiths’ imperfect duties have no cause for complaint should they not be benefitted is 
because they do not have a right to inheritance.106 By contrast, the reason that the 
potential beneficiaries of the imperfect duties of Jones and the other wealthy 
philanthropists retain cause for complaint when they have not been benefited is because 
they have a right to assistance. This, Waldron thinks, holds true despite the fact that the 
relevant duties are imperfect. Waldron claims, then, to have provided an example of 
imperfect duties correlating with a right.  
In reply, however, we might note that there is another way of accounting for the 
moral difference between (1) and (2). The difference has to do with the presence of other 
duty-bearers. We should note that in (2), even if it is the case that those not benefitted by 
the fulfillment of Jones’s duty retain cause for complaint, they do not retain cause for 
complaint against Jones. Rather, their complaints can now only be directed at those duty-
bearers who have not fulfilled their duties. If there were no one else who could assist 
those in need, presumably Waldron would agree that, as in (1), those not benefitted have 
no more cause for complaint on account of having no one to complain against. In this 
way, we can account for the moral difference between (1) and (2) without invoking 
rights.  
But this analysis neglects another important point that Waldron raises, but does 
not, I think, develop adequately. Waldron rightly suggests that ‘Jones and his [wealthy 
philanthropist] friends may think that something has gone wrong if all of them end up 
(accidentally) lavishing their charity on the same few persons or if, after all of them have 
fulfilled their imperfect duties, some indigents have still not received any benefits at 
all’.107 By contrast, we can imagine a parallel case in which Smith’s siblings, all writing !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
106 This should not be confused with the claim that people have or do not have a right to inherit. 
The right to inherit is understood primarily as a right not to be prohibited from inheriting goods. 
The right being denied here is the right to be made an heir. I think this is reasonably 
uncontroversial.  
107 ‘Rights and Duties’, p. 16. 
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their wills, find themselves in the same situation as Smith (and therefore bound by the 
same duty). I think it is less clear in this case that anything has gone wrong – let alone 
terribly wrong – if each sibling chooses the same family member as their heir. The 
relevant difference between (1) and (2) therefore concerns what can be said of the 
situation in which all the relevant duty-bearers have fulfilled their duties, and yet some 
potential beneficiaries nevertheless remain unbenefitted, despite it having been possible for all 
to be benefitted.  
But why is it that something has gone wrong in case the duty-bearers in (2) but 
not in (1) all benefit the same few potential beneficiaries leaving others unbenefitted, 
despite it having been possible for all to be benefitted? On Waldron’s account, it is 
because the potential beneficiaries in (2) have a right to assistance whereas the potential 
beneficiaries in (1) do not have a right to the inheritance. This can plausibly be chalked 
up to the importance of the interest in avoiding severe poverty. While I think this comes 
closer to capturing the moral difference between (1) and (2), I do not think that it 
adequately supports Waldron’s claim that imperfect duties can correlate with rights.  
Waldron’s suggestion is that the importance of this interest and the feasibility of 
it being fulfilled for everyone in need through the actions of others are together 
sufficient to affirm a right to assistance, despite the relevant duties being imperfect. He 
argues that  
Our concept of a right is loose enough to be defined in a way that accommodates 
what we want to use it to say. It would be crazy if a philosophically controversial 
view about the tightness of the relation between rights and duties were to 
preclude us from using the language of rights to mark the difference between 
what we think about case (1) and what we think about case (2), above’.108  
This argument picks up on the central point that I am trying to emphasize in this 
chapter, namely that the disagreement over the human right to subsistence hinges on 
what counts as a right. Waldron’s point is just that there is a recognizable difference 
between case (1) and case (2), and one way of expressing this difference is through the 
language of rights. We might note that expressing the difference between case (1) and 
case (2) in terms of rights is compatible with LPA, but not DRA. Ultimately, Waldron’s 
argument aims to show that there is a conception of rights according to which the 
difference between various imperfect duties is considered a difference with respect to 
rights. The conception of rights Waldron has in mind is a conception along the lines of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
108 ‘Right and Duties’, p. 16. 
 79!
the Razian account discussed above according to which ‘to invoke a right is to predicate 
a duty on some concern for a certain individual interest’.109  As we have seen, on this 
conception of rights, a right is justified based on the importance of the interest it 
protects. Claimability is not a condition on the justified affirmation of rights on this sort 
of account.  
 
John Tasioulas has recently mounted a similar defence of the conventional interpretation 
of the human right to subsistence.110 He explicitly endorses a Razian account of rights 
according to which ‘a right exists if an individual’s interest, taken by itself, has the 
requisite kind of importance to justify the imposition of duties on others variously to 
respect, protect, and promote that interest’.111  He argues that we are therefore justified in 
affirming a human right to subsistence based on the fact that the interest in having access 
to the means for subsistence is of tremendous importance to all persons, and on its own 
sufficient to justify holding others to be under duties to respect, protect, and promote 
this interest.  
As we have seen, the claimability objection hinges on the view that universal 
rights must entail universal duties.  If they do not, then some mechanism is required for 
establishing who owes what to whom. So far, Tasioulas, and indeed Waldron and Shue, 
will be in agreement: If the duties owed to any given individual are not owed by every 
moral agent, then we need to establish by whom they are owed. The central difference 
between these two accounts is that according to the claimability condition, we cannot 
justifiably affirm a right until the relevant duty-bearers and the content of their duties 
have been identified, whereas Shue, Waldron, and Tasioulas deny that this is the case. 
Tasioulas, for example, argues that 
Although it would be pleasingly symmetrical, there is no implication that the duties 
[corresponding to universally-held rights] must also be universal (i.e., that all 
persons bear the duties correlative to the human rights enjoyed by all).112  
Likewise, Shue argues that  ‘[u]niversal rights (…) entail not universal duties, but full 
coverage’.113 Shue goes on to argue that a division of moral labour is required in order to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
109 Waldron refers here to Raz as well as to Neil MacCormick, whose account of rights was 
influential for Raz. ‘Rights and Duties’, p. 16. 
110 ‘The Moral Reality of Human Rights’. 
111 ‘The Moral Reality of Human Rights’, p. 77 
112 Ibid. 
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ensure the fulfillment of universal rights when the duties entailed are positive. The idea is 
that the positive duties corresponding to a given universal right are initially imperfect, but 
can be perfected through the introduction of patterns of cooperation.  
Interestingly, one could agree that universal rights do not entail universal duties, 
and yet still hold that human rights must be doubly universal. A right that is universal in 
scope could, in principle, not be universal in obligation. But as we saw in Chapter 2, the 
reason that that human rights are thought to be doubly universal is on account of their 
being fundamental. It might be that some universal rights do not entail universal duties, 
but O’Neill’s point is that insofar as we take a right to be fundamental, it must entail 
universal duties. Tasioulas does not deny that human rights are fundamental rights – 
rights held simply in virtue of our humanity. They are not, on his view, held in virtue of 
any special relationships. This, however, poses a problem: If a human right is not held 
against all moral agents, then some criteria are necessary in order to decide who the duty-
bearers are. As O’Neill’s argument implies, no criteria are available such that their 
application will, in all instances, yield a determinate attribution of duties to specific duty-
bearers. As such, institutions are required to place agents able to assist in a special 
relationship to certain persons in need. The objection is thus that the right can therefore 
not be fundamental since this means that it is held in virtue of the value to all persons of 
having access to the means for subsistence, but also in virtue of the particular relationship 
in which the right-holder is placed by the relevant institutional arrangements to those 
who are assigned the duties. Tasioulas’s reply is that this is to confuse the existence of a 
right with its implementation.114 On LPA, the implementation of all rights requires that 
specific duties be assigned to specific agents; but this is taken to be a separate matter 
from the justified affirmation of a right. On their view, we can justifiably affirm a right 
before knowing who the relevant duty-bearers are and the content of their duties.  
Tasioulas goes on to argue that indeterminacy in the content of duties and 
identification of duty-bearers does not threaten the existence of a right, but rather 
‘reflects a healthy plurality of mechanisms for securing the right’.115 This, he argues, is 
because, following Raz, he takes rights to be dynamic.  To say that rights, or more 
specifically their deontic implications, are dynamic means that the fulfillment of a right 
can be multiply realizable: Some rights can be fulfilled in a number of different ways !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
113 ‘Mediating Duties’, p. 690. 
114 ‘The Moral Reality of Human Rights’, p. 93. 
115 ‘The Moral Reality of Human Rights’, p.94. 
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involving different combinations of acts and abstentions on the part of others. Affirming 
that the deontic implications of rights can be dynamic constitutes a denial of the 
claimability condition. This is because the dynamism of rights affirms that it can 
simultaneously be the case that X is a right and that the deontic implications of X are not 
determinate. This is precisely what the claimability condition precludes.  
 
3.2.4.  Trouble with the Interest Argument 
What I have shown so far is that both Waldron and Tasioulas defend the conventional 
interpretation of the human right to subsistence against the claimability objection by 
explicitly affirming LPA. While LPA can undoubtedly accommodate a human right to 
subsistence given the tremendous value for all persons of having access to the means for 
subsistence, the trouble with both of their arguments is that, like the Basic Right 
Argument, they simply presuppose this conception of rights. Neither Waldron nor 
Tasioulas provides any reason for thinking that LPA is superior to DRA.  
 Waldron’s argument might be more convincing if it were the case that the 
conception of rights according to which rights cannot correlate with imperfect duties 
cannot adequately account for the moral difference between case (1) and case (2) above. 
If it could be shown both that there is no other satisfactory way of expressing the 
difference between the two cases but through the vocabulary of rights, and that all of the 
duties involved genuinely are imperfect, proponents of the claimability condition would 
have cause to re-assess their conception of rights.  I argue, however, that DRA can 
provide a satisfactory account of the moral difference between (1) and (2). As such, 
Waldron’s argument, like the Basic Rights Argument, is incomplete.   
 As we have seen, the moral difference between case (1) and case (2) has to do 
with what can be said of the situation in which each duty-bearer has discharged her duty, 
and yet some potential beneficiaries remain unbenefitted despite it having been possible 
for all potential beneficiaries to receive some benefit. It seems plausible to suppose that 
there is nothing morally problematic about this situation with respect to case (1), whereas 
something has indeed gone terribly wrong if this happens in case (2). The question is 
whether this difference can be adequately accounted for without attributing rights to the 
potential beneficiaries in case (2). I think it can.  
 While imperfect duties admit of discretion in their fulfillment, it is a mistake to 
think that all imperfect duties admit of a wide degree of discretion. What is required in 
order to fulfil an imperfect duty may depend on features of the circumstances in which 
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the duty-bearer finds himself, and the features of the circumstances in which the duty-
bearer finds himself serve to limit the ways in which his imperfect duty might be fulfilled. 
The relevant features of one’s circumstances must therefore be taken into account in 
deciding how to discharge one’s imperfect duties.  
 When ascertaining how to discharge one’s imperfect duty to assist those in dire 
need, I argue that the relevant features of one’s circumstances include what others are 
doing. If all of Waldron’s wealthy philanthropists accidentally lavish their charity on the 
same few individuals, leaving others in dire need, this is because they have each failed to 
take into account what the others will be doing. We can understand the moral fault of 
this situation to lie in the fact that the duty-bearers failed to take into account all the 
morally relevant features of their circumstances in deciding how to discharge their own 
imperfect duties, and thus failed to properly discharge those duties. It might be pointed 
out that the same could be said in case (1) where there are multiple benefactors and 
multiple potential beneficiaries. Why should Smith and his siblings not be required to 
cooperate so as to ensure an equitable distribution of inheritance among their family 
members?  
The reason is, I think, in line with Waldron’s own view to the extent that it has to 
do with the interests of the family members in inheriting from Smith and his siblings. 
The thought is that these interests are not sufficient to warrant consideration in this case, 
whereas the interests that the needy in case (2) have in acquiring access to the means for 
subsistence is of sufficient importance as to warrant consideration in the deliberations of 
Jones and his wealthy philanthropist friends about how they ought to act. It is this 
distinction that Waldron characterizes in terms of rights. My query is that it is not clear 
what more we get out of characterizing it terms of rights as compared to characterizing it 
purely in terms of the relative importance of the interests in question. In the next 
chapter, I will provide a more detailed discussion of this question.  
 
I have outlined three related arguments in defence of the conventional interpretation of 
the human right to subsistence which are based on the rejection of the claimability 
condition. What these arguments have in common is they all presuppose, implicitly or 
explicitly, LPA. I argue that it is the viability of this conception of rights that is 
fundamentally at issue in the debate over the human right to subsistence and socio-
economic human rights in general. If LPA can be vindicated, it does indeed seem that we 
have reason to reject the claimability condition altogether. In the absence of reasons for 
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preferring this conception of rights, however, the arguments just discussed provide only 
a partial defence of the conventional interpretation of the human right to subsistence. In 
the following section, I turn to an assessment of the interpretation of the human right to 
subsistence based on LPA.  
 
3.3.  Towards Resolving the Dispute 
I have so far argued that (1) the conventional interpretation of the human right to 
subsistence and the claimability objection presuppose different and incompatible 
accounts of the nature, and particularly the logical structure, of rights; and (2) some 
influential arguments in defence of the conventional interpretation fail to address the 
claimability objection because they simply assume a conception of rights according to 
which claimability is not a condition. One way to proceed here would be to attempt to 
provide a decisive argument in favour of either LPA or DRA. If DRA could be 
vindicated and LPA rejected, then we would have to discard the arguments discussed in 
the previous section. On the other hand, if LPA could be vindicated, then the arguments 
discussed in the previous section would be complete. In this section, I will advance a 
slightly weaker argument. Rather than trying to show that LPA or DRA should prevail, I 
argue instead that understood according to LPA, the conventional interpretation does 
not provide a plausible account of the human right to subsistence. In this, I remain 
agnostic as to whether claimability is a condition on all rights, and argue instead that it is 
at least a condition on the justified affirmation of a human right to subsistence.     
My argument hinges on my earlier claim that the justifiability of affirming a 
human right to subsistence requires that it make a distinctive contribution to reasoning 
about the normative implications of global poverty. Theorizing about human rights does 
not take place in a vacuum. Just as theorizing about legal rights must make reference to 
the legal context and purpose of rights, so too must theorizing about human rights – as 
moral rights – make reference to their normative context and role in normative 
reasoning. My claim in this section is that unless the duties correlative to the human right 
to subsistence are claimable, this condition remains unfulfilled. 
 
3.3.1.  The Human Right to Subsistence and the Normative Implications of Global Poverty 
In Chapter 1, I outlined the central questions concerning the normative implications of 
global poverty. These include the question of which agents bear remedial responsibility 
for the deprivations experienced by the global poor as well as the question of what 
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responses are warranted when these responsibilities are shirked. I argued that a plausible 
account of the human right to subsistence must make some distinctive contribution to 
answering at least one of these questions, and I suggested that it is with respect to the 
justified responses on the part of first and third parties that it is likely to do so. I argue in 
this section that interpreted according to LPA, the human right to subsistence in fact 
fails to make this or any other distinctive contribution to reasoning about the normative 
implications of global poverty.  
 
In a sense Raz himself concedes the point that rights according to his conception make 
no distinctive contribution to normative reasoning. On his account, we can move directly 
from interests to duties without positing rights at all; but positing rights serves the 
purpose of making reference to these arguments easier, and also highlighting how 
different premises at the level of values can lead to the same conclusions about duties. In 
this respect, the affirmation of a right serves a distinctive purpose in moral and political 
discourse, namely by facilitating it; yet it does not make a distinctive contribution to 
reasoning about the specific normative implications of a situation. The affirmation of a 
right merely signals that it is justifiable to hold agents to be under duties with respect to 
the interests of others. The right itself does no justificatory work. Furthermore, it 
contributes nothing to determining which agents owe which duties to which right-
holders, nor what right-holders and third parties are entitled or required to do when the 
duties in question are not fulfilled.  
The affirmation of a right on the Razian account is just the re-statement of a 
given set of premises using a different term, in much the same way as one might affirm 
on the basis of having two fifty-pence coins that one has a pound. Understood on the 
Razian account, the human right to subsistence is an essentially redundant conclusion in 
an argument from the importance for all persons of having access to the means for 
subsistence to duties to respect, protect, and promote their enjoyment of access to the 
means for subsistence. Referring to a human right to subsistence allows us to remain 
neutral with respect to which specific values give rise to duties – on our analogy, which 
specific combination of small coins yields our one pound. But as far as working out the 
normative implications of global poverty, the affirmation of a human right to subsistence 
says nothing more than that there is at least one argument from the value of having 
access to the means for subsistence to duties on the part of others to respect, protect, 
and promote this value. This does not contribute anything distinctive to answering the 
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questions of remedial and preventive responsibility, nor does it contribute to justifying 
actions in response to the failure to fulfil these responsibilities.  
 Defenders of the conventional interpretation of human right to subsistence do 
not typically endorse such a weak interpretation. Few would be happy to say that the 
affirmation of a human right to subsistence expresses nothing more than the observation 
that there are a number of arguments that lead to the conclusion that there are moral 
duties to respect, protect, and promote people’s enjoyment of access to the means for 
subsistence. The affirmation of a human right to subsistence is generally taken by its 
proponents to entail facts about the nature of the corresponding obligations. In 
particular, proponents of the conventional interpretation of the human right to 
subsistence generally endorse the view discussed in Chapter 1 according to which the 
duties correlative to rights are necessarily duties of justice, and are therefore justifiably 
enforceable, at least prima facie.  
This claim is, for example, at the core of Simon Caney’s argument in defence of 
the conventional interpretation of the human right to subsistence.116 He argues that we 
should see the duties to protect people from deprivation of and to provide them with 
access to the means for subsistence as duties of justice because otherwise, they will not 
be enforced. If this were the case, Caney notes that ‘there would be less compliance and 
more poverty’ (p. 299). He concludes that we should therefore prefer an account that 
characterizes the duties to protect people from deprivation of and to provide them with 
access to the means for subsistence as duties of justice, correlative to a human right to 
subsistence.  
An initial problem with Caney’s argument is that, as discussed in Chapter 1, there 
is no reason to think that duties of justice will necessarily be enforced. There is 
furthermore no reason to think that they are even more likely to be enforced than duties 
of beneficence. If this argument is to have any plausibility, it must therefore be weakened 
to the claim that if there is a human right to subsistence, then there will be prima facie 
justification to enforce whatever duties correlate with it. Since the human right to 
subsistence correlates with positive duties of protection and assistance on the 
conventional account, on this account, these duties are therefore prima facie justifiably 
enforceable. In the following sub-section, I raise some doubts about the success of this 
argument. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
116 Caney, ‘Global Poverty and Human Rights: The Case for Positive Duties’. 
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3.3.2.  The enforceability of duties to protect and assist 
If the duties correlative to human rights are duties of justice, and duties of justice are 
prima facie justifiably enforceable as such, then we can infer that the duties correlative to 
the human right to subsistence are prima facie justifiably enforceable as such. In this 
respect, it looks as though the affirmation of a human right to subsistence makes a 
distinctive contribution to reasoning about the normative implications of global poverty, 
particularly with respect to the sorts of responses that are warranted in case remedial and 
preventive responsibilities are neglected. Insofar as these responsibilities constitute duties 
correlative to the human right to subsistence, then it follows that the use of coercive 
force in guaranteeing their fulfillment is prima facie justifiable. In this section, I will 
suggest that this is actually not the case for the positive duties of protection and 
assistance. This, I will argue, is because in the absence of institutions, they do not 
correlate with the human right to subsistence in the way requisite for their enforcement 
to be justifiably enforceable as such. 
 My central claim is that the view that the positive duties of protection and 
assistance thought to correlate with the human right to subsistence on the conventional 
interpretation are enforceable neglects an important epistemic component of 
enforceability. Enforcement is never justified if it is arbitrary. In order for enforcement 
to be justified, we must know who can justifiably be coerced and what they can justifiably 
be coerced into doing. I argue that the force of the claimability objection is to underscore 
the indeterminacy of the relevant duties. Because the positive duties thought to correlate 
with the human right to subsistence on the conventional interpretation are imperfect and 
thus have indeterminate bearers and content, they cannot justifiably be enforced until it 
is established who owes what to whom. This is not what O’Neill herself argues, but my 
point here is that it provides the best way to understand the claimability objection. While 
it may be unclear clear why claimability itself matters to the justified affirmation of rights, 
its connection to enforceability makes its relevance more apparent. 
 Proponents of the conventional interpretation might reply that this is not 
damaging to their view since all they are saying is that once we establish who owes what to 
whom, those duties can prima facie justifiably be enforced. Interpreted according to LPA, 
the affirmation of a human right to subsistence admittedly contributes nothing to 
establishing who is remedially and preventively responsible. However, the claim on 
behalf of defenders of this account is that once it is worked out who owes what to 
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whom, the fact that these duties are necessary to fulfil a human right justifies their 
enforcement, at least prima facie.  
 I argue that the problem with this reply has to do with the allocation of duties. 
Miller helpfully distinguishes between the identification and assignment of responsibility.117 
The identification of responsibility can take place only when there is a fact of the matter 
about who is responsible. In cases where there is no fact of the matter, responsibility 
must be assigned. An identification of responsible agents can be correct or incorrect. By 
contrast, an assignment of responsibility to agents can be justified or unjustified, but not 
correct or incorrect since there is no fact of the matter to appeal to as a standard.  
 There might be principles for the identification of remedial responsibility that 
apply in some cases. We might think, for example, that the agent who is morally 
responsible for the bad situation is necessarily remedially responsible for it.118 This, 
however, will not be the case for the fundamental positive duties thought to correlate 
with the human right to subsistence since they are not owed on the basis of any prior 
interaction. It is acknowledged even by defenders of the conventional interpretation that 
the bearers of the positive duties thought to correlate with the human right to 
subsistence are indeterminate. As such, these duties cannot be identified; rather they must 
be assigned.  
 Given the vast number of people in need and vast number of agents able to 
assist, there will almost always be more than one justifiable assignment of the relevant 
duties. An important question therefore concerns who gets to do the assigning. My claim 
is that the justifiability of enforcement of duties that must be assigned rather than 
identified will depend in part on the legitimacy of the agent doing the assigning and 
enforcing. And this requires institutional arrangements. The positive duties thought to 
correlate with the human right to subsistence will therefore not be justifiably enforceable 
as such in the absence of institutions. This, I think, is the best way of interpreting 
O’Neill’s point.  
 A defender of the conventional interpretation might reply that if there are 
multiple distributions of duties that are morally equivalent (no moral principle make one 
preferable to the others), then they are each prima facie justifiably enforceable. This !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
117 National Responsibility and Global Justice, p. 84.  
118 Miller himself does not think that there are any such straightforward principles, but it remains 
an open question whether there are. I discuss this further in Chapter 6. 
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thought requires careful formulation since it is not the case that there is prima facie 
justification to enforce all  of the options. If there is no moral difference between A 
assisting X while B assists Y, and A assisting Y while B assists X, the suggestion under 
consideration is that there is prima facie justification to enforce either  A’s duty to assist X 
and B’s duty to assist Y, or A’s duty to assist Y and B’s duty to assist X, but at any rate 
not both of these options. The claim, then, must be that insofar as there is a fundamental 
right to assistance, there is prima facie justification to enforce the exclusive disjunction of 
all the morally equivalent distributions of duties of assistance. That is to say that any one, 
but not all of the morally equivalent sets of duties can prima facie justifiably be enforced.  
In order to support this interpretation, it must be shown that it makes a distinctive 
contribution to reasoning about the normative implications of global poverty. I argue 
that in the absence of institutions, it does not.  
 I mentioned in the introductory chapter that the reason the duties correlative to 
rights are prima facie justifiably enforceable is that they stem from the legitimate demands 
of individuals. The duties correlative to rights unlike those that do not correlate with 
rights, are owed to particular individuals on the basis of the legitimate demands those 
individuals have. What it means for someone to owe you a duty is that you are prima facie 
justified in responding in certain ways when that duty goes unfulfilled. In particular, it is 
prima facie justifiable for you or someone acting on your behalf to use coercive force to 
exact performance of the duty in question. It follows from this, however, that a duty is 
only justifiably enforceable for this reasons if it is claimable on O’Neill’s account of 
claimability. Rights that are not claimable do not have duties that correlate with them in 
the sense required to warrant the use of coercive force in ensuring their performance. In 
such cases, institutions are required to assign duties to agents before any duties are even 
prima facie justifiably enforceable.  
 My point is that duties with indeterminate content cannot be justifiably 
enforceable until their content has been made more determinate. But because institutions 
are required for this, duties with indeterminate content are never prima facie justifiably 
enforceable as such, as a matter of fundamental justice: further justificatory contributions 
are always required.  
 A defender of the conventional interpretation of the human right to subsistence 
might point out that from the perspective of those in need, it does not matter which 
distribution of duties is chosen from among the set of morally equivalent fair 
distributions. While this is true, it does not help solve the problem that until one 
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distribution has been chosen, no one has a claim on any agent in particular, and so no 
duties can justifiably be enforced as such.  
 The point of this discussion has been to show that although we can infer that the 
duties correlative to rights are prima facie justifiably enforceable as such, in the absence of 
institutions, no positive duties correlate with the human right to subsistence in the right 
way for this to apply. As such, the human right to subsistence on the conventional 
interpretation does not make the contribution to reasoning about the normative 
implications of global poverty that some have argued it does.    
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—4— 
AVOIDING THE CLAIMABILITY OBJECTION 
 
 
 
 
I have argued that at the core of the debate between proponents of the claimability 
condition and defenders of the human right to subsistence is the question of the nature 
of moral rights. I have also suggested that the conventional interpretation of the human 
right to subsistence based on a conception of rights that denies the claimability condition 
struggles to make a distinctive contribution to reasoning about the normative 
implications of global poverty. O’Neill concludes that we should therefore abandon 
reference to the human right to subsistence altogether in reasoning about the normative 
implications of global poverty. I think that this is too hasty. It overlooks alternative 
interpretations of the human right to subsistence that promise conformity with the 
claimability condition. The arguments in defence of the human right to subsistence 
discussed in the previous chapter rejected the claimability objection on the basis of a 
denial of the claimability condition. In this chapter, I turn to a different strategy for 
overcoming the claimability objection. Rather than seeking to deny the claimability 
condition, the arguments that I discuss in this chapter and the next grant it, and instead 
consider whether a plausible account of the human right to subsistence is available that 
can fulfil it.  
In the following sections, I explore three alternative ways of defending the 
human right to subsistence that take for granted the claimability condition. One takes 
human rights in general to be claims held primarily against the coercive social institutions 
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imposed upon oneself. In section 4.1, I discuss an institutional account according to 
which the human right to subsistence is claimable for each individual against the coercive 
social institutions imposed upon her. This account deviates from the conventional 
interpretation in that it does not take human rights to be fundamental rights, but rather 
rights that arise out of the special relationship between individuals and coercive social 
institutions. I argue that this account fails because it arbitrarily limits the role of human 
rights. In section 4.2, I discuss a further alternative account of the human right to 
subsistence that involves interpreting the positive duty of assistance correlative to the 
human right to subsistence as a claim held against the collective of all those in a position 
to make some contribution to the alleviation of global poverty. I argue that this 
interpretation fails since the relevant collective cannot fulfil the necessary conditions for 
bearing duties. The final interpretation of the human right to subsistence that I discuss in 
section 4.3 of this chapter remains true to the conventional interpretation in that it takes 
human rights to be fundamental rights, but it deviates from the conventional 
interpretation in that it reinterprets the human right to subsistence as a right held against 
all others to respect, recognition, and consideration. Although of the three accounts I 
discuss here, I think this one provides the most plausible interpretation of the human 
right to subsistence in light of the claimability condition, it diverges considerably from 
how rights in general, and the human right to subsistence in particular, are generally 
understood. Furthermore, this account falls prey to some of the same problems as the 
interpretation of the conventional interpretation based on LPA discussed in the previous 
chapter. In the next chapter, I advance a fourth alternative interpretation of the human 
right to subsistence that I argue succeeds both in avoiding the claimability objection and 
in providing a plausible interpretation of this right.  
 
What these approaches all have in common is that they all grant the claimability 
condition and seek instead to challenge the second premise of the claimability objection, 
namely that the human right to subsistence is not claimable. Although I argue that none 
of the accounts discussed in this part ultimately succeed, I think that their broad 
approach has great potential to move the discussion forward. In particular, it is an 
appealing approach in that it allows us to circumvent deep-rooted differences over the 
nature of rights. My own argument in defence of the human right to subsistence which I 
advance in Chapters 5 and 6 takes this approach.  
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 It might be objected that my acceptance of the claimability condition is hasty in 
the absence of further reasons in support of DRA over LPA. I concede that I have 
offered only a tentative reason in support of maintaining the claimability condition as 
applied to the human right to subsistence, and I certainly think that further investigation 
is required in this area of rights theory. My hope, however, is to contribute to the 
discourse on the normative implications of global poverty without getting mired in 
debate at the level of rights theory. This is because debates at this level are long-standing 
and there is no clear path to their resolution. To reiterate, I do not mean to suggest that 
progress in these debates should not be pursued. Rather, my purpose here is simply to 
show that we can make progress in reasoning about the human right to subsistence and 
the normative implications of global poverty despite enduring tensions at the level of 
rights theory. Surely this is advantageous. 
 
4.1.  Institutionalism about Human Rights? 
The focus of this section will be on the work of Thomas Pogge. Pogge has made an 
important contribution to the literature on global poverty and the human right to 
subsistence and his account is worth discussing in detail here for at least two reasons. 
First, his account of the human right to subsistence promises to avoid the claimability 
objection. That said, Pogge’s account is not intended specifically as a reply to the 
claimability objection. Rather, Pogge’s account is widely interpreted as reply to the 
libertarian view outlined in Chapter 2 that duties of justice are only ever in the first place 
negative. As we shall see, Pogge grants this premise without necessarily endorsing it in 
order to show that, contrary to what is generally thought, it is consistent with a human 
right to subsistence and positive duties of justice on the part of the global rich to assist 
the global poor. I will argue that, in addition to promising to provide a reply to the 
libertarian argument, Pogge’s account offers a potential reply to the claimability 
objection. Nevertheless, I will argue that Pogge’s argument ultimately fails as a reply to 
both.119 Pogge’s account does, however, contain considerable insights, some of which I 
borrow in the account I advance in Chapter 5. 
 This brings us to the second reason that a detailed discussion of Pogge’s account 
is relevant here. The account that I advance in Chapter 5 shares much in common with 
Pogge’s account, particularly in that it seeks common ground from which the discussion !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
119 Tasioulas makes a similar point in ‘Philosophy, Criticism, and Community’, Journal of Applied 
Philosophy, 26 (2009), 259-268 (p. 262). 
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of the normative implications of global poverty can proceed. Understanding Pogge’s 
account and why I do not think it is successful will help to highlight the ways in which 
my own account differs from it and, hopefully, improves on it.  
 
4.1.1.  Pogge’s Institutional Account 
An important insight from Pogge is that the specific content of a right is not always 
given by how it is expressed.120 The right to life, for example, is not generally understood 
as a right not to die. Neither is it a right to have one’s life saved at all cost. A right to life 
may mean having a claim not to be killed, but even some killing is thought to be morally 
justifiable. So the right to life is more accurately characterized as giving the right-holder a 
claim not to be unjustifiably killed, and perhaps under certain conditions a claim to some 
life-preserving measures. While rights are often stated in lofty, abstract terms, the specific 
content of a right is given by its correlative duties. Pogge reminds us of this because 
many are quick to dismiss the possibility of a human right to subsistence on the grounds 
that human rights cannot have as their correlates positive duties of provision. Pogge 
invites us to consider a conception of the human right to subsistence according to which 
its content is not necessarily the provision of access to basic necessities on the part of all 
those who are able to do so. In this respect, Pogge’s account of the human right to 
subsistence represents a deviation from the conventional interpretation. On Pogge’s 
account, the content of the human right to subsistence is more complicated than this. As 
we shall see shortly, this has to do with his emphasis on the institutional side of human 
rights. Ultimately Pogge argues that we should interpret the human right to subsistence 
as a right not to have coercively imposed upon us any social institution under which we 
are foreseeably and avoidably subject to severe poverty. In what follows we shall take a 
closer look at what Pogge means by this and why he thinks we should endorse this 
account.     
Pogge’s approach is to grant the libertarian premise that fundamental duties of 
justice  can only be negative:  
My argument conceives (…) both human rights and justice as involving solely 
negative duties: specific minimal constraints – more minimal in the case of human 
rights – on what harms persons may inflict upon others.121 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
120 Pogge, ‘Severe Poverty as a Human Rights Violation’, p. 14. 
121 World Poverty and Human Rights, p. 13. 
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Pogge does not reveal whether or not he thinks this conception to be correct. He 
emphasizes, however, that his silence on this matter should not be taken as an 
endorsement of the view that there are no fundamental positive duties of justice.122  
In reply to those who reject the human right to subsistence on the basis of its 
correlation with positive duties of assistance it is often pointed out that it also correlates 
with the negative duty not to deprive others of access to the means for subsistence.123 
Interestingly, this is not the central duty that Pogge’s account is built on. The negative 
duty that Pogge primarily focuses on is the duty not to be complicit in or to benefit from 
the imposition on others of unjust coercive social institutions. A coercive social 
institution that deprives those upon whom it is imposed of access to the means for 
subsistence is, on Pogge’s account, unjust. But as we shall see shortly, his account of 
social injustice includes more than this.  
Pogge distinguishes his ‘institutional’ account of human rights from 
‘interactional’ conceptions that place ‘the treatment of human beings under certain 
constraints that do not presuppose the existence of social institutions.’124 On an 
interactional conception, human rights provide norms that govern, primarily 
interpersonal interaction. The duty not to deprive people of access to the means for 
subsistence is a norm of interpersonal interaction. By contrast, Pogge’s institutional 
understanding sees human rights ‘primarily as claims on coercive social institutions and 
secondarily as claims on those who uphold such institutions.’125 Human rights on an 
institutional conception therefore provide norms that govern the conduct of individuals 
indirectly.  
 Inspiration for Pogge’s institutionalism about human rights comes from Article 
28 of the UDHR according to which ‘Everyone is entitled to a social and international 
order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully 
realized’.126 This formulation is, however, open to some interpretation. First of all, it is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
122 ‘Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties’, Ethics & International Affairs, 19 (2005), 55-
83 (pp. 65-66, p. 74). 
123 See, notably, Shue, Basic Rights, Chapter 2. This claim is central to my own account advanced 
in Chapter 5. I return to it there.  
124 World Poverty and Human Rights, p. 45. 
125 World Poverty and Human Rights, p.45. Although Pogge focuses on the institutional 
interpretation of human rights, he concedes that human rights might also have interactional 
elements as well. See ‘Human Rights as a Violation of Negative Duties’, pp. 65-66. 
126 Pogge sites Article 28 in a number of places including World Poverty and Human Rights, p. 1, p. 
64; ‘Human Rights and Human Responsibilities’, in Global Responsibilities: Who Must Deliver on 
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not clear whether this right simply constrains morally what sorts of social institutions can 
be coercively imposed on persons, or whether it mandates the creation of new social 
institutions when this would make possible the full realization of human rights. Given his 
focus on negative duties, Pogge remains neutral on whether this right entitles people to 
the creation of new institutions, and focuses instead on the constraint it imposes on 
existing and hypothetical institutions.  
Secondly, it is not clear what constitutes an institutional order in which human 
rights can be fully realized. Elucidating this requires an account of what it means for a 
right to be fully realized. Pogge equates full realization of rights with their fulfillment. On 
one interpretation, a right is fulfilled insofar as it is, as a matter of fact, not being violated 
by any moral agent. But Pogge’s account is rather more demanding than this. On his 
account, ‘a human right is fulfilled for some person if and only if this person enjoys secure 
access to the object of this human right’.127 In most cases, this will involve institutional 
guarantees to the objects of human rights.128 Pogge recognises that no institution can 
absolutely guarantee secure access to the objects of human rights to all those upon 
whom it is imposed; however, he holds that in order for human rights to be fully 
realized, the enjoyment of their objects must be protected against standard threats.129 In 
many cases this will require a great deal of social planning and infrastructure that may go 
well beyond the intended function of the institutions in question. Furthermore, this will 
inevitably entail costs for those involved in the imposition of the institutions in 
question.130 
Finally, interpreting Article 28 requires the provision of an account of how we 
can ascertain whether human rights can be fully realized within a given institutional 
order. It seems plausible to suppose that we know that an institutional order fulfils this 
condition if (and only if) the incomplete realization of any human rights cannot be 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Human Rights, ed. by Andrew Kuper (New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 3-36 (p. 14); and ‘Severe 
Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties’, p. 11. 
127 ‘Human  Rights and Human Responsibilities’, p. 15. 
128 Pogge acknowledges, however, that the object of a right can be socially guaranteed without 
being institutionally guaranteed. See World Poverty and Human Rights, p. 45. 
129 The idea of ‘standard threats’ to the enjoyment of the object of a right is borrowed from Shue, 
Basic Rights. Although Pogge himself does not specifically invoke Shue’s work in this case, it 
seems to be what he has in mind. 
130 As discussed in 3.2.1., it is on similar grounds that Shue famously rejects the distinction 
between positive (welfare) and negative (liberty) rights in Basic Rights, Chapter 2.  
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attributed to the order in question. But when can we attribute the incomplete realization 
or non-realization of rights to a given institutional order?  
On one account, we can attribute the incomplete realization of human rights to 
an institutional order if reforming that institutional order is necessary for human rights to 
be fully realized. That is to say that we can attribute the incomplete realization of human 
rights to an institutional order if there are no modifications that can feasibly be made to 
any other factors affecting the realization of human rights such that these rights could be 
fully realized without modifying the institutional order in question. This account involves 
keeping constant the structure of the institutional order under evaluation and asking 
whether it is possible to arrange other factors affecting the realization of human rights in 
such a way that human rights are fully realized. If this can be accomplished, then on this 
account human rights can be fully realized under that institutional order.   
This, however, is not the account that Pogge favours. Rather, he claims that, 
‘how fully human rights can be realized in some institutional order is measured by how 
fully these human rights generally are (…) realized in it’.131 Note that on the account 
outlined in the previous paragraph, it is possible for human rights not to be fully realized 
in general, but for their full realization nevertheless to be possible under the institutional 
order in question. On Pogge’s view, the incomplete realization of human rights can be 
attributed to an institutional order if there are feasible alternatives to the way the 
institutional order is structured that would guarantee that human rights are fully realized, 
or at least that they are realized to the greatest possible extent given practical constraints.  
Given the various ways in which the components of Article 28 can be 
understood, we are left with a range of interpretations of the right expressed in it. At one 
extreme is the minimalist interpretation and at the other extreme is the maximalist 
interpretation.  
Minimalist Interpretation of Article 28: Everyone has a claim against anyone involved in 
coercively imposing upon them an institutional order that the institutional order in 
question not be structured in such a way that makes it impossible for the other 
rights and freedoms set out in the UDHR to not be violated.  
Maximalist Interpretation of Article 28: Everyone has a claim against anyone involved in 
coercively imposing upon them an institutional order that the institutional order in 
question be structured in such a way as to ensure their enjoyment of secure access 
to the objects of the other rights and freedoms set out in the UDHR, and everyone !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
131 ‘Human Rights and Human Responsibilities’, p. 14. 
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is also entitled to the creation of new institutional orders that make possible the 
secure enjoyment of the objects of their human rights where this is not otherwise 
possible.   
 
Pogge’s interpretation falls somewhere in between these two extremes, but slightly 
closer to the maximalist interpretation.  
Pogge’s Interpretation of Article 28: Everyone at least has a claim against anyone involved 
in coercively imposing upon them an institutional order that the institutional order 
in question be structured in such a way as to ensure their enjoyment of secure 
access to the objects of the other rights and freedoms set out in the UDHR.  
It is notable that Pogge opts for more than the minimalist interpretation of Article 28 
given his aims of engaging with those who deny that duties of justice can extend to the 
positive provision of goods and services except by contract.  I will, however, return to 
this point over the course of what follows.  
 
So far we have seen that Pogge argues that there is a stringent universal negative duty of 
justice not to impose, be complicit in imposing, or benefit from the imposition of unjust 
coercive social institutions. He thinks that this is compatible with the libertarian view that 
fundamental duties of justice are only ever negative. On Pogge’s account, a social 
institution is unjust insofar as it could feasibly be modified in such a way that human 
rights deficits could be avoided. Rather than being understood as rights that all persons 
hold against all other moral agents, on Pogge’s account, human rights are, in the first 
place, claims held against the coercive social institutions imposed upon oneself. This may 
seem to have the odd implication that someone who is not subject to any coercive social 
institution does not therefore have any human rights.132  I do not, however, think that 
Pogge’s account need be interpreted in this way. Pogge holds that to have a human right 
to X is to have a claim against the social institutions coercively imposed upon oneself to 
guarantee one’s enjoyment of X. I argue that we should understand the human right to X 
on Pogge’s account, then, as a claim that no one coercively impose upon oneself a social 
institution that does not guarantee one’s enjoyment of X. In this respect, human rights 
are held by all humans, regardless of the social institutions that happen to be coercively 
imposed upon them, and against all moral agents. The idea is that, if there is a human 
right to X, the guarantee of X (among the other objects of human rights) is a condition !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
132 Thanks to Peter Jones for bringing this point to my attention.  
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on the justified coercive imposition of a social institution on any person.  This, we 
should note, is consistent with any substantive account of human rights.133 So in order to 
make any substantive evaluations of existing institutional orders based on this, what we 
now need is an account of what human rights there are.  
Pogge accepts that the justification of human rights must be widely-acceptable. 
In order to achieve this, he advances an account of human rights according to which 
they are grounded in widely accepted values. In order to accommodate the plurality of 
values held by people worldwide, Pogge thinks human rights are grounded not in any 
particular conception of human flourishing, but rather in ‘the social context and means 
that persons normally need, according to some broad range of plausible conceptions of 
what human flourishing consists in, to lead a minimally worthwhile life’.134 As the core 
criterion of basic social justice, human rights thus imply that (at least minimally) just 
social institutions are ones that are structured in such a way ‘that the persons affected by 
them can develop, deepen, and realize an ethical world view of their own’ (Ibid.). From 
this, Pogge argues that we can derive three categories of human rights: liberty of 
conscience, political participation, and basic goods.  
 The human right to subsistence falls under the category of rights to basic goods. 
The object of this right is access to the means for basic subsistence including adequate 
food, water, clothing, housing, and medical care. Pogge’s justification for including this 
right among human rights is that a person has no reasonable chance at living a minimally 
decent human life insofar as they lack access to the means for basic subsistence. The 
existence of a human right with access to the means for subsistence as its object on 
Pogge’s account means that any institutional order in which those on whom it is imposed 
cannot securely enjoy access to the means for subsistence but who could given certain 
feasible institutional reforms is unjust, and anyone who cooperates in upholding it is in 
violation of their negative duty not to impose upon others unjust coercive social 
institutions. Recall that on Pogge’s view it is not sufficient that the institutional order in 
question simply not impede the secure enjoyment of access to the means for basic 
subsistence. For Pogge, in order for an institutional order to be just, human rights must 
in general be fulfilled within it, where fulfillment implies reasonably secure enjoyment of 
the objects of the rights in question. As such, for an institutional order to be at least 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
133 Pogge, ‘Human Rights and Human Responsibilities’, p. 14. 
134 World Poverty and Human Rights, p. 48. 
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minimally just, it must be structured in such a way as to guarantee reasonably secure 
access to the means for basic subsistence for all those upon whom it is imposed.  
 
4.1.2.  Trouble with Pogge’s Account 
It should be clear enough that the existing global order is failing badly in respect to 
Pogge’s interpretation of the human right to subsistence. Pogge is right to point out that 
there are feasible alternatives to the way that the global order is currently structured that, 
if implemented, would result in much less severe poverty worldwide.135 On his account, 
all those who are complicit in the imposition of the existing global order or who benefit 
from it are in violation of their duty not to impose on others unjust coercive social 
institutions. He argues that those who are complicit in the imposition of the existing 
global order or who benefit from it therefore owe assistance by way of compensation to 
those burdened by it.  
Pogge favours his institutional interpretation of the human right to subsistence 
because he thinks it ‘occupies an appealing middle ground’: 
It goes beyond (minimalist interactional) libertarianism, which disconnects us from 
any deprivations we do not directly bring about, without falling into a (maximalist 
interactional) utilitarianism of rights, which holds each of us responsible for all 
deprivations whatever, regardless of the nature of our causal relation to them.136 
In this section I will question whether Pogge’s account really offers the sort of 
compromise he thinks it does.  
Although Pogge is explicit about his methodology, he is not always clear about 
who his intended interlocutor is. As I mentioned earlier, Pogge is generally taken to be 
engaging with the libertarian, but his argument is also at times aimed at the average 
citizen of a relatively affluent democratic country who does not have a well worked-out 
moral and political philosophy, and at other times aimed at the liberal egalitarian 
nationalist. As we shall see, Pogge’s argument is not equally successful in addressing each 
of these interlocutors. In this section, I argue that although Pogge’s account is minimalist 
with respect to interactional duties, because it goes beyond minimalism with respect to 
what is required of social institutions, it draws on premises that his libertarian 
interlocutors will reject. As such, my claim is that Pogge fails to provide a convincing !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
135 Pogge argues for this point at length in a number of publications including notably World 
Poverty and Human Rights, Chapter 8, and ‘Severe Poverty as a Violation of Human Rights’. 
136 World Poverty and Human Rights, p. 66. 
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reply to the libertarian view. I argue that his arguments may fare better against the 
average citizen and the liberal egalitarian nationalist before turning to the question of 
whether it can avoid the claimability objection.  
 
Pogge’s libertarian interlocutor is someone who holds that duties of justice are always in 
the first place negative. I argue that it is unlikely that someone who conceives of ‘both 
human rights and justice as involving solely negative duties’ will accept Pogge’s view that 
justice requires that coercive social institutions be structured in such a way as to 
guarantee reasonably secure access to the means for subsistence for those upon whom 
they are imposed.  Libertarians draw a sharp distinction between harming and merely 
failing to benefit. They will argue that being guaranteed reasonably secure access to the 
means for subsistence constitutes a benefit. On this account, failing to guarantee 
reasonably secure access to the means for subsistence does not count as harming people, 
but merely failing to benefit them.  
 Pogge has responded to this sort of criticism by arguing that coercively imposing 
a global order under which people are foreseeably and avoidably subject to severe 
poverty does in fact constitute a harm. But Pogge’s notion of harm differs from the 
conventional understanding. Harm is a comparative notion. It is ordinarily understood 
with reference to some baseline. Harm is ordinarily understood relative to either a 
diachronic or a subjunctive baseline. According to the diachronic notion of harm, 
‘someone is harmed when she is rendered worse off than she was at some earlier time’. 
On the subjunctive notion of harm, someone is harmed insofar as she is rendered worse 
off ‘than she would have been had some earlier arrangements continued undisturbed’.137 
These notions of harm can factor into an account of injustice, namely that justice 
requires refraining from (these notions of) harming others. 
Pogge argues that neither of these notions of harm is relevant in ascertaining 
whether the current global order harms the global poor.138 To evaluate the global order 
with respect to severe poverty on the basis of the diachronic notion of harm would entail 
considering whether the global poor are made worse off by it than they were at some 
previous time under some different order. But even if the global poor are, on the whole, 
better off under the current global order than they were under previous global orders, 
this does not entail that they are not being harmed by the current global order. This !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
137 Pogge, ‘World Poverty and Human Rights’, Ethics & International Affairs, 19 (2005), 1-7 (p. 4). 
138 ‘Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative duties’, pp. 39-41. 
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would be akin to saying that because there is less slavery under the current regime than 
there was under the past regime, the current regime does not harm those subject to 
slavery. This is a false inference.  
To evaluate the global order with respect to severe poverty based on the 
subjunctive notion of harm would entail considering whether the global poor are worse 
or better off under the current global order than they would have been had some past 
order been allowed to persist. But again, to conclude that the global order does not harm 
the poor just because the global poor are, on the whole, better off than they would have 
been had some previous institutional order persisted is irrelevant to whether they are 
being harmed by the current institutional order. To illustrate, consider the claim that ‘the 
regime of Jim Crowe laws did not harm African-Americans in the US South because they 
were better off than they would have been had slavery continued’.139  Surely this is false 
even if it is true that they were better off under the regime of Jim Crowe laws than they 
would have been had slavery persisted.  
 On Pogge’s account, the baseline by which harm is to be assessed is given by 
what justice requires. Instead of conceiving of injustice in terms of harm, Pogge’s 
account ‘relates the concepts of harm and injustice in the opposite way, conceiving harm in 
terms of an independently specified conception of social justice.’ According to Pogge, 
‘we are harming the global poor if and insofar as we collaborate in imposing an unjust 
institutional order upon them’.140 On Pogge’s account, injustice is necessarily harmful, 
but the injustice does not have to be characterised in terms of the ordinary notions of 
harm outlined above.  
On Pogge’s account, the assertion that the imposition of unjust coercive social 
institutions is harmful leaves open what constitutes an unjust coercive social institution. 
Injustice on this account may be characterized in terms of the ordinary notions of harm 
discussed above, but it need not.141 So, for example, if we take treating like cases alike as 
a principle of justice, a coercive system of laws that requires that men are paid more than 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
139 Ibid., p. 40. 
140 ‘World Poverty and Human Rights’, pp. 4-5. 
141 We should notice that if injustice is characterized in terms of the ordinary notions of harm, 
the claim that to impose an unjust social institution on others is to harm them becomes trivially 
true since it is both the case that the institution is harmful because it is unjust and unjust because 
it is harmful. 
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women for equal work is unjust.142 This is true even if everyone is better off under this 
system than they were under the previous system (diachronic) or than they would have 
been had the previous system been allowed to persist (subjunctive), and even if the 
minimum wage for women is well above what anyone needs to live a comfortable and 
flourishing life. On Pogge’s account, women under this system are harmed on account of 
being subject to injustice, not because they are made badly-off either in relative or 
absolute terms.  
I agree with Pogge about the inadequacy of diachronic and subjunctive notions 
of harm with respect to evaluating the current global order. Furthermore, I agree that we 
can both conceive injustice in terms of harm and harm in terms of injustice without 
circularity. The problem with Pogge’s account is the independent notion of injustice that 
he appeals to. Conceiving of harm in terms of injustice is consonant with the view that 
both human rights and justice involve only in the first instance negative duties; but 
Pogge’s view that justice requires that coercive social institutions be structured in such a 
way as to guarantee reasonably secure access to the objects of human rights to all those 
upon whom they are imposed is not. This is why Pogge’s account does not work as an 
reply to the libertarian account. Pogge’s argument does not take into account the reasons 
that support the libertarian view that fundamental duties of justice are only ever negative 
and that justice requires in the first place only the non-violation of rights. The central 
reason for this, as we saw in the Chapter 2, is that all persons have a fundamental right to 
liberty. A social institution that is structured in such a way as to guarantee reasonably 
secure access to the objects of all of the human rights included in the UDHR will 
inevitably violate this right. This is because it will require, at least in some cases, the 
redistribution of resources on the basis of need. Pogge’s interpretation of the human 
right to subsistence therefore does not offer a plausible reply to the libertarian, at least 
insofar as it is intended to grant the central libertarian premise.143   
Although Pogge’s argument fails to provide a successful reply to the libertarian 
objection, this may not be not as damaging a criticism as some have made it out to be. 
This is because there is reason to think that Pogge is not engaging specifically with the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
142 I am not making any particular claim about whether we should accept this as a principle of 
justice. I am just giving an example of the sort of principle that Pogge has in mind, namely a 
principle of justice that has nothing to do with harming people on the ordinary notions of harm 
discussed above. 
143 Similar arguments have been advanced by Tasioulas, ‘Philosophy, Criticism, and Community’, 
p. 261; and Debra Satz, ‘What do we Owe the Global Poor?’, p. 53. 
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libertarian. The introductory chapter of World Poverty and Human Rights suggests that 
Pogge’s interlocutor is not someone who holds a well-worked out libertarian theory. In 
fact, it suggests that he is engaging with the average citizen of a relatively affluent 
democratic country who has certain ‘firmly entrenched moral convictions about 
interpersonal morality and domestic justice’,144 but not a particularly well thought-out 
moral or political philosophy. Elsewhere, Pogge engages with an interlocutor who 
espouses the nationalist view that different principles of justice apply respectively at the 
domestic and global levels.145 I will set aside the question of whether Pogge’s account 
succeeds as a response to either of these views since it is not material to out present 
concern. Our main concern here is with the potential of Pogge’s institutional account of 
the human right to subsistence to overcome the claimability objection.  
 
Pogge’s institutional account of the human right to subsistence seems to avoid the 
claimability objection since he specifies outright that human rights are claims held in the 
first instance against the social institutions coercively imposed upon us. If this turns out 
to be a conceptual fact about human rights, then the human right to subsistence would 
be unproblematically claimable. This is because on the institutional conception, we could 
identify coercive social institutions as owing duties of assistance and protection against 
deprivation to all those upon whom they are imposed. Moreover, we can in principle 
identify as being in violation of the human right to subsistence all those responsible for 
the coercive imposition of social institutions that do not guarantee to all those upon 
whom they are imposed reasonably secure access to the means for subsistence.  
I argue, however, that we lack sufficient reason to conceptually limit human 
rights in this way. Although it will often be the case that coercive social institutions are 
best placed to ensure the fulfillment of human rights, this is not a necessary fact about 
human rights, but rather a contingent fact about how the world happens to be 
structured. The fact that coercive social institutions will often be best placed to ensure 
the fulfillment of human rights is compatible with an interactional account because it 
does not follow from this that human rights are necessarily claims held primarily against 
coercive social institutions. Unless it is a conceptual fact about human rights that they are !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
144 Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, p. 1. 
145 Pogge has explicitly aimed his argument at liberal nationalists in ‘Do Rawls’s Two Theories of 
Justice Fit Together?’ in Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia? ed. by Rex Martin and David A. 
Reidy (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), pp. 206-242. Miller has offered a reply in 
National Responsibility and Global Justice, pp. 238-247.  
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claims held primarily against the coercive social institutions imposed upon us, the 
claimability condition is not fulfilled. 
 
An initial problem with Pogge’s account is that it does not cohere with some plausible 
judgements about human rights. On his account, a necessary feature of human rights 
violations is that they are in some sense official. On Pogge’s account, there are a number 
of ways in which a coercive social institution can disrespect the human rights of those 
upon whom it is imposed ranging from explicitly sanctioning rights violations to failing 
to provide adequate protection against rights violations.146 At any rate, civilians, on 
Pogge’s account, cannot violate human rights. They can violate moral rights; but on 
Pogge’s account, what distinguishes human rights from the general class of moral rights 
is precisely the official nature of their violations.  
To illustrate the implausibility of this implication of Pogge’s account, consider 
two recent examples of what are known as honour killings:  In one, an adolescent Iraqi 
girl was beaten to death by her father for having affection for a British soldier, though by 
all accounts the affection was not mutual and nothing sexual had transpired between 
them.147  Killings of family members, especially girls, are not unusual in Iraq and are 
socially condoned by some groups.  No charges were raised against the man; in fact local 
authorities appear to have supported his action.  In the other case, an adolescent Muslim 
girl was beaten to death by her father, in this case for refusing to wear the hijab, the 
traditional Islamic headdress.148  This incident occurred in Canada where such 
occurrences are rare and socially condemned.  The father has been charged with first 
degree murder and awaits trial in state custody. 
Assuming that there are human rights to life and security of person, on an 
interactional conception of human rights, both cases constitute violations of these rights.  
On an institutional account, by contrast, human rights are held against coercive social 
institutions and not individuals.  Although both cases involve grievous moral wrongs, on 
an institutional conception of human rights, a human rights infringement occurred in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
146 Pogge, ‘Human Rights and Human Responsibilities’, pp. 16-17.  
147 Afif Sahran, ‘The Iraqi Girl Killed for Loving a British Soldier’, Observer, 27 April 2008 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/apr/27/iraq.military>; Afif Sahran and Caroline 
Davies, ‘”My daughter deserved to die for falling in love’”, Observer, 11 May, 2008 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/may/11/iraq.humanrights>  
148 Kenyon Wallace, ‘Father Charged in Teen’s Killing’, Globe and Mail, 11 December 2007 < 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/father-charged-in-teens-
killing/article802820/> 
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Iraqi case but not in the Canadian one because appropriate and effective coercive social 
institutions that offer the security of person to everyone are in place and generally 
effective in Canada, but not in Iraq (as evidenced in particular by the reaction of the state 
to the killing).  
Pogge argues that we should favour his institutional conception of human rights 
because it accommodates the view that, although human rights may be grounded in 
fundamental human interests, not all affronts to people’s fundamental interests count as 
human rights violations.  Isolated harms, he notes, are not generally counted as human 
rights violations, but large-scale, systematic threats to people’s basic interests are, 
especially when they are the result of official behaviour or state policy. According to 
Pogge, a one-off infringement of a person’s physical security does not count as a human 
rights violation. By contrast, a legitimate human rights grievance exists on Pogge’s 
account where a person’s physical security is systematically at risk despite never actually 
being  infringed. 
As Tasioulas rightly notes, ‘a lot here turns on our considered judgments as to 
what should count as paradigm cases of human rights and their violation.’149  And it is 
not clear that Pogge has the intuitive edge.  It is not, for instance, obvious that a one-off 
threat to someone’s physical security is not a human rights violation.  Furthermore, 
Pogge’s institutional conception of human rights excludes cases of persistent domestic 
violence and cases like the Canadian honour-killing example. These strike many as 
paradigmatic violations of human rights. An implication of Pogge’s argument is that such 
people are conceptually confused. I doubt this is the case, and Pogge provides 
insufficient reason to think it is.  
 
4.1.3. Beitz’s Practical Approach 
Beitz concurs with Pogge that human rights are claims held primarily against coercive 
social institutions, but he offers further justification for this view. Beitz rejects the 
traditional approach to human rights theorizing in favour of what he refers to as a 
‘practical’ approach. The traditional approach begins by determining the nature of human 
rights and from this deriving accounts of their specific content and normative force. As 
we saw in Chapter 2, this is the sort of approach taken in justifying the human right to 
subsistence on conventional interpretation. On the traditional approach, international !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
149 Tasioulas, ‘The Moral Reality of Human Rights’, p. 96. 
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human rights as we find them in modern practice derive their authority from deeper 
values. The task of the human rights theorist is therefore to provide an account of these 
underlying values in order to be able to judge whether existing practice is in line with it. 
In discussing Beitz’s approach, it is helpful to distinguish between ‘human rights’, which 
generally refers to the naturalistic or humanistic idea of rights that all humans have 
simply in virtue of their humanity, and ‘international human rights’, which refers to the 
objects of international human rights doctrine. Traditionally, ‘international human rights’ 
has been taken to refer simply to human rights as they manifest themselves in 
international doctrine and practice. Beitz argues that we should resist understanding 
international human rights in this way.  
Beitz argues that we should take the practice of human rights as primary in 
theorizing about the content and normative force of international human rights. On this 
approach, our understanding of the idea of human rights is framed ‘by identifying the 
roles this idea plays within a discursive practice’.150 According to Beitz, in order to 
theorize about human rights as normative principles, we must start, then, by identifying 
their role in the relevant discursive practice. He is largely influenced by Rawls who takes 
human rights to be standards of international legitimacy.151 Beitz argues, however, that 
this arbitrarily limits the role of human rights. He argues instead that the practical 
approach must take ‘the doctrine and practice of human rights as we find them in 
international political life as the source materials for constructing a conception of human 
rights’.152  Taking this as his starting point, Beitz proposes a model of the discursive 
function of human rights according to which (1) ‘Human rights are requirements whose 
object is to protect urgent individual interests (…)’; (2) ‘Human rights apply in the first 
instance to the political institutions of states, including their constitutions, laws, and 
public policies’; and (3) ‘Human rights are matters of international concern’.153 Our 
interest here is primarily in (2).  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
150 Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights, p. 102. 
151 Ibid., p.99. To characterize Rawls’s account in this way is not entirely accurate, namely 
because Rawls takes human rights as governing relations between ‘peoples’ rather than nations or 
states, and so they cannot strictly be understood as standards of international legitimacy. 
Furthermore, it is unclear what could be meant by ‘international legitimacy’. Human rights, 
according to Rawls, are standards that must be met by any people in order for its self-
determination to be respected by other peoples. When human rights are not respected by a 
people, intervention on the part of other peoples is considered legitimate.  
152 Ibid., p. 102. 
153 Ibid., p. 109. 
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We should note that Beitz’s institutionalism is narrower than Pogge’s since he 
takes human rights to be claims held primarily against ‘the political institutions of states’ 
whereas on Pogge’s account, human rights are claims held primarily against any social 
institution coercively imposed upon an individual. If anything, this makes Beitz’s account 
more resilient to the Claimability Objection. On Pogge’s account, any given individual 
might be subject to multiple coercive social institutions, so it might not be clear against 
which institution a given human rights claim is held. On Beitz’s account, human rights 
claims are always held initially against one’s state. Beitz’s account also has the advantage 
over Pogge’s that it offers greater justification in support of the institutionalist 
conception of human rights.  On Beitz’s account, institutionalism about human rights is 
justified based on (a) the validity of the practical approach to theorizing about human 
rights, and (b) the role that international human rights play within the relevant discursive 
practice as inferred from observations about contemporary international human rights 
doctrine and practice.  
In what follows, I argue that Beitz’s institutionalism about human rights 
encounters fatal difficulties with respect to both (a) and (b). With respect to (a), it is 
doubtful whether there is a sufficiently cohesive practice to anchor our understanding of 
international human rights.154 This is in part due to the fact that the practice of human 
rights is not well-established. Beitz acknowledges that international human rights practice 
is an ‘emergent’ practice,155 but he thinks it is nevertheless sufficiently cohesive as to 
provide at least a loose framework for theorizing about international human rights. Beitz 
focuses on international human rights doctrine from 1948 onwards. I argue that Beitz’s 
focus on doctrine is too narrow to account for the practice in general. Because 
international human rights doctrine is notoriously (and in most cases intentionally) vague, 
international lawyers, diplomats, policy-makers, and theorists play an important role in 
interpreting these documents. This poses a problem for Beitz’s account since 
interpretation will, in many cases, depart significantly from the doctrine itself, drawing on 
both legal and non-legal precedents in particular jurisdictions, political discourse, as well 
as ordinary moral reasoning. My claim is that we cannot infer from cohesion in human 
rights doctrine that there is cohesion in the overall discursive practice. When we broaden 
our focus beyond international doctrine, we find considerable disagreement not just 
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154 Miller makes a similar argument in National Responsibility and Global Justice, pp. 168-172. 
155 The Idea of Human Rights, pp. 42-44. 
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about the inclusion and interpretation of particular human rights within international 
doctrine, but about the very concept of what a human right is.  
Setting aside this concern and granting for the sake of argument that the practical 
approach is both desirable and workable, there are nevertheless important problems with 
Beitz’s conclusion that human rights are claims held in the first instance against the state. 
First, Beitz’s institutionalism about human rights falls prey to the same challenge as 
Pogge’s, namely that it precludes a number of plausible judgements about human rights 
infringements. Like Pogge, Beitz is committed to denying that a threat by a civilian to the 
life of another civilian on its own constitutes a violation of human rights. Unlike Pogge’s 
claim, however, Beitz has recourse to reasons beyond our (alleged) ordinary judgements 
about what does and what does not count as a human rights violation. Beitz’s claim is 
that we can infer from international human rights doctrine that the role that human 
rights play in the relevant discursive practice is confined to providing practical principles 
governing primarily relations between citizens and their respective states, and secondarily 
between states and other institutional agents (including other states).  I doubt, however, 
that this conclusion is warranted.  
Even if international human rights doctrine were the only aspect of the discursive 
practice relevant to theorizing about human rights, it does not give us sufficient reason to 
endorse institutionalism about human rights. This is because nowhere in international 
human rights doctrine does it say that the duties correlative to human rights are borne 
only in the first instance by states. International human rights doctrine from 1948 is 
compatible with the humanistic conception of human rights. Take, for example, the 
concluding paragraph of the preamble of the UDHR: 
The General Assembly proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as 
a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end 
that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration 
constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for 
these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and 
international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, 
both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of 
territories under their jurisdiction. 
Although it certainly makes clear that the political institutions of states should be 
working to secure the human rights of their members, nothing follows from this with 
respect to whether human rights are also held against other moral agents. Gilabert has 
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recently argued that many of the claims made in the UDHR ‘give a humanist framing to 
the whole declaration’.156 My claim is not so strong. My point is just that contemporary 
human rights doctrine does not preclude a humanist interpretation of human rights, and 
thus we cannot infer from it the institutional conception Beitz has in mind. We cannot 
draw any inferences from international doctrine about which conception of human rights 
is appropriate. International doctrine is ambiguous in this respect. To take another 
example, consider the preamble to the 1966 International Covenants. Like the preamble 
to the UDHR, it highlights the obligations of states ‘to promote universal respect for, 
and observance of, human rights and freedoms’; but it equally states that ‘the individual 
(…) is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant’. Of course there are various ways of interpreting 
these and other similar statements made in international human rights doctrine. The 
important point is that they do not provide conclusive evidence in support of 
institutionalism. My argument is therefore that Beitz fails to provide adequate reason in 
support of his institutional conception of human rights. 
I have argued that neither Pogge nor Beitz provides sufficient reason to 
conceptually limit the bearers of the duties correlative to human rights in the way they 
propose. Of course it might turn out that states or coercive social institutions are best 
placed to fulfil many of the duties correlative to human rights, but this is not necessarily 
so. Nickel, for example, takes the primary duty-bearers of the positive duties correlative 
to human rights to be states, but this is the outcome of ‘strategic reasoning’ rather than 
conceptual analysis.157 As I argued in Chapter 2, however, unless the use of such strategic 
reasoning can yield a determinate assignment of duties of assistance and protection 
against deprivation, the claimability objection still stands.  
 
4.2.  Collective Perfect Duties of Assistance? 
In this section, I draw again on the sort of examples raised by Waldron and discussed in 
Chapter 3. I suggest that this sort of example gives rise to concerns beyond the one he 
expresses. Both of the examples he discusses involve the bearer of an imperfect duty, the 
discharging of which will benefit some, but not all potential recipients. Waldron’s claim is 
that where the potential recipients’ interests in being benefitted are of sufficiently high 
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156 Pablo Gilabert, ‘Humanist and Political Perspectives on Human Rights’, p. 14.  
157 Nickel, ‘How Human Rights Generate Duties to Protect and Provide’, especially pp. 82-83. 
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importance, they can be said to have rights despite the corresponding duties being 
imperfect. I argued that his reasons in support of this view are insufficient to vindicate 
his claim that imperfect duties can correlate with rights. Nevertheless, I think that the 
concerns Waldron expresses raise further challenges for the view that just because the 
duty on the part of individuals to assist the global poor is imperfect there can be no 
human right to assistance. In this section and the next, I will discuss several examples 
along the lines of the ones Waldron discusses in order to highlight the importance of his 
concerns. I argue that in at least some Waldron-type examples, the existence of a right 
can be justified on the basis of a perfect duty held by a collection of individuals. If this 
could be generalized to the case of global poverty, then it seems the human right to 
subsistence would be claimable for each individual in need against the collective of all 
those in a position to assist. The purpose of this section will ultimately be to evaluate this 
possibility. 
 
As I mentioned in Chapter 2, there are various interpretations of the distinction between 
perfect and imperfect duties. I argued that insofar as perfect duties are taken to correlate 
with rights on account of being claimable, the relevant interpretation of imperfect duties 
must be as duties that are not owed to any particular potential recipient and so are not 
claimable. What makes a duty imperfect in the sense relevant to the claimability objection 
is that its fulfillment cannot be directed at every potential recipient. This is notably the 
case with respect to positive duties whose fulfillment can only benefit a limited number 
of potential recipients. This is in the first place because of physical constraints on what 
persons can accomplish. Even if a person decided to devote all of her time and resources 
to, for example, assisting the global poor, given the magnitude of severe poverty 
worldwide, she could not benefit each and every person suffering from it. Another 
reason the fulfillment of imperfect positive duties might not benefit every potential 
recipient is because of reasonable limits on what people can be required to do in the 
interests of others. Even if it were the case that one individual could assist all those in 
need if she devoted all of her time and resources to doing so, she might not be duty-
bound to assist all those she can. An example of a reasonable limit on the extent of 
required sacrifice in the interest of others is the point at which the person offering 
assistance becomes worse off than those she is trying to assist.158   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
158 This is the limit that Singer uses. In saying that it provides an example of a ‘reasonable limit’ I 
do not mean to suggest that it is the correct one. There might be good reasons to limit the extent 
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 On this account of the distinction between imperfect and perfect duties, whether 
a duty is perfect or imperfect cannot always be inferred from the content of the duty 
alone. Whether a duty is perfect or imperfect can be contingent on the particular 
circumstances. Although some duties are necessarily perfect, for other duties, whether 
they are imperfect or perfect will be determined by the particular circumstances. 
Straightforward negative duties to abstain from certain types of action such as torture, 
murder, rape, and so on seem to be perfect in all conceivable circumstances. However, 
there are other duties, in particular positive duties, which might be imperfect in some set 
of circumstances, C, and yet perfect in another set of circumstances, C1. Relevant facts 
about the circumstances must be taken into account.  
The general duty of individual agents to assist those in need in the world as it is, 
given the number of people in dire need and the limited capacities of any individual, is 
imperfect. What the above discussion implies, however, is that the duty of assistance can, 
in the right circumstances, be perfect. This is straightforwardly the case when the duty of 
assistance is special. In welfare states, for example, the duty to assist those who cannot 
obtain the material means for subsistence falls on the state since the state has granted its 
citizens the right to its assistance in times of need. The more pertinent point for our 
current discussion is that the duty of assistance can, in certain circumstances, be perfect 
despite being owed by all to all. In a universe of two people, if one person, N, is in need 
of assistance and the other person, A, is able to assist (taking into account whatever 
reasonable limits there are on the extent of required sacrifice), then A’s duty to assist N 
to the extent that he can (taking into account the reasonable limits on the extent of 
required sacrifice) is perfect. In this case, N has a right to A’s assistance. All of this is 
compatible with the claimability condition.  
 But if there is a right in this example, then it would seem strange to suggest that 
there is no right in the situation in which there are two people, N1 and N2, in need of 
assistance, and two people, A1 and A2, who are each able to assist one – but only one – 
person. At first blush, this seems to be what a conception of rights that includes the 
claimability condition is committed to. This is because if it is not possible for an agent to 
assist all those in need of assistance, then her duty of assistance is imperfect. And if her 
duty of assistance is imperfect, then no one has a claim to her assistance. In the case just 
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of required sacrifice even further (for example, utility, duties to the self, justified priorities for 
loved ones). The point is just that this seems like a reasonable minimum limit on the extent of 
required sacrifice. 
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described, it is true that neither A1 nor A2 can assist both N1 and N2. This is the kind of 
case that Waldron seems to have in mind in his discussion of the wealthy philanthropists. 
I think we ought to be troubled by the claim that N1 and N2 lack rights to assistance in 
this case, but as I argued in the previous chapter, this kind of concern alone does not 
provide sufficient reason to deny the claimability condition.   
 In this section, I will explore an option for affirming that both N1 and N2 have 
rights to assistance despite the duties of A1 and A2 being imperfect, while nevertheless 
granting the claimability condition. This can be done, I argue, by identifying a collective 
agent as holding perfect duties of assistance to both N1 and N2. If this works, it offers a 
potential way of understanding the human right to subsistence, namely as a claim held by 
each against the collective of all those in a position to contribute to alleviating global 
poverty. Although I argue that collectively-borne duties are plausible in some cases 
including the case of N1 and N2, I ultimately argue that the collective of all those in a 
position to contribute to alleviating global poverty does not fulfil the relevant criteria for 
being collectively responsible.   
 
In order to vindicate the claim that N1 and N2 each have claims to assistance from A1 
and A2 jointly, we need to show (a) that collectives can bear moral duties, and (b) that 
the collective comprised of A1 and A2 fulfils the conditions for bearing moral duties of 
assistance which are perfect towards both N1 and N2.  
The most persistent objection to the very intelligibility of collective moral 
responsibility comes from methodological individualists who challenge it on the ground 
that collections of individuals lack certain features thought to be necessary for being 
morally responsible, namely agency or the capacity for forming intentions.159 While it is 
widely thought that propositions about the actions of collectives can be meaningful, 
methodological individualists regard such propositions as purely figurative. And if 
propositions about the actions of individuals are merely figurative, propositions about 
their moral responsibility cannot be literal. According to H. D. Lewis, when we attribute 
moral responsibility to collectives, ‘We hypostatize abstractions and make them the 
bearers of value, forgetting that linguistic devices which make for succinctness of 
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159 See, for example, H.D. Lewis, ‘Collective Responsibility”, Philosophy, 23 (1948), 3-18; and Jan 
Narveson, ‘Collective Responsibility’, Journal of Ethics, 6 (2002), 179-198. 
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expression or poetic and rhetorical effect are not to be divested of their metaphorical and 
elliptical meanings, and taken as literal truth’.160  
 If methodological individualism is correct, then saying that A1 and A2 are jointly 
responsible for assisting both N1 and N2 is just shorthand for saying that they are each 
responsible individually. This, however, will not suffice for N1 and N2 to have rights 
given the claimability condition. As we have already seen, the duties that A1 and A2 have 
individually are imperfect, and therefore cannot correlate with rights if we grant the 
claimability condition. We are looking for a way of accounting for the judgement that N1 
and N2 have rights to assistance while nevertheless accepting the claimability condition. 
In order to succeed, it must be the case that some agent literally bears a perfect duty of 
assistance to each of N1 and N2. If there can be no literal sense in which A1 and A2 are 
jointly responsible, then this line of argument will fail.  
Methodological individualists seek to debunk the notion of collective 
responsibility either by showing that collections of individuals cannot act or by showing 
that their actions are exempt from moral evaluation. Both of these lines of attack 
generally focus on the alleged impossibility of collective intentions. Insofar as intentions 
are taken to be necessary for action, some have argued that collections of individuals are 
incapable of action, thereby denying anything for collections of individuals to be 
responsible for. Others who accept that the presence of an intention may not be 
necessary for action have argued that intention is nevertheless integral to an action being 
the proper subject of moral  evaluation.  
In response to methodological individualism, some defenders of collective 
responsibility have sought to show that it is possible for a collection of individuals to 
have agency and intention in a way that is not reducible to the aggregation of the 
respective agencies of its individual members.161 Others have argued that intentionality is 
necessary for neither action nor moral responsibility.162 Indeed these sorts of arguments 
have been the focus of the literature on collective moral responsibility. But there are two 
important differences between the sorts of cases that tend to be the focus of the 
literature on collective moral responsibility and the kind of situation we are interested in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
160 ‘Collective Responsibility’, p. 7. 
161 Michael Bratman, ‘Shared Intention’, Ethics, 104 (1993), 97-103; Mary Gilbert, Solidarity and 
Responsibility: New Essays in Plural Subject Theory (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
2000), especially Chapter 2; and David J. Velleman, ‘How to Share and Intention’, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 57 (1997), 104-117. 
162 Larry May, Sharing Responsibilities (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). 
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here. One is that the literature is almost exclusively concerned with attributions of 
backward-looking collective responsibility for bad outcomes, whereas we are interested 
in forward-looking responsibility for the prevention of bad outcomes or the remedying 
of bad situations. Second, the literature tends to focus on attributions of moral 
responsibility for particular actions, whereas we are interested in the question of 
collective moral responsibility for culpable inaction.  
Virginia Held is one of the few theorists who has directly addressed the kind of 
concerns that are of immediate interest to us.163 Supposing that A1 and A2 have no 
special relationship or previously-agreed procedure for jointly making decisions, they 
form what Held refers to as a ‘random collection of individuals’.164  A random collection 
of individuals is ‘a set of persons distinguishable by some characteristics from the set of 
all persons, but lacking a decision method for taking action that is distinguishable from 
such decision methods, if there are any, as are possessed by all persons’.165 The 
plausibility of the suggestion that A1 and A2 jointly bear perfect positive duties of 
assistance correlative to N1 and N2’s respective rights to assistance thus depends on 
whether a random collection of individuals can bear moral responsibility. 
 Agency is required for action, and therefore for responsibility for action; but 
Held’s focus, and our current interest is in culpable inaction. Just as individuals can be 
morally responsible for failing to act, so too can collectives. Although a random 
collection of individuals may not be an agent, it may have the capacity to form itself into 
a collective agent. It is important to note, however, that it is not the case that a random 
collection of individuals can literally form itself into a collective agent, since this would be 
an action and would therefore require pre-existing agency. The idea is rather that the 
individuals that make up the random collection can, at least under certain conditions and 
if they so choose, form themselves into a collective agent by cooperating. This is important 
because as we shall see, it is not always the case that a random collection of individuals 
can succeed in forming itself into a collective agent.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
163 ‘Can a Random Collection of Individuals be Morally Responsible?’, The Journal of Philosophy, 67 
(1970), 471-481. Others include Robert Goodin, Protecting The Vulnerable (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1985), pp. 134-144; Larry May, ‘Collective Inaction and Shared Responsibility’, 
Noûs, 24 (1990), 269-277. I will focus on Held’s account because it is the one which deals most 
comprehensively with issues of concern here.  
164 ‘Can a Random Collection of Individuals be Morally Responsible?’, p. 471.  
165 Ibid. Following Stanley Bates, we might note Held’s somewhat idiosyncratic use of ‘random’, 
‘Reply to held’, Ethics, 81 (1971), 343-349 (p. 343). A truly random group of individuals would 
not be distinguishable from the set of all persons in the way that Held has in mind.   
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 The sort of case we are interested in is one in which there are a number of 
individuals, none of whom can bring about the desired end on their own, but who, if 
they each contribute in the right way, can collectively succeed in bringing about the 
desired end. Held argues that a random collection of individuals can be held responsible 
for bringing about (or for failing to have brought about, depending on whether we are 
evaluating before or after the fact) a given desirable end, if the  action  called  for ‘is 
obvious  to  the reasonable person’.166 This seems to be the case in our example. It is 
obvious that what is required of A1 and A2 is simply that they agree on who will assist 
N1 and who will assist N2 in order to ensure that both N1 and N2 get the assistance 
they need. If they fail to confer before acting and they both end up assisting N1, on this 
account N2 has been wronged by A1 and A2 jointly.  
 Held’s account thus offers us a way for us to accept the view that N1 and N2 
each have a right to assistance without concluding, as Waldron does, that a right can exist 
with only imperfect duties as its correlate. Although it is true that A1 and A2’s respective 
duties of assistance are imperfect, on the account inspired by Held, the duty of assistance 
of the collective comprised of A1 and A2 is perfect, and so N1 and N2 can be said to 
have claims against it.   
 Does this account of the moral responsibility of random collections of 
individuals offer a plausible way to interpret the human right to subsistence? On this sort 
of account, the human right to subsistence – understood as a right to assistance – would 
be held against the random collection of all those in a position to make some 
contribution to the alleviation of severe poverty worldwide.  One problem with this 
proposal is that it does not seem to satisfy Held’s condition that the action required is 
obvious to the reasonable person. The question of how any given individual should 
contribute is incredibly complicated, even given the institutional structures already in 
place. Should we be donating money to aid organizations such as Oxfam, Save the 
Children, and UNICEF? If so, which ones should we donate to? Should we favour 
organizations that focus on emergency aid, development, political reform, or economic 
reform? Or should we be lending money to support small businesses in the developed 
world through micro-finance organizations such as Kiva? Or perhaps it would be better 
to spend time engaging in political action by writing letters to political leaders, signing 
and circulating petitions, engaging in peaceful protests or other forms of resistance, or 
perhaps even running for political office. All of these seem like worthy contributions to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
166 ‘Can a Random Collection of Individuals be Morally Responsible’, p. 476. 
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fighting global poverty, but it is not obvious for any given individual which, if any, is the 
right course of action.  
 Held discusses such cases in which the required action is not obvious to the 
reasonable person. In some such cases collective responsibility is simply not attributable, 
but in other cases she thinks that it is. An example is Held’s case in which three 
unacquainted pedestrians encounter a man whose leg is trapped under the wreckage of a 
collapsed building. In order to assist him, various beams must be removed, and this 
requires the strength of all three. The trouble is that although it strikes each pedestrian as 
obvious which beam should be moved first,  the three pedestrians cannot agree. In the 
absence of a decision-making  procedure, the three pedestrians argue until the victim has 
bled to death.  Held argues that in this case, the random collection may be considered 
morally responsible for failing to adopt a decision-making procedure. This would be 
most obviously true in case nothing much is at stake with regards to which beam gets 
moved first. If that were the case, the disagreement would be frivolous, and inaction 
would surely be culpable. However, we can imagine that each of the three pedestrians 
reasonably thinks that the consequences of moving the wrong beam would  lead to dire 
consequences for the victim, and yet they nevertheless disagree with respect to which 
beam should be moved first. In this case, a decision-procedure is essential for collective 
action, and which decision-procedure is selected could make an important difference to 
the outcome.  
We might notice, then, that Held’s claim that the pedestrians can be held 
responsible for failing to adopt a decision-making procedure just shifts the uncertainty to 
another level, threatening regress. What if the pedestrians could not agree on a decision-
making procedure? What conditions must be fulfilled in order for a random collection of 
individuals to be morally responsible for failing to adopt a decision-making procedure? 
In keeping with Held’s account, it would seem that in order for a random collection of 
individuals to be morally responsible in a case like this, it would have to be obvious to 
the reasonable person which decision-making procedure they should adopt. But why 
should we suppose this to be the case? Held acknowledges this potential problem. She 
points out that the question of which decision-making procedure to adopt is a separate 
question occurring in its own context, and so it will sometimes be obvious, even when 
the required action is not. For example, if it turns out that one of the three pedestrians in 
Held’s example is a retired rescue-worker with a great deal of experience in extricating 
people from difficult situations, then it might be obvious to the reasonable person that 
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the other two should defer to him. However, if this is not the case and no decision-
making procedure is obvious, then it seems moral responsibility cannot be attributed to 
the collective for failing to act.  
In the case of global poverty, it may seem reasonable that we should defer to 
experts on poverty-relief and development; but even where there is widespread 
agreement about what is needed in order to eliminate severe poverty in some area, there 
is little agreement on how this translates into action on the part of individuals. Held 
argues that collective moral responsibility may nevertheless still be attributable in cases 
like this. On her view, when it is not obvious to the reasonable person which decision 
method is appropriate,  
the reasonable person may perhaps then be morally responsible for not acting to 
transform the random collection of which he is a member into an at least loosely 
organised group seeking answers to questions concerning the most appropriate 
and justifiable decision methods for classifiable kinds of contexts. Such a group 
might be the community of those moral inquirers who are capable at arriving at 
decisions on moral questions by a process of free inquiry and reasonable 
discussion.167 
It is certainly plausible to think that there is a moral requirement that people worldwide 
work towards the establishment of decision-making procedures with the aim of 
eventually eradicating severe poverty. However, it is unhelpful in providing a plausible 
account of the human right to subsistence in light of the claimability condition. This is 
because until a decision-making procedure has been adopted, there are only imperfect 
duties to work towards the adoption of a decision-making procedure. In this case, no 
collective can plausibly be identified as holding a perfect duty of assistance to each 
person in desperate need. Without some sort of institution to oversee individual 
contributions and to ensure that they are well-directed, there is little sense in which there 
is the sort of potential for collective effort required for an attribution of collective moral 
duties that are perfect.  
 This is not to disparage an approach to reasoning about the normative 
implications of global poverty that focuses on collective responsibility. Global poverty, 
like other large-scale global problems, can only be adequately addressed with the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
167 ‘Can a Random Collection of Individuals be Morally Responsible’, p. 481. 
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cooperation of multitudes of agents, both individual and institutional.168 Collective 
responsibility for inaction is thus central to our normative understanding of this issue. 
My claim here is just that interpreting the positive duties thought to correlate with the 
human right to subsistence as collective duties does not succeed in avoiding the 
claimability objection.   
 
In this section, I have argued that although I think there is scope for vindicating the 
claim that A1 and A2 jointly owe perfect duties of assistance to both N1 and N2, I do 
not think that the same line of argument can support the claim that all those in a position 
to make some contribution to the alleviation of global poverty collectively owe a perfect 
duty of assistance to each of those in need. Although the judgement that N1 and N2 
have rights to assistance can be vindicated on the basis of the collective duties of A1 and 
A2, the relevant conditions for collective perfect duties cannot be met in the case of 
global poverty. 
 
4.3.  Perfect Duties of Consideration? 
I have so far argued that the first two proposals for how the human right to subsistence 
positively construed might fulfil the claimability condition fail. I have argued that it is 
implausible to conceptually limit the bearers of the duties correlative to human rights to 
states or other coercive social institutions. Furthermore, I have argued that the human 
right to subsistence cannot plausibly be interpreted as a claim to assistance and 
protection held against the random collection of all those in a position to make some 
contribution. In this section, I consider a third proposal for how the human right to 
subsistence positively construed might be claimable on O’Neill’s conception of 
claimability. Although the human right to subsistence is construed on this proposal as 
having positive duties as its correlates,  it deviates from the conventional interpretation in 
that it takes the relevant duties to be duties of consideration rather than duties of 
assistance and protection. I argue that this provides the most plausible account of the 
human right to subsistence positively construed, but that it nevertheless encounters some 
of the same difficulties as the conventional interpretation based on LPA as discussed in 
Chapter 3. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
168 See, for example, Micheal Green, ‘Institutional Responsibility for Moral Problems’, in Global 
Responsibilities: Who must deliver on human rights?, ed. by Andrew Kuper, pp. 117-134.  
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As we have seen, we can account for the rights to assistance of N1 and N2 in the 
example above by holding that A1 and A2 jointly bear perfect duties of assistance to 
each. Now consider another similar case in which two people, N3 and N4, are in need of 
assistance. In this case, however, just one person, A3, is able to assist, and he is able to 
assist only one of the two. If it were the case that A3 could make some partial but 
nevertheless beneficial contribution to assisting both N3 and N4, and supposing that 
there is no reason to make a greater contribution to assisting one than the other, we 
might plausibly say that A3 has a perfect duty to both N3 and N4 to assist them to the 
extent that he can (taking into account reasonable limits on the extent of required 
sacrifice). But suppose that the goods required by both N3 and N4 cannot be distributed 
between them. Say, for example, what is needed is rescue; and say that A3 is only 
physically able to rescue one. A3’s duty of assistance in this case is imperfect since its 
fulfillment cannot benefit both potential recipients. A3 is permitted, and indeed must use 
his discretion in determining which victim to assist. If all things are equal, then A3 can 
fulfil his imperfect duty by saving either N3 or N4.  
 Because A3’s duty of assistance in this example would be fulfilled by assisting 
one of the two victims, and because he is not duty-bound to assist both, on a conception 
of rights that includes the claimability condition, neither victim has a right to A3’s 
assistance. This is because neither can claim assistance from A3. Although A3 can be 
identified as a duty-bearer, A3’s duty is not owed to N3 or N4 in particular, and so 
neither can demand of A3 to be assisted.  
 As we have seen, on a conception of rights that includes the claimability 
condition, only perfect duties correlate with rights. This implies that only the violation of 
a perfect duty constitutes a directed wrong. If no one has a claim to an act or forbearance 
on the part of an agent, that agent wrongs no one in particular in failing to act or forbear 
in that way. In the example above, if A3 chooses to assist N3, then N4 cannot be said to 
have been wronged, and vice versa. But then if neither N3 nor N4 has a claim against A3 
to assistance, on this account neither of them is wronged if A3 fails to fulfil his duty of 
assistance altogether. This is unpalatable since it seems like in failing to do what he can to 
assist, A3 in some sense wrongs both N3 and N4. But how could this be if neither had a 
claim on A3?  
 It might be suggested that actually, both N3 and N4 do have rights to A3’s 
assistance. They both have highly important interests in receiving the assistance, and in 
principle, they can both identify A3 as the relevant duty-bearer. On this account, A3 has 
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a perfect duty of assistance to N3 and to N4, but because he cannot fulfil both duties, he 
is justified in infringing either N3 or N4’s right. This account, however, takes us back to 
the question of what distinctive contribution rights make to normative reasoning. With 
respect to this example, it does not seem that the affirmation of a right affects moral 
reasoning about how to act. A3’s deliberations look no different whether or not N3 and 
N4 have rights. And it is not clear what difference it would make to the matter of 
justifiable enforcement of the relevant duties whether N3 and N4 have rights.  
 One thought is that N3 and N4 both having rights to A3’s assistance does make 
a difference in that A3 would owe compensation to whichever victim he did not assist. 
Suppose that the assistance needed by N3 and N4 in our example is not a matter of life 
or death, but rather one of debilitating injury. Call the initial situation in which both N3 
and N4 are in need of assistance to avoid the debilitating injury S1, and the subsequent 
situation in which either N3 or N4 has suffered the debilitating injury S2. It might be 
thought that, although A3 is only able to assist one person in S1, if both had rights to his 
assistance, he is obligated to provide compensation by way of further assistance in S2 to 
the one who ends up suffering the debilitating injury. I think this suggestion is 
implausible, namely because it is not clear that compensation would be owed in this sort 
of case. After all, if A3 did everything that he could, there seem to be no grounds for a 
further demand of compensation. It nevertheless seems plausible to suppose that 
whichever person suffered the debilitating injury in S1 could have a claim to assistance 
from A3 in S2 insofar as A3 is able to assist (taking into account the relevant limits on 
the extent of required sacrifice).  
I argue, however, that the assistance that A3 might owe in S2 is not helpfully 
construed as being owed as a matter of compensation for his failure to assist both 
victims in S1. S2 can unproblematically be treated as a new and discrete situation in 
which someone is in need and someone is able to assist. In support of this interpretation, 
suppose that, having received assistance from A3 in the initial situation, N3 is now 
equally in a position to assist N4 who is now in need of further assistance. If A3 had 
owed N4 assistance in S1, there would be reason to think that he should provide N4 
with the assistance she needs in S2. But given that both A3 and N3 are equally well 
suited to assist N4 in S2, this does not seem to hold.    
 I argue that a more plausible account is that both N3 and N4 have rights in S1, 
but they are not rights to A3’s assistance. Rather, they are rights to A3’s appropriate 
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consideration in matters concerning how to act.169 In assisting one of the victims, A3 
shows both victims appropriate consideration. In failing to assist either victim, A3 shows 
inadequate consideration of both victims. On this account, N3 and N4 can have their 
right violated even if they would not have ultimately benefitted from the discharging of 
A3’s duty.  
 We can understand the human right to subsistence on this sort of account as a 
right held by all humans against all others that they adopt the end that everyone who 
requires assistance in avoiding severe poverty gets it. (This might be construed as 
derivative of a broader requirement that all moral agents adopt the end that no one 
preventably suffers). Sen advances this sort of interpretation of the human right to 
subsistence, and of human rights in general. On his account, ‘Human rights generate 
reasons for action for agents who are in a position to help in the promoting or 
safeguarding of the underlying freedoms’.170 This sounds a lot like the Razian conception 
of rights discussed in Chapter 3. However, there is at least one important difference 
between the Razian account and the account that Sen advances. This has to do with the 
nature of the obligations entailed by rights. While Raz draws a sharp distinction between 
reasons and duties (rights provide reasons for holding others to be under duties to act or 
refrain from acting in particular ways), Sen seems to blur this distinction by treating the 
correlates of all rights as reasons: 
The induced obligations primarily involve the duty to give reasonable 
consideration to the reasons for action and their practical implications, taking 
into account the relevant parameters of the individual case. (Ibid.) 
 
The basic general obligation is that one must be willing to consider seriously what 
one should reasonably do, taking note of the relevant parameters of the cases 
involved. The necessity to ask that question (rather than proceeding on the 
assumption that we owe nothing to others, unless we have actually harmed them) 
can be the beginning of a more comprehensive line of ethical reasoning. The 
territory of human rights firmly belongs there. (Ibid., p. 340) !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
169 I will speak of consideration in what follows, but the notions of respect and recognition also 
seem equally appropriate in this context. For our present purposes, I will not distinguish between 
these three notions. Although I suspect that they are not merely synonymous, analysis of them 
and their relationships to each other, and their respective roles in moral reasoning is beyond the 
scope of the present project.    
170 ‘Elements of a Theory of Human Rights’, p. 319. 
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The rights of the global poor on the sort of account Sen has in mind are thus violated in 
that many among the global rich are failing to take their plight adequately into 
consideration in deciding how to act. This is certainly true of anyone who makes no 
contribution at all to global poverty relief efforts, assuming they have the means to do so 
within the relevant limits on the extent of required sacrifice. It will also be true of anyone 
failing to make a sufficiently large contribution based on their means. It will furthermore 
be true of anyone who sacrifices enough, but does not use appropriate discretion in how 
to direct the benefits.   
 I think that this account, though flawed for reasons I will discuss presently, is the 
most plausible of the three alternatives to the conventional interpretation so far 
considered. It tells us that our failure to work towards the eradication of severe poverty 
worldwide constitutes an affront to every individual suffering from severe deprivations. 
Our acquiescence in severe poverty shows a lack of consideration for the freedom and 
humanity of each person in dire need. On this account, those in dire need have a claim 
on each of us that we show them the consideration to which they are entitled as human 
beings. We can do this not by trying in vain to assist each and every person in need, but 
rather by working towards the eradication of global poverty by cooperating with others 
in the fostering of institutions that can effectively address the problem.  
 This is a powerful message, but although I think it provides the best way of 
understanding the positive duties correlative to the human right to subsistence, I argue 
that it has at least two serious shortcomings. First, like the accounts of the human right 
to subsistence based on LPA discussed in Chapter 2, it draws no distinction between 
what I referred to as the broad and narrow deontic implications of human rights. I take 
the narrow deontic implications of a right to refer to the duties directly entailed by the 
right – namely those whose unfulfillment constitutes a violation of the right. The broad 
deontic implications of a right on this distinction refer to the duties that are indirectly 
entailed by it, such as duties to protect others from violations of the right and duties to 
assist those whose rights have been violated.  
I agree with Sen that ‘Human rights generate reasons for action for agents who 
are in a position to help in the promoting or safeguarding of the underlying freedoms’, 
but reasons are not the same as duties. According to Sen, however, the failure to draw a 
sharp distinction between reasons and duties 
would indeed involve an immense escalation if the duty in question were not one 
of giving reasonable consideration to a possible action, but an absolute obligation 
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to undertake that action, no matter what other values one has and what other 
commitments one has reason to consider. (Ibid., p. 339) 
What Sen seems to be saying here is that when the duty in question is the duty to give 
‘reasonable consideration to a possible action’, it does not differ significantly from the 
reasons for taking that action. This, however, departs significantly from the ordinary 
understanding of what a duty is, namely something that one is obligated to perform (or 
not perform, as the case may be). To this line of argument Sen replies as follows: 
But that way of seeing one’s duties—as compulsory action—is not only at some 
distance from the acknowledgment of reasons for action, but it also lacks 
cogency, and even internal coherence. There are many fine deeds for each of 
which a reason for action exists, but it would typically be impossible to carry out 
the totality of all those deeds. There is a need for the assessment of priorities and 
for discrimination in the way the obligation to give reasonable consideration may 
be followed up by sensible choices of action. (Ibid.) 
What Sen seems to be saying here is that we cannot do all of the things that we have 
reason to do, and so we must make a reasoned choice as to which actions to carry out. 
This is precisely the thought that underlies the claimability objection. Since we cannot 
assist every person that we have reason to assist, we cannot be obligated to do so. This 
does not, however, mean that we have no obligations whatsoever with respect to those 
actions; it only means that those obligations are imperfect, and so not owed to anyone in 
particular.  
 In Chapter 2, I discussed two ways of interpreting the distinction between perfect 
and imperfect duties. I argued that a duty is imperfect in the sense relevant to the 
claimability objection if it is not owed to anyone in particular. The other sense in which a 
duty might be thought to be imperfect is that it is a requirement to adopt a particular end 
rather than to perform or not perform a particular action. Acknowledging this difference 
helps to clarify Sen’s account. Although a duty that is imperfect in the sense of requiring 
the adoption of an end might be thought to be owed to no one in particular, it might 
equally be thought to be owed in some sense to everyone. This, I think, gets us closer to 
what Sen means in claiming that ‘imperfect obligations are correlative with human rights 
in much the same way as perfect obligations are’ (Ibid., p. 319). If we are in fact duty-
bound to adopt the end that everyone in need of assistance receives it, and if we owe this 
duty to humanity at large, then claimability does not seem to be a problem.  
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Although I have argued that conceiving of the human right to subsistence as a right that 
all others give due consideration to one’s need in deciding how they will act succeeds in 
avoiding the claimability objection, I am skeptical that it constitutes a plausible 
interpretation of this right. I argued in the previous chapter that the reason we should 
take seriously the claimability condition is that rights that are not claimable struggle to 
make a distinctive contribution to reasoning about the normative implications of global 
poverty. Insofar as there is a requirement on rights that they make a distinctive 
contribution to normative reasoning, I argued that claimability is a necessary condition 
on the existence of all rights. Claimability is not, however, sufficient for the existence of 
a right. The claimability of a right does not guarantee that it will make a distinctive 
contribution to normative reasoning. It is for this reason that I am sceptical about the 
success of the interpretation of the human right to subsistence according to which it 
constitutes a claim that everyone give due consideration to the needs of those suffering 
from severe poverty. Although, unlike the conventional interpretation of the human right 
to subsistence based on LPA, it is claimable, I argue that, like the conventional 
interpretation, this interpretation struggles to make a distinctive contribution to 
reasoning about the normative implications of global poverty.   
The interpretation of the human right to subsistence as a claim to due 
consideration would have purchase on two related views, neither of which is plausible. 
One is the view that duties of justice are always more important than duties of 
beneficence. If this were the case, we could infer from the existence of a human right to 
subsistence on this interpretation that the consideration of those in need should 
outweigh many other considerations in our deliberations about how we ought to act. In 
this way, it would contribute to reasoning about the normative implications of global 
poverty. This contribution would not, however, be distinctive since the conclusion that 
the consideration of those in need should outweigh many other considerations in our 
deliberations about how we ought to act could be reached without positing a right to 
subsistence. The relative weight of this consideration could be inferred from the 
importance of the value of people having access to the means for subsistence irrespective 
of them having any claim to this. At any rate, as I argued in Chapter 1, there is good 
reason to reject the view that what distinguishes duties of justice from duties of 
beneficence is simply that they are more important.    
The other view on which the interpretation of the human right to subsistence as 
a claim to due consideration would have purchase is the view according to which 
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something is either owed as a matter of right or is morally supererogatory. On this sort 
of account, what is gained from affirming a human right to subsistence on the 
interpretation under consideration is that it implies that to give consideration to the 
needs of those suffering from severe poverty in deliberating about how to act is a 
stringent moral requirement. This, I argue, rests on a false dichotomy. While I accept that 
it is either the case that something is a duty or that it is not morally required, there are 
duties that do not correlate with rights. For example, being kind, charitable, or beneficent 
is not morally supererogatory despite kindness, charity, and beneficence not being owed 
to others as a matter of right. Failure to be kind, charitable, or beneficent is morally 
blameworthy; and duties to be kind, charitable or beneficent are no less stringent than 
those that do correlate with rights. As I argued in Chapter 1, duties that correlate with 
rights are distinguished from other duties in that they are prima facie justifiably enforceable 
as such, not in that they are morally required.  
Aside from these two possibilities – both of which I argue should be rejected – it 
is not clear what is gained with respect to reasoning about the normative implications of 
global poverty from the affirmation of a human right to subsistence understood as a 
right to consideration. As such, despite the human right to subsistence being claimable 
on this interpretation, I argue that this interpretation does not provide an overall 
plausible account of the human right to subsistence.  
 
4.4.  Two Observations 
At this juncture, it is worth making two observations. The first has to do with the extent 
of the disagreement between those who affirm the human right to subsistence and those 
like O’Neill who argue for stringent and potentially demanding moral obligations on all 
moral agents to work towards the eradiation of global severe poverty while denying a 
corresponding human right. I think that the persistent disagreement between proponents 
of these views has obscured the degree to which they are actually in agreement about 
many of the normative implications of global severe poverty. Both agree that the general 
duties to work towards the eradication of severe poverty are imperfect. Both agree that 
these are, nevertheless, stringent moral obligations. Furthermore, both agree that the 
discharging of our imperfect duties of assistance and protection against deprivation will 
in most cases be institutionally oriented. Effectively discharging our duties to work 
towards the eradication of severe poverty worldwide will in some cases make use of 
existing institutions that may or may not need to be restructured to suit the task. In other 
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cases the creation of new institutions will be required. Both agree that the effect of 
institutions will, in many cases, be to make imperfect duties of assistance and protection 
perfect by allocating specific responsibilities to specific duty-bearers. The only significant 
difference between these two views is that on one, we are warranted in the affirmation of 
rights to assistance and protection prior to the establishment of the relevant institutions, 
and on the other we are not. On reflection, it is not obvious that this difference is all that 
significant.     
 
The second observation has to do with what more can be said about the nature of the 
imperfect duties of assistance and protection against deprivation. I argued in the previous 
chapter that the linkage argument advanced by Ashford, although an improvement on 
Shue’s linkage argument, nevertheless does not succeed in vindicating the human right to 
subsistence. However, Ashford’s argument does succeed in justifying stringent moral 
duties to assist those in dire need on the basis of a commitment to promoting the 
enjoyment of rights. These duties fall somewhere in between duties of beneficence and 
duties of justice since they are not correlative to any right, but their fulfillment is 
indirectly a matter of human rights. 
One of the central motivations for affirming a human right to subsistence is to 
support the view that the duties to work towards the alleviation of severe poverty 
worldwide are duties of justice as opposed to duties of beneficence. The reason for this is 
that duties of beneficence are often taken to be weak and discretionary whereas duties of 
justice are seen as being stringent and strong. But insofar as there is a clear distinction 
between duties of justice and duties of beneficence, for reasons discussed in Chapter 1, I 
doubt that it has to do with their stringency or strength. Duties of beneficence are 
discretionary only in that the duty-bearer has discretion over how they are discharged 
and who is benefitted, not whether they must be discharged. With respect to the 
stringency of the requirement to fulfil them, duties of beneficence are no different, 
morally, than duties of justice: both must, morally, be fulfilled.  
While simply showing that some duty is a duty of justice does not tell us much 
about the strength of that duty, showing that a duty is entailed by a human right does. As 
we saw in Chapter 2, human rights protect particularly important values and their 
fulfillment will, in most cases, take precedence over the promotion of other values. So to 
show that a duty is entailed by a human right is to provide support of the high 
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importance of the fulfillment of that duty, regardless of whether it is a duty of justice or a 
duty of beneficence.  
  I argue that there are universal duties of assistance and protection that do not 
correlate with the human right to subsistence, but whose fulfillment is nevertheless a 
matter of human rights. Drawing on the linkage argument advanced by Ashford, I argue 
that there are duties of assistance that are indirectly entailed by human rights, though not 
the human right to subsistence.  
Recall that according to Ashford, there is a substantive connection between the 
secure enjoyment of the substance of certain core human rights and the secure 
enjoyment of access to the means for subsistence. In the absence of secure enjoyment of 
access to the means for subsistence, people are vulnerable to perverse trade-offs such as 
accepting to undergo (a limited amount of non-fatal) torture in exchange for subsistence 
goods. The banning of such contracts would serve the purpose of securing the 
enjoyment of freedom from torture, but would ultimately be against the interests of the 
right-holders who may have a greater interest in subsistence-plus-torture than they do in 
freedom from torture without subsistence. The only way to both respect the interests of 
the right-holders and protect them from the violation of their rights is to ensure that they 
have secure enjoyment of access to the means for subsistence.  
Ashford takes this argument to support the human right to subsistence 
understood a right to be provided with secure access to the means for subsistence. I 
argued, however, that this does not follow. While I accept that people have rights to 
things that are necessary for the fulfillment of their rights, I distinguish between fulfillment 
and enjoyment. Ashford’s argument requires that people have rights to things that are 
necessary for the enjoyment of their rights, but I have argued that this view presupposes 
an account of rights based on LPA, which is inadequately supported. 
Nevertheless, I do think that the argument has force in another respect. Even a 
non-consequentialist can accept that the promotion of the widespread enjoyment, not 
mere fulfillment, of human rights is an important moral goal. Ashford’s argument shows 
that insofar as we care about promoting the enjoyment of human rights, we must work 
towards the widespread enjoyment of secure access to the means for subsistence. As 
such, insofar as there is a moral requirement to work towards the widespread enjoyment 
of human rights, then it follows that there is a moral requirement to work towards the 
widespread enjoyment of access to the means for subsistence. In this respect, the duty to 
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work towards the widespread enjoyment of access to the means for subsistence is a 
matter of human rights, albeit indirectly. 
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—5—  
THE MINIMAL INTERPRETATION: A PROPOSAL 
 
 
 
 
I have so far argued that the force of the claimability objection comes from the challenge 
it presents to proponents of the human right to subsistence to show how the affirmation 
of this right affects moral reasoning about the normative implications of global poverty. 
Understood according to the conventional interpretation as a fundamental right to 
assistance and protection against deprivation, I have argued that the affirmation of a 
human right to subsistence does not significantly affect reasoning about the distribution, 
extent, and stringency of obligations to assist those in need and to protect people against 
deprivation. More controversially, I have argued that it does not contribute to reasoning 
about what actions are permissible or required by first and third parties in response to 
failures of second parties to fulfil obligations of assistance and protection. I also argued 
that the same is true of the human right to subsistence interpreted as a right that others 
give due consideration to those in need.  
  
In this chapter, I argue that we should not conclude from this that affirmations of a 
human right to subsistence are merely empty rhetoric. This, I argue, would be to 
overlook the significance of the negative duties correlative to this right. Following Shue, 
it is widely accepted that we should not restrict the duties correlative to the human right 
to subsistence to positive duties of protection and provision;171 but the nature and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
171 Shue, Basic Rights, Chapter 2. 
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implications of the negative duties correlative to the human right to subsistence are 
underexplored in the literature. Interpreting the human right to subsistence as correlating 
primarily with negative duties promises to avoid the claimability objection. It has the 
added advantage of also promising to avoid the liberty objection. It remains to be seen, 
however, whether focusing on such duties will have a significant effect on moral 
reasoning about the normative implications of global poverty. I argue in the next chapter 
that it does. In this chapter, I lay the foundation in support of this claim by providing an 
analysis of the negative duties correlative to the human right to subsistence.  
 
5.1. The Minimal Interpretation 
It is widely acknowledged, though seldom discussed, that there are important negative 
duties correlative to the human right to subsistence. It is important to distinguish 
between two negative duties: 
(1) The duty not to support coercive social institutions that do not uphold the 
human right to subsistence 
(2) The duty not to deprive others of access to the means for subsistence 
As we saw in Chapter 4, Pogge’s account focuses almost exclusively on duty (1). This is 
because of the ‘institutional’ conception of human rights he espouses. Duty (2), by 
contrast, is a norm of interpersonal interaction. I argue that the shortcomings of Pogge’s 
account discussed in Chapter 4 can be remedied by shifting our focus to duty (2). The 
account of the human right to subsistence that I advance in this chapter will take duty (2) 
as the central point of our understanding and application of this right. I will begin in this 
section by providing a conceptual analysis of this duty. The purpose of this is twofold. 
First it provides a framework for the identification of violations of the human right to 
subsistence, negatively construed. Second, in providing this framework, my analysis of 
the duty not to deprive will allow us to assess the contribution of an interpretation of the 
human right to subsistence based on it to reasoning about the normative implications of 
global poverty.   
 
As we have seen, Pogge’s account of the human right to subsistence falls somewhere 
between a thoroughly minimalist account according to which it is a claim held against the 
coercive social institutions imposed upon us that they not deprive us of access to the 
means for subsistence on the one hand, and on the other hand a thoroughly maximalist 
account according to which not only is it a claim against the coercive social institutions 
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imposed upon us to guarantee our access to the means for subsistence, but also a claim 
on others including non-institutional agents to create institutions with the express 
purpose of ensuring that everyone is guaranteed access to the means for subsistence 
where such institutions are lacking. Pogge’s account is based on a minimalist account of 
interactional justice and something closer to a maximalist account of institutional justice. 
Individuals, on Pogge’s account, are only bound by negative duties of justice (namely 
duties not to violate human rights, and duties not to support unjust coercive social 
institutions), whereas coercive social institutions are bound by more demanding 
principles of justice (such as the protection and promotion of the objects of human 
rights).  
Focusing on the duty not to deprive yields an interpretation of the human right 
to subsistence that is closer to the thoroughly minimalist account. A thoroughly 
minimalist account of the human right to subsistence would hold that any institutional 
order that makes it impossible for those on whom it is imposed to enjoy access to the 
means for subsistence is unjust. This is because an institutional order that makes it 
impossible for those on whom it is imposed to enjoy access to the means for subsistence 
is in violation of the negative duty not to deprive people of access to the means for 
subsistence. As such, anyone who cooperates in upholding this institutional order is in 
violation of their negative duty not to impose upon others unjust coercive social 
institutions.  
There are two problems with the thoroughly minimalist account of the human 
right to subsistence, and indeed of human rights in general. The first has to do with the 
account offered in section 4.1.1 above of what is required for an institutional order to 
make it impossible for those upon whom it is imposed to securely enjoy the objects of 
their human rights. On this account, the global order makes it impossible for people to 
enjoy the objects of their human rights if and only if, holding the structure of the global 
order constant, no changes can feasibly be made to any other variable such that people 
would securely enjoy the objects of their human rights. This, however, precludes the 
possibility that the structure of the global order combined with other variables – notably the 
structure of domestic institutions – leads to people not being able to enjoy the objects of 
their human rights.  
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To illustrate, consider an example from Pogge.172 In this example, two companies 
have factories operating alongside the same river. Each company disposes of its chemical 
waste in the river. Neither chemical alone would have any effect whatsoever on the 
quality of the water in the river, but the combination of the chemicals from the two 
factories causes the water to become contaminated, thus endangering the health of the 
residents of a village downstream. Although the actions of each company are individually 
benign and morally permissible, the combination of each company’s respective actions 
causes harm in which both companies are complicit. Although it is true that neither 
company’s actions would be harmful were it not for the actions of the other company, 
this does not excuse their actions. This is because there is no more reason for one 
company to refrain from disposing of its waste in the river than there is for the other (or 
so we assume here for the sake of argument). As such, the responsibility and therefore 
the burden must be borne by both companies together. 
The thoroughly minimalist account of responsibility outlined in Chapter 4 
precludes multiplicative harms of this sort since it requires holding constant the structure 
of the institutional order in question. In this example, if we held constant the actions of 
one company and asked ourselves whether any other variable could be changed such that 
the harm was avoided, we would come up with the answer that, yes, in fact the other 
company could cease dumping its waste in the river. But this holds true for each 
company, so the thoroughly minimalist account yields the implausible conclusion that 
neither company (and indeed no one) is responsible for the harm. To suggest that the 
structure of the global order should be held constant in evaluating its contribution to 
human rights deficits is to suggest that it takes precedence over other factors that may 
affect the realization of human rights such as the structure of domestic political 
institutions.  
Pogge is right to suggest that while human rights violations are usually the direct 
result of local factors, this does not preclude the shared responsibility of the global order. 
I argue, then, that a plausible account of the human right to subsistence will hold that an 
institutional order can be said to impede the realization of human rights if, but not only if, 
there are no modifications that can feasibly be made to any other factors affecting the 
realization of human rights such that these rights could be fully realized without 
modifying the institutional order in question. It must also allow that there are other !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
172 Pogge, ‘Recognized and Violated by International Law: The Human Rights of the Global 
Poor’, Leiden Journal of International Law, 18 (2005), 717-745 (pp. 734-735). 
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factors which, combined with the structure of the global order, affect the realisation of 
human rights; but that some such factors can equally be held constant in our evaluation 
of the global order, and any other institutional order or other contributing factor for that 
matter.  
 
The second problem with the thoroughly minimalist account is its claim that in order to 
be considered unjust in respect to the human right to subsistence, the global order must 
make it impossible for people to acquire the material means for subsistence. Although an 
institutional order that does this is surely unjust, an institutional order that makes it 
extremely difficult for people to acquire the material means for subsistence would also 
seem to be unjust. Just how difficult it has to be to acquire access to the means for 
subsistence under a given institutional order in order for it to be considered unjust is a 
separate question, and one that I will set aside for the moment.  
 
In light of these two deficiencies, I reject the thoroughly minimalist account in favour of 
what I simply refer to as the ‘minimal interpretation’ of the human right to subsistence.  
This interpretation places the duty not to deprive at the core of the human right to 
subsistence, but it allows that an institutional order might violate this duty in conjunction 
with other factors, and that an institutional order might violate this duty despite it being 
possible – thought extremely difficult – for persons within it to acquire access to the 
means for subsistence. We should note that the minimal interpretation, like the 
thoroughly minimalist account, blurs the distinction between institutional and 
interactional conceptions of human rights. This is because the reason that individuals are 
duty-bound not to support unjust coercive social institutions is because unjust coercive 
social institutions violate the human rights of others. Supporting an unjust coercive social 
institution thus entails being complicit in the violation of human rights; and since 
individuals are duty-bound not to violate human rights, the duty not to support unjust 
coercive social institutions can be reduced to this duty. On Pogge’s mixed account, by 
contrast, the principles of justice that apply to social institutions are not the same as 
those that apply to individuals; so the duty of individuals not to support unjust coercive 
social institutions cannot be reduced to their duty not to violate human rights.173   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
173 This brings to mind a debate between Pogge, G. A. Cohen, and Liam Murphy over whether 
different principles of justice govern interpersonal interaction and institutional structure 
respectively. The minimalist account I am proposing here is not necessarily committed to the 
view that all of the principles of justice that govern the structure of institutions also apply to 
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5.2. The Duty not to Deprive 
The minimalist interpretation of the human right to subsistence that I am proposing is 
based on the duty not to deprive. This duty is the direct correlate of the human right to 
subsistence. This is widely accepted by proponents of the human right to subsistence, 
but discussion of this duty has tended to be overshadowed in the literature by discussion 
and debate about the positive duties taken to correlate with the human right to 
subsistence. Indeed very little has been written about the duty not to deprive. The most 
influential treatment of it is in Shue, and so I take that as my starting point. On his 
account, the negative duty correlative to the human right to subsistence is  
a duty simply not to take actions that deprive others of a means that, but for 
one’s own harmful actions, would have satisfied their subsistence rights or 
enabled them to satisfy their own subsistence rights, where the actions are not 
necessary for the satisfaction of one’s own basic rights and where the threatened 
means is the only realistic one.174 
I have two minor objections to this account, neither of which concerns its content. My 
first objection is to the suggestion that fulfilling this duty is simple. As we shall see in 
what follows, the duty not to deprive is considerably more complex than is suggested 
here. Furthermore, because its violation is largely the result of aggregate or collective 
action, it is often difficult to ascertain whether or not the action of a particular agent 
constitutes a violation of this duty. My second objection is just that this account is 
insufficiently determinate. Although it provides a loose guide for thinking about the duty 
not to deprive, there is more that the theorist can contribute. My aim in this chapter is 
therefore to supplement Shue’s account and show that a sufficiently detailed account of 
the duty not to deprive can make an important contribution to moral reasoning about 
global poverty. In what follows, I will discuss eight key features of the duty not to 
deprive based on Shue’s account. Together, these will provide the supporting beams, so 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
individual conduct, and vice versa; only that at least the non-violation of human rights is 
common to both. Pogge, it seems, is willing to accept this. See Pogge, ‘On the Site of 
Distributive Justice; Reflections on Cohen and Murphy’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 29 (2000), 
137-169; G. A. Cohen, ‘Where the Action Is: On the Site of Distributive Justice’, Philosophy & 
Public Affairs, 26 (1997), 3-30; and Liam Murphy, ‘Institutions and the Demands of Justice’, 
Philosophy & Public Affairs, 27 (1998), 251-291. 
174 Basic Rights, p. 55. 
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to speak, of a framework for assessing violations of the human right to subsistence on 
the minimalist interpretation.  
 
(1) The duty not to deprive is a duty not to deprive people relative to an absolute baseline, namely the 
threshold for subsistence. 
We can begin by noticing that the duty not to deprive on Shue’s account is a duty not to 
deprive relative to an absolute baseline. Someone might be deprived of what they 
previously had (deprivation relative to a diachronic baseline), or they might be deprived 
of what they would have had had some previous state of affairs been allowed to persist 
(deprivation relative to a subjunctive baseline). Although for a person to be deprived, 
they must be made poorer than they were before, or than they might have been, my 
claim is that in order for the deprivation to be unjust, they must also be made poor 
relative to the threshold for absolute poverty. On Shue’s account, the relevant threshold 
is the threshold for subsistence. We can distinguish those suffering from poverty in this 
sense by referring to them as absolutely poor. The human right to subsistence is grounded 
in the tremendous and undeniable importance for every human being to have access to 
the means for subsistence. Whatever else the human right to subsistence entails, its 
fulfillment requires at least that right-holders not be forseeably and avoidably deprived of 
access to the means for subsistence. 
Shue’s account is not committed to the injustice of deprivation in general, and 
rightly so. Examples of morally permissible ways in which one might be causally 
implicated in someone’s deprivation include claiming one’s winnings in a fair game of 
cards, despite this resulting in one’s opponent being poorer than he was before, or than 
he would have been had he not wagered; or offering a better service than a business 
competitor thereby drawing in those who were previously the competitor’s patrons. This 
might cause the competitor to become poorer than she was before, or poorer than she 
would have been had you not offered a good service, but it is nevertheless morally 
permissible.175 Furthermore, there are laws that may have the effect of making people 
poorer than they might otherwise be, but where this does not make them unjust. For 
example, a law might require that every commercial building have a secondary fire 
escape. This might entail a considerable financial burden for a shopkeeper who is thereby 
required to have a secondary fire escape installed. But just because a law imposes costs !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
175 David Miller makes a similar claim in ‘Distributing Responsibilities’, in Global Responsibilities: 
Who Must Deliver on Human Rights?, ed. by Andrew Kuper, pp. 95-115 (p. 100). 
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on some people making them worse off than they were or than they would otherwise be, 
this does not entail that the law is unjust.  
Shue’s account also leaves open whether deprivation relative to some higher 
absolute baseline would also be unjust. The baseline that he has in mind is the threshold 
for subsistence, but his account is compatible with it being unjust to deprive people 
relative to a higher baseline than this. Shue’s point is that whatever other cases of 
deprivation might be unjust, it is at least unjust to deprive someone relative to the 
absolute baseline in question.  
 
(2) The duty not to deprive is a duty not to deprive people of access to the means for subsistence. 
According to Shue, the object of which we are duty-bound to avoid depriving people is 
‘a means that would have satisfied their subsistence rights or enabled them to satisfy their 
own subsistence rights, (...) where the threatened means is the only realistic one’. This 
requires some unpacking. First of all, given that the duty not to deprive is meant to be 
the corollary of the human right to subsistence, it is equivocal and potentially circular to 
suggest that it is a duty not to deprive people of a means that would satisfy this same 
right. I take it that the relevant duty is better expressed as the duty not to deprive people 
of access to the means for subsistence. This initially raises two questions: What is meant 
by ‘subsistence’? And, What does it mean to have access to the means for subsistence? In 
this section, I address each in turn. 
I already discussed the matter of what is meant by ‘subsistence’ in Chapter 2. As 
we saw, what counts as subsistence is often described in vague terms. Nevertheless, I 
argued that our analysis of the human right to subsistence can proceed based on a fairly 
rough idea of what subsistence means. To reiterate, I take it that our analysis of the 
human right to subsistence – and in this case of the negative duties correlative to this 
right – can proceed based on an account of subsistence understood as including food 
adequate to avoid malnutrition, clean water adequate to avoid dehydration, clothing and 
shelter adequate to avoid exposure to the elements, and basic emergency and preventive 
medical care to avoid at least easily avoidable disease and debility, and easily preventable 
death.  
Let us, then, turn now to the second question posed above. As I said earlier, the 
substance of the human right to subsistence, and so the object of which people must not 
be deprived, is access to the means for subsistence. Having access to some good is not the 
same thing as having that good. I have access to X if, for example, it is among the things 
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that I can purchase with the money that I actually have or barter with goods that I 
actually possess; but this is not the same as actually having X. To be sure, we have access 
to all those things that we have; but the inverse does not hold. Having access to the 
means for subsistence means having opportunities to acquire the material means for 
subsistence when one does not actually possess these.  
I take it that having access to the material means for subsistence is the relevant 
object of the human right to subsistence because the fulfillment of the human right to 
subsistence should be compatible with people freely choosing to deny themselves all or 
some of the material means for subsistence. For example, although actually having 
enough food to avoid malnutrition is tremendously important for all persons, we would 
not say of someone who is on a politically motivated hunger strike or who is fasting for 
religious reasons that her human right to subsistence is not fulfilled. Insofar as human 
rights are intended to protect highly important human interests, it is the interest in being 
able to acquire the material means for subsistence that matters most.   
A further qualification is required. A single mother who has no way of obtaining 
the material means for subsistence for herself and her children except by prostituting 
herself can be said to have access to the means for subsistence in that she has at least one 
opportunity to secure for herself and her dependents the material means for subsistence. 
But insofar as the human right to subsistence is meant to protect the interest in being 
able to acquire the material means for subsistence, we should add the qualification that 
this be possible in a way that does not threaten the dignity or integrity of the right-
holder. Having access to the means for subsistence should then be interpreted as having 
reasonable opportunities to acquire the means for subsistence, understood as having 
opportunities to acquire the means for subsistence that do not compromise the dignity 
or integrity of the agent.  
What counts as an opportunity to acquire the material means for subsistence that 
does not compromise the dignity and integrity of the agent is a difficult question. 
Examples of opportunities that compromise the dignity or integrity of the agent that 
come to mind immediately include things like prostitution and selling one’s organs. But it 
might be pointed out that prostitution and organ-selling do not necessarily compromise 
the dignity and integrity of the agent. Take, for example, a woman who chooses 
prostitution as means to make profit from among a large range of other opportunities. 
Compared to the woman who has no choice but to prostitute herself in order to feed her 
children, it seems less clear that her dignity and integrity is compromised. What we can 
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perhaps say is that few people would choose prostitution, organ-selling, and the like as 
ways to make a living unless they had no other choice, and so on their own they do not 
count as reasonable opportunities to acquire the means for subsistence. But this is not 
entirely unproblematic. There might be opportunities to acquire the means for 
subsistence that do not obviously compromise the dignity and integrity of the agent 
forced to take them up despite being ones that few people would choose unless they had 
no other option. Perhaps more problematic is that an opportunity that compromises the 
dignity and integrity of one person may not compromise the dignity and integrity of 
another. Making a living as a taxi driver does not generally compromise the agent’s 
dignity; but it might if it represents the only available option for a refugee who has 
trained as a surgeon in his home country but whose qualifications are not recognized in 
his host country. Working in an abattoir does not generally compromise the integrity of 
the agent; but it might if it represents the only available option for a practicing Buddhist. 
On the one hand, these questions serve to underscore my earlier point that 
assessing violations of the duty not to deprive is not simple. On the other hand, we can 
put the matter of what precisely counts as having a reasonable opportunity to acquire the 
means for subsistence aside for the moment since we can go a considerable way in our 
analysis and evaluation of the human right to subsistence without a precise account. This 
is because there are a huge number of people who clearly lack a reasonable opportunity 
to acquire the means for subsistence in light of the fact that they lack any opportunity at 
all. There are also millions of people who clearly have many reasonable opportunities to 
acquire the means for subsistence. It will suffice for the purposes of the current analysis 
to say that the substance of the human right to subsistence is access to the means for 
subsistence understood as having reasonable opportunities to acquire the means for 
subsistence. This implies that the negative duty correlative to the human right to 
subsistence is a duty not to be complicit in rendering someone incapable (either having 
no opportunities or having only opportunities that compromise the agent’s dignity or 
integrity) of accessing the means for subsistence.  
 
(3) The duty not to deprive is a duty not to deprive people of their only realistic opportunity to acquire the 
means for subsistence. 
It is important to note Shue’s requirement for an act to count as a violation of the duty 
not to deprive that ‘the threatened means is the only realistic one’. There is nothing 
inherently wrong with depriving someone of one of many opportunities that they might 
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take to acquire the means for subsistence. A shop-keeper with several employees who 
decides upon retirement to close the shop deprives the former employees of the 
opportunity to acquire the means for subsistence by working in the shop; but assuming 
there are further reasonable opportunities for them to acquire the means for subsistence 
available, he does not violate his duty not to deprive. A person has access to the means 
for subsistence in the relevant sense if she has at least one reasonable opportunity to 
acquire the means for subsistence. As such, the human right to subsistence is violated 
only insofar as a person is deprived of her only reasonable opportunity to acquire the 
means for subsistence.   
 An implication of this is that it is unjust to be causally implicated in someone’s 
absolute impoverishment even if that person consented to the action that resulted in it. 
So in the examples mentioned above in which two parties willingly engage in fair 
economic competition, the winning party is not justified in claiming her winnings in case 
this will result in the absolute impoverishment of the other. It might be objected that this 
is to deny people the moral freedom to wager their only means for subsistence, even if 
they stand to gain considerably. This is a difficult question and I cannot address it 
adequately here. I note, however, that we can find a parallel in the question of the extent 
to which people are morally free to consent to undergoing highly damaging treatment by 
others. While it is generally accepted that a boxer who gets knocked out in a fair match 
has had no right violated insofar as he consented to compete and the competition is fair, 
it is less clear that a person’s consent to be killed and cannibalized morally justifies those 
actions on the part of another.176    
 
(4) The duty not to deprive is not parasitic on other duties.  
Consider the following case: 
Case 1: Family A is a family of subsistence farmers in a country that predictably 
experiences several unproductive months each year as a result of the climate. 
Family A works hard during the productive months and stores enough food to 
get through the unproductive months. Just before the unproductive season, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
176 In 2002, Armin Meiwes, a German man, slaughtered and then ate parts of another man who 
had explicitly consented to these actions. Meiwes, who was initially convicted of manslaughter, 
was ultimately convicted of murder in 2006 and sentenced to life in prison. See Luke Harding, 
‘German Court Find Cannibal Guilty of Murder’, Guardian, 10 May 2006 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/may/10/germany.lukeharding?INTCMP=SRCH> 
Although the German judiciary found that the acts were not legally permissible despite the 
victim’s consent, the question remains whether his consent renders them morally permissible.  
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someone comes and steals all of the food they had stored, leaving Family A no 
way of feeding themselves for this time.  
This example seems like a clear case of behaviour that constitutes a deprivation of Family 
A’s access to the means for subsistence. However, we might note that a satisfactory 
account of the injustice in this situation can ostensibly be given by appeal to the property 
rights of Family A. Assuming that the Family A had a legitimate claim to the food they 
stored, the injustice in this situation consists in the violation of their right in their 
property. The violation of this right might be thought to be aggravated by the fact that it 
leaves Family A particularly badly off; but it would straightforwardly constitute a rights 
violation even if it did not. If Family A were very wealthy to begin with and only a small 
amount of their property was stolen, an injustice would still have been committed.  
 There are plenty of ways in which injustice can result in people lacking access to 
the means for subsistence. In addition to straightforward violations of property rights, 
unjust discrimination, exploitation, and coercion, to name a few, can also result in those 
subject to them falling below the threshold for subsistence. The human right to 
subsistence appears to be superfluous in accounting for injustice in these cases and 
others like them. If it turns out that the injustice of severe impoverishment always resides 
in how it is brought about and never in the impoverishment itself, then it seems that 
there is no human right against severe poverty, but rather rights against being deprived of 
one’s rightful property, being unjustly discriminated against, being unjustly exploited, 
being unjustly coerced, and so on. A great deal of poverty in the world is undoubtedly 
the result of such injustices, and we should, of course, be concerned about this, perhaps 
especially when they result in people being deprived of access to the means for 
subsistence. But what we are really interested in here is whether there is a duty not to 
deprive, the violation of which amounts to the violation of the human right to 
subsistence. To show that there is, we need to show that the violation of the duty not to 
deprive is not merely parasitic on the violation of some other duty. If it is, then it is really 
just an aggravating factor. When someone’s right is violated which in turn results in their 
being deprived of access to the means for subsistence, this is a worse violation of that 
right. But is the human right to subsistence really just the aggravated violation of other 
rights? This seems too weak. In order to support the affirmation of an independent right 
against deprivation, however, we would need to show that there are cases in which the 
injustice in the deprivation resides in the deprivation itself. Consider, then, another case: 
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Case 2: Family B are subsistence farmers in a remote area. They have been grazing 
their animals on the same small tract of land for several generations. This land 
actually belongs in deed to their neighbours, Family C, who are much better off 
than they are and who have had no use for the land for many years. The 
neighbouring farm is eventually passed on to the next generation of Family C who 
decide to sell it to Family D. Family D decide that they want to make use of the 
land that Family B use for grazing. This means that Family B will no longer be able 
to keep animals, without which they will slip below the threshold for subsistence.  
 
This case is not quite as straightforward as Case 1. First of all, there is a question of 
whether Family D’s act of evicting Family B constitutes an injustice at all given that 
Family D has a claim to the land on the basis of their having purchased it from Family C 
who also presumably had some claim to the land. According to the human right to 
subsistence, however, the eviction of Family B is unjust since it constitutes an action that 
forseeably and avoidably results in the severe impoverishment of Family B. This suggests 
that Family B has a competing and indeed overriding claim to the land. But if this is 
right, Case 2 starts to look rather like Case 1 in that the injustice does not reside in the 
mere fact that Family B is caused to fall below the threshold for subsistence, but rather 
that doing so was a violation of their right in the land. There is, however, an important 
question here of what grounds such a claim.  
The answer, it seems, is the right to subsistence of each member of Family B. It 
is plausible that principles of property ownership must be sensitive to the importance of 
people’s basic needs being met.177 Such principles would not permit the eviction from 
property of those for whom the use of that property is their only means of subsisting. 
Case 2, then, offers an example of how an otherwise just action (claiming purchased 
property) is rendered unjust by the constraint imposed by the human right to 
subsistence. I argue that this provides a helpful insight in analyzing the negative duties 
correlative to the human right to subsistence. 
I argue that the human right to subsistence manifests itself predominantly as a 
constraint on the acceptability of moral principles and their application. Principles of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
177 Waldron, for example, argues that systems of private property must presuppose that everyone 
has access to the means for subsistence. This finds support in many libertarian theories, including 
notably Locke’s. According to Locke, the system of private ownership should not make anyone 
worse off than he would have been in the state of nature. The human right to subsistence 
understood negatively is embodied in this principle. See Waldron, ‘Rights and Duties: Two Sides 
of the Coin’, pp. 18-23. 
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property ownership that support the unrestricted license of property-owners over the use 
of their property, for example, are generally justifiable.178 However, where the application 
of this principle leaves people unable to adequately provide for themselves and their 
dependents, it conflicts with the right to subsistence, even construed as entailing only 
negative duties. Since the interest in not falling below the threshold for subsistence is so 
important, the case can be made for injustice in the application of any principle – even 
one that is otherwise justifiable – that results in some people inevitably falling below this 
threshold.  
 
(5) The duty not to deprive is a duty not to deprive people of opportunities. 
What I said in the previous sub-section echoes the ‘centrist’ libertarian view that 
everyone is entitled to the resources necessary for subsistence.179 On this sort of 
libertarianism, the validity of private property rights presupposes that everyone has 
access to the resources they need for subsistence. This is not just a matter of initial 
acquisition; rather it is an ongoing requirement.  
 My interpretation of the negative duty correlative to the right to subsistence is 
not, however, a mere re-statement of a centrist libertarian account. This is because of its 
focus on opportunities rather than property. Of course property will in many cases 
represent opportunity, as in Cases 1 and 2, but this will not always be the case. Consider 
a third case: 
Case 3: Family E, which consists of a mother, a father, and three children, 
manage to secure for themselves the material means for subsistence only because 
the eldest child, who is 14 years old, has been withdrawn from school in order to 
work at the local factory. The combined income of the two parents is insufficient 
to provide adequately for the family. One day, upon realizing that the child-
employee is only 14, the factory owner fires him on the grounds that he does not 
think that children under the age of 15 should be employed. Although this allows 
the child to return to school, the family soon finds itself lacking the material 
means for subsistence.   
This is a difficult case. A principle against the employment of children under the age of 
15 is discriminatory. But not all discrimination is unjust. In general, there seem to be !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
178 There are, of course, egalitarian arguments that aim to impose further restrictions on private 
property ownership. This, however, is not our concern here.  
179 See, for example, A. John Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Rights (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1992), especially Chapter 5.  
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good reasons for not employing children, so it is not clear that this principle is unjustly 
discriminatory. However, the factory owner’s application of this principle denies the 
members of Family E the opportunity to adequately provide for themselves. According 
to Shue’s account, therefore, the impoverishment of Family E in this case constitutes an 
injustice. This implies that there are circumstances under which it is unjust to refuse to 
employ children. Again, as in the previous cases, it looks as though the injustice of the 
situation resides not merely in the absolute impoverishment of the family, but rather 
elsewhere – in this case in the application of an unjustly discriminatory principle. But like 
in Example 2, we need to explain why the refusal to employ children is in this case 
unjust. It seems reasonable to appeal to the fact that, although there are good reasons to 
discourage the employment of children, in this case it has the effect of denying some 
people the only opportunity to provide for themselves the means for subsistence. Appeal 
to a human right to subsistence interpreted as a negative right is therefore indispensable 
to explaining why we should reject the application of such a principle in this case. 
 The point of this example is just to illustrate that the relevant object of 
deprivation is the opportunity to acquire for oneself and one’s dependents the material 
means for subsistence. This entails that the thieves in Case 1 would not have acted in 
violation of the human right to subsistence if Family A had some other reasonable means 
of obtaining the material means for subsistence despite having been deprived of their 
rightful property. This is, of course, not to deny that that an injustice had occurred. 
Family A would still have had their property rights violated. However, a violation of the 
human right to subsistence only occurs, when the right-holder is left with no reasonable 
opportunity to acquire the material means for subsistence.   
 
(6) The duty not to deprive includes the duty not to deny. 
The negative duty correlative to the human right to subsistence is expressed on Shue’s 
account as a duty not to deprive. We have already discussed of what it is a duty not to 
deprive, namely the reasonable and realistic chance at securing the material means for 
subsistence. In this section, I want to take a closer look at the concept of deprivation.  
 We speak of deprivation in two ways: active and passive. We can speak of 
someone depriving someone else of some object. This is the active sense of deprivation. 
Deprivation is also used as a synonym for absolute poverty.  We can say that some 
people live in a state of deprivation. In the expression of the negative duty correlative to 
the right to subsistence, the relevant sense of deprivation is the active one. The usual way 
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of understanding deprivation in this sense is as an act of taking some object away from 
someone. I argue that it is important that we understand deprivation more broadly as 
encompassing not only taking away, but also withholding or denial. To illustrate the 
importance of this point, consider another example.  
Case 4: While wandering the countryside looking for new opportunities, Family 
E happen upon some land. They ascertain that the land belongs to Family F, and 
also that Family F own a great deal of land and do not use all of it and have not 
for many years. In fact, they would hardly notice if Family E planted a small 
garden on a remote corner of the land. Family E approach Family F and requests 
permission to use enough land for them to grow what they need to subsist and a 
little more so that they can afford to pay Family F a small amount for the use of 
the land. Despite having no other use for the land and having no competing 
offers for it, Family F refuse to grant Family E use of the land, leaving Family E 
with no opportunities to acquire access to the means for subsistence.   
Family E in this case have not been deprived of anything that they already had. Rather, 
they have been denied something that they could have had. But just as in Case 2, if the 
land represents Family E’s only opportunity to acquire access to the means for 
subsistence, then they have a claim to it on the basis of their human right to subsistence. 
Just as it is impermissible to deprive someone of that to which they have a right, so too is 
it impermissible to deny it to them.  
This recalls the abovementioned distinction between diachronic and subjunctive 
baselines. On the minimalist account of the human right to subsistence, to absolutely 
impoverish someone relative to a diachronic baseline is to deprive them of that to which 
they are entitled. To deny someone access to the means for subsistence is to absolutely 
impoverish them relative to a subjunctive baseline, but is equally impermissible. An 
important and difficult question concerns what sorts of actions counts as denial. Say, for 
example, I accidentally leave my book at your house. If I turn up and ask you to give it 
back and you refuse, it seems fairly clear that you are denying me my book. But what if I 
ask you to bring it back to me and you refuse, saying I must come and get it? Are you 
denying it to me then? What if you borrowed my book and now refuse to bring it back to 
me?  
These questions are relevant to the issue of global poverty since, in many cases, 
the very poor are not able to simply take, or even to try to take that to which they are, on 
this account, entitled. In some cases, this is due to weakness or immobility, in others it is 
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due to lack of education and understanding of their own situation and rights. These 
questions, therefore, require attention, but I will not pursue them here. Our inquiry can, 
for the moment, proceed on the basis of a fairly rough understanding of what it means to 
deny someone access to the means for subsistence.  
 
(7) The duty not to deprive can be violated singularly or multiplicatively. 
The examples discussed so far are all examples of singular violations of the duty not to 
deprive. They involve one identifiable agent depriving persons of access to the means for 
subsistence. My purpose here is to point out that if we focus only on such violations, we 
will overlook important instances of unjust deprivation. This is because as discussed 
above, in order to transgress the duty not to deprive thereby violating the human right to 
subsistence, an agent must deprive the victim of his only reasonable opportunity to 
acquire the means for subsistence. Whereas it would not be a violation of the human 
right to subsistence for Family D to evict Family B from the land in Case 2 if Family B 
had at least one other viable opportunity to secure subsistence for themselves, if the use 
of the land is their only available means of remaining above the threshold for 
subsistence, then depriving them of access to it constitutes a violation of their right. 
Likewise, the factory-owner’s refusal to employ children in Case 3 would be 
unproblematic, except that in this case it deprives Family E of their only available 
opportunity to secure subsistence for themselves. Here, however, we encounter a 
potential problem, namely that it is seldom the case that one agent’s action is sufficient to 
deprive another of their only opportunity for acquiring the means for subsistence. This is 
brought out in Case 4. We can protest against Family F’s denial to Family E of access to 
their land on the grounds that this is to deny Family E their only opportunity to secure 
subsistence for themselves. But Family F could respond by questioning why they rather 
than some other family of property-owners should bear the burden of having to sacrifice 
some of their land so that Family E can subsist. It does not follow from the requirement 
that principles of property ownership be sensitive to people’s dire need that any given 
property-owner must sacrifice their property unless they are the proprietors of the only 
available property. So if all the other land was being used for the purposes of 
guaranteeing subsistence to its proprietors except part of Family F’s, then Family E 
might be said to have a claim to that part of Family F’s land.  
Even if this were the case, however, Family F might respond to our protests by 
pointing out that the only reason that use of their land is the only opportunity for Family 
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E to secure subsistence for themselves is that the factory owner in Case 3 is stubbornly 
refusing to hire the eldest child of Family E. ‘Why,’ Family F might question, ‘should we 
be construed as the ones depriving Family E of their only opportunity to secure 
subsistence for themselves when the factory owner could hire the child?’ Perhaps if it 
could be shown that there are better reasons for children not to be employed than for 
proprietors to have full license over their property this could be justified; but there is no 
clear path to the resolution of such conflicts, and some such conflicts might simply not 
be resolvable due to the incommensurability of the values at stake. 
The purpose of this discussion has been to show that while the human right to 
subsistence might well have as its correlate negative duties not to deprive others of their 
only reasonable opportunity to secure subsistence for themselves and their dependents, 
the assessment and the occurrence of such deprivations will sometimes be complicated 
by the fact that the deprivation is multiplicative. We must take in to account such 
multiplicative harms lest we overlook instances of unjust deprivation. As we saw in 
Pogge’s example of the two companies who dump waste into the river, although the 
actions of each company are individually benign and morally permissible, the 
combination of each company’s respective actions causes harm in which both companies 
are complicit. Although it is true that the neither company’s actions would be harmful 
were it not for the actions of the other company, this does not excuse their actions. This 
is because there is no more reason for one company to refrain from disposing of its 
waste in the river than there is for the other (or so we assume here for the sake of 
argument). As such, the responsibility and therefore the burden must be borne by both 
companies together. Likewise in the case of Family F and the factory owner, neither can 
deny their responsibility for depriving Family E of the opportunity to secure subsistence 
for themselves on the grounds that their actions would not lead to such a deprivation 
were it not for the actions of the other.  
In the absence of other viable opportunities for Family E, it is neither the factory 
owner nor Family F alone who are responsible for the deprivation, but rather the 
conjunction of their respective refusals to accommodate Family E. The problem is not 
that Family F insist on their entitlement to their land. And the problem is not that the 
factory owner refuses to employ children under the age of 15. The injustice occurs as a 
result of the conjunction of Family F’s denial of land access to Family E and the factory 
owner’s refusal to employ children.  
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(8) The duty not to deprive can be violated directly or indirectly. 
All of the examples discussed so far involve cases of direct violations of the duty not to 
deprive. They are direct in the sense that the harmful actions of the agents either 
singularly or multiplicatively have a direct effect on the victims. In this sub-section, I will 
highlight the fact that the duty not to deprive can also be violated indirectly.  
It is important to note in Cases 1-4 above the absence of any reference to laws or 
social conventions, aside from the brief mention in Case 2 of Family C owning the land 
in deed. The decisions of the various agents are cast as purely based on principles they 
personally endorse backed by their own ability to enforce their decisions. This is not very 
realistic. Consider, then, the following two modified examples: 
 
Case 2’: Family B’ are subsistence farmers in a remote area. They have been 
grazing their animals on the same small tract of land for several generations. This 
land actually belongs in deed to their neighbours, Family C’, who are much better 
off than they are and who have had no use for the land for many years. The 
neighbouring farm is eventually passed on to the next generation of Family C’ 
who decide to sell it to Family D’. Family D’ decide that they want to make use 
of the land that Family B’ use for grazing. This means that Family B’ will no 
longer be able to keep animals, without which they will slip below the threshold 
for subsistence.  Family B’ refuse to vacate the property on the grounds of their 
human right not to be denied their only reasonable opportunity to secure 
subsistence for themselves. Family D’ call in the local authorities who, on the 
basis of existing law that grants Family D’ unrestricted license to their property, 
forcibly evict Family B’ from the land.  
 
Case 3’: Family E’, which consists of a mother, a father, and three children, 
manage to secure for themselves the material means for subsistence only because 
the eldest child, who is 14 years old, has been withdrawn from school in order to 
work at the local factory. The combined income of the two parents is insufficient 
to provide adequately for the family. One day, upon realizing that the child-
employee is only 14, the factory owner fires him on the grounds that there are 
strictly enforced laws against the employment of children under the age of 15 and 
he cannot afford to be punished by the local authorities for breach of this law. 
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Although this allows the child to return to school, the family soon finds itself 
lacking the material means for subsistence.  
If we think that the human right to subsistence can ground constraints on principles 
governing property ownership and principles of discrimination, then the same must hold 
for laws governing property ownership and discriminatory laws. As such, the injustice in 
these modified examples, insofar as we think they involve some injustice, resides in the 
laws. Now supposing that the laws in these examples are unjust, where does 
responsibility lie? In Case 2’, we might wonder if Family D’ act unjustly in calling on 
officials to enforce an unjust law. And in Case 3’ we might wonder if the factory owner 
acts unjustly in complying with an unjust law. But if Family D’ and the factory owner 
bear any moral responsibility at all for the impoverishment of Family B’ and Family E’ 
respectively, surely they are not solely culpable. Those responsible for the imposition of 
the laws must hold some, if not all, of the responsibility for the impoverishment that 
results from them.  
The same would be true for a modified version of Case 4 – call it Case 4’ – in 
which there are laws against the employment of children as well as laws that favour the 
property rights of Family F’ over the land that Family E’ so badly need. Unlike the 
injustice in Case 4, the injustice in Case 4’ is not the result of multiplicative harm, 
assuming that the same legislative body is responsible for both laws. In this case, as in 
Cases 2’ and 3’, the harm is neither singular nor multiplicative, but rather systemic or 
institutional.  
We saw in Chapter 4 that Pogge espouses an institutional account of the human 
right to subsistence, and human rights in general. It is worth taking a moment here to 
underscore the difference between his account and the institutional perspective I have in 
mind.  As we have seen, Pogge constrains the scope of the duty-bearers of human rights 
conceptually whereas I am making no such claim. My claim is only that for the human right 
negatively construed, we will fail to recognize many violations of it unless we take on the 
institutional perspective. This does not imply that human rights violations in general 
cannot be interactional; only that we must not neglect the institutional perspective.  
 
Building on Shue’s account, I have argued that the negative duty correlative to the 
human right to subsistence is a universal duty not to act in such a way as to deprive, or 
be complicit in depriving, others of access to the means for subsistence. I have provided 
a conceptual analysis of this duty with the aim of providing a framework for identifying 
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violations of it, and of the human right to subsistence. I specified that what counts as 
having access to the means for subsistence is having at least one reasonable opportunity 
to acquire the means for subsistence. Along the way, several important questions have 
been raised that I have not been able to adequately address here. These include the 
questions of (a) what the relevant threshold living standard for subsistence is, (b) what 
counts as a reasonable opportunity to acquire the means for subsistence, (c) whether 
people can waive the right to subsistence, and (d) what counts as denying someone 
access to the means for subsistence. Answering these questions may be required in order 
to ascertain whether a given agent’s human right to subsistence has been violated. I have 
tried to provide some guidelines for thinking about these issues; but we need not provide 
decisive and complete answers to these questions in order to recognize all violations of 
the human right to subsistence.  
 In the next section, I will reply to some objections to the minimal interpretation 
of the human right to subsistence as I have presented it here, before going on in the next 
chapter to highlight the main implications affirmations of this right have for our moral 
reasoning about global poverty.  
 
5.3. Objections to the Minimal Interpretation 
In this section, I will discuss two potential objections to the minimal interpretation of the 
human right to subsistence. My purpose is to show that these objections can be 
overcome; but discussing them also has the additional value of highlighting some of the 
important features of the minimal interpretation.  
 
5.3.1. It Deviates Too Far from the Conventional Interpretation 
In considering why the minimal interpretation might be rejected, it will be helpful to 
reflect on why the duty not to deprive has been neglected in the literature. One reason 
might be that we already understand it sufficiently and so it does not make for very 
interesting philosophical discussion. I think this is a misguided view. I hope in the 
previous section to have highlighted the complexities of the duty not to deprive and to 
raise some difficult questions that must be answered in order for us to have a full 
understanding of this duty.  
 Another reason that the duty not to deprive might be neglected is that it is 
thought that its violation simply does not account for much poverty worldwide. We need 
to make clear why this might be a problem. There is, I think, something strange about 
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the suggestion that the number of cases of violations of a right can affect whether or not 
it is a human right. It seems strange, for example, to suggest that torture would not 
constitute a human rights violation if very few people were ever tortured. I argue that the 
human right to subsistence can be coherently interpreted as a right against being 
deprived of access to the means for subsistence, even if there are very few actual threats 
to this right. This would not, however, provide a terribly satisfying interpretation of this 
right. The motivation for much of the literature on the human right to subsistence is to 
draw attention to the injustice of global poverty and the urgency of remedying the 
situation. For this reason, it is plausible that the success of an account of the human right 
to subsistence depends on the extent to which we can trace poverty in the world today to 
its violation. 
But what reason is there to think that the violation of the duty not to deprive 
does not account for much poverty worldwide? It might not seem to be the case that 
much poverty can be explained by the straightforward deprivation of one individual by 
another of access to the means for subsistence. But as I have argued, the violations of 
the duty not to deprive might be multiplicative or indirect. As long as we focus on 
instances of singular and direct violations of this duty, we will miss many of the most 
grievous violations of it. More to the point, however, absent a sharper account of what 
the duty not to deprive requires, we are not in much of a position to judge the extent to 
which its violation can account for poverty worldwide. Assessing whether it does is in 
part an empirical task, but we first need a normative framework. I have started to build 
such a framework here, but it is far from complete. The point is that to shut down the 
project of providing such a framework on the grounds that it will not serve us in 
reasoning about the normative implications of global poverty is question-begging.  
 
I have argued that at least these two reasons for neglecting the duty not to deprive are 
unsatisfactory and, as such, do not provide reason to reject an interpretation of the 
human right to subsistence that takes this duty as its focal point. It might nevertheless be 
argued that, although the minimal interpretation provides a plausible way of avoiding the 
claimability objection, it strays too far from how the human right to subsistence is 
generally understood, and therefore fails as a plausible interpretation of this right. As we 
have seen, the human right to subsistence is conventionally interpreted as a universal 
right to protection and provision. Interpreting it only as a right not to be deprived is, 
according to the sort of objection at hand, too narrow.  Where masses of people lack any 
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opportunity to acquire the means for subsistence as a result of natural disaster, they have 
been deprived, but not by any agent. The minimal interpretation says that they are 
entitled to take what they require to subsist; but they will most likely be unable to do this. 
This is likewise the case for all very small children and individuals who are severely 
disabled. If they are left to die even though assistance could have been provided, the 
objection holds that according to the minimal interpretation, no human rights violation 
has occurred.   
 I want to stress that the minimal interpretation I am proposing is not committed 
to this. I have provided reason to think that claimability is in fact a condition on the 
existence of rights, and I have argued against various interpretations of the human right 
to subsistence according to which the positive duties thought to be correlative to it are 
claimable. This does not support the strong conclusion that there is no plausible 
interpretation of the human right to subsistence according to which it correlates with 
positive duties that are claimable. My point is just that such an interpretation remains to 
be provided. The minimal interpretation I am proposing, like Pogge’s account, need not 
be taken as an exhaustive account of the duties correlative to the human right to 
subsistence in order to make an important contribution to moral reasoning about global 
poverty.  
My point is that the claimability objection constitutes a persistent challenge to the 
human right to subsistence, and should be taken seriously. I have argued that the 
differences that underlie the debate between proponents of the claimability condition 
and defenders of the conventional interpretation of the human right to subsistence run 
very deep. I have argued that a critique of the views that underlie the claimability 
condition is a worthwhile pursuit, but because this kind of approach tends to take the 
discussion further and further away from the urgent practical matter of global poverty 
that has motivated the discussion, my suggestion is that proponents of the human right 
to subsistence would do well to look for ways in which the practical discussion can be 
moved forward despite fundamental philosophical differences. As such, the point of the 
minimal interpretation is largely to provide a critique of the rejection of the human right 
to subsistence while nevertheless granting the central normative premise of the 
claimability objection. Incidentally, this also works for the liberty objection discussed in 
Chapter 2, although I am not inclined to endorse this premise. This leaves open the 
possibility that the minimal interpretation is a partial interpretation of the human right to 
subsistence.  
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The negative duties correlative to the human right to subsistence which are 
acknowledged by all defenders of this right are frequently overlooked in the literature. 
My central claim is that in setting aside the duty not to deprive, defenders of the human 
right to subsistence are overlooking an important contribution to reasoning about the 
normative implications of global poverty. Agreement on the existence and importance of 
the duty not to deprive provides a way forward for those who ultimately disagree about 
very fundamental aspects of moral philosophy. In the following chapter, I will gesture 
towards some important areas in need of further discussion. 
 
5.3.2. It Fails to Avoid the Claimability Objection 
A second line of objection against the minimal interpretation of the human right to 
subsistence is that it fails to accomplish what it promises. It promises to provide a 
plausible account of the human right to subsistence that avoids the claimability objection 
by fulfilling the claimability condition. In this section, I will consider and ultimately reject 
a reason for thinking that it does not succeed in doing this.   
The reason that the minimal interpretation would seem to avoid the claimability 
objection is that it is generally thought that negative duties are necessarily perfect, and 
therefore claimable on O’Neill’s account. Ashford has, however, suggested that the duty 
not to deprive is, in many cases, imperfect. This would imply that this duty is not 
claimable on O’Neill’s account of claimability according to which the duty-bearers and 
the content of their duties must be determinate. As we shall see, on Ashford’s 
interpretation, the duty not to deprive will also struggle to avoid the liberty objection.  
Particularly where the deprivations are systemic, Ashford argues that it is 
sometimes impossible to identify the content of the negative duties that have been 
violated and the specific perpetrators:  
The negative duties corresponding to these rights [against being deprived of access 
to basic necessities] may be shared duties that have not been specified and 
allocated among agents. In such cases, while we can identify a group of agents as 
sharing responsibility for a large number of violations, we cannot match up specific 
victims to specific violators and single out the agent(s) specifically responsible for a 
specific victim’s violation.180   
It is important to keep in mind the distinction between difficult-to-determine and 
indeterminate. We have seen that O’Neill’s concern is not just that the duty-bearers and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
180 ‘The Duties Imposed by the Human Right to Basic Necessities’, p. 215. 
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the content of their duties are difficult to determine in the case of the human right to 
subsistence; rather, her objection is that they are indeterminate in the absence of 
institutions. Ashford is making the same point about the duty-bearers and content of the 
duties corresponding to the negative right not to be unjustly deprived of access to the 
means for subsistence. Her claim is not just that it is difficult to identify causal 
responsibility in cases of systemic deprivations, but rather that the perpetrators simply 
cannot be identified for any given victim. This is because she holds that the fulfillment of 
the negative duty not to collaborate in the imposition of coercive social institutions that 
deprive people of access to the means for subsistence in many cases requires members of 
unjust coercive social institutions to engage in institutional reform. But the duty to 
engage in institutional reform is an imperfect duty in the absence of institutional 
mechanisms for establishing what is required of each agent, and so absent such 
institutional mechanisms, it looks as though the human right to subsistence construed 
negatively is nevertheless not claimable, at least in cases of systemic deprivations. 
Furthermore, if the duty not to deprive can require its bearers to engage in institutional 
reform, it is not really a negative duty. As such, it will not satisfy the liberty objection.  
I argue that although Ashford is right to point out the complexity of systemic 
violations of human rights, the difficulties this creates in identifying perpetrators, and the 
resulting need to adjust the conventional ways in which we think about human rights 
violations, the duty not to deprive is nevertheless both negative and perfect. This 
supports the view that a purely negative conception of the human right to subsistence 
can in fact avoid the liberty and claimability objections.  
 I argue that when a person’s right to not be deprived of access to the means for 
subsistence is violated systemically, there is a fact of the matter about how each 
individual participant’s actions have contributed to the violation. As we shall see in the 
next chapter, in many cases the specific role played by any given participant in the 
systemic violation of one person’s right not to be deprived will be extremely difficult to 
determine. In fact, it might be that, given the resources we have for understanding such 
connections, it is impossible to determine. But this is not because it is indeterminate. 
There is a fact of the matter about how one agent’s actions affect another through highly 
complex webs of interconnection, even if we cannot access this fact. This is undoubtedly 
an important obstacle in practice, but it poses no theoretical problem. The claimability 
condition only requires that rights are claimable in principle, meaning that the duty-bearers 
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and the content of their duties are determinate. In the case of systemic violations of the 
right against unjust deprivation, I argue that this condition is fulfilled.  
 The point I have just made pertains to the identification of duty-bearers after a 
right has been violated. Ashford, however, is more concerned with how a given agent 
might avoid violating her negative duty not to be complicit in systemic injustice. This 
requires avoiding complicity in the imposition of unjust coercive social institutions on 
others. How is the conscientious individual to act or abstain from acting so as to avoid 
complicity in the imposition of such institutions? The most obvious answer is to 
withdraw from those institutions or at least from the unjust aspects of them insofar as 
these can be singled out and isolated. But as Ashford rightly points out, in many cases, 
this cannot be reasonably required. For many people, extracting themselves from the 
social institutions in which they participate would involve excessive burdens. In some 
cases it is simply not possible given a lack of reasonable alternatives. For example, a great 
deal of basic material goods are available to residents of the developed world at very low 
costs on account of their being manufactured in societies where the cost of labour is very 
cheap. In most cases, at least part of the reason labour is so cheap is because the 
labourers have no other viable options for supporting themselves and their dependents, 
and so they are willing to work for less than a subsistence wage and in very poor and 
sometimes dangerous conditions. Residents of developed countries may agree that this is 
unjustly exploitative and that they should not support social institutions which put 
people in a position to be exploited and allow (legally) for their exploitation. Some 
residents of developed countries might choose to withdraw from these institutions by 
purchasing only goods that were manufactured under non-exploitative conditions. These 
goods, however, might be more expensive than those manufactured under exploitative 
conditions. As such, some residents in developed countries might not be able to afford 
to purchase only goods manufactured under exploitative circumstances without thereby 
putting themselves and their dependents at a serious disadvantage. According to 
Ashford, in order to fulfil their negative duty not to be complicit in the imposition of 
unjust coercive institutions, people in this sort of situation must engage in institutional 
reform insofar as this is possible. Engaging in institutional reform, however, involves 
taking positive steps rather than merely forebearing.  
 Ashford draws on Pogge’s account which characterizes the negative duty relevant 
to the human right to subsistence is the duty not to impose on others without compensation 
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unjust coercive social institutions.181 Here we see the distinction between duties and 
obligations put to use.182 There are clear cases in which the performance of some positive 
action, rather than mere abstention is required for the fulfillment of a negative duty. For 
example, the negative duty not to break promises can require the duty-bearer to perform 
sometimes quite onerous positive actions, namely those whose performance was 
promised. In Kantian terms, negative duties can entail positive obligations. In order for a 
duty to be perfect, so must the obligations it entails. This is achieved in the case of the 
promise since the content of the positive obligations entailed by the negative duty not to 
break one’s promises is defined by the promise itself. Following Pogge, Ashford holds 
that the duty not to be complicit in the imposition of unjust coercive social institutions 
entails positive obligations. But, she points out, in the absence of coordinated action, the 
obligation to engage in institutional reform is imperfect. How one should go about 
engaging in institutional reform is left largely to the discretion of the agent. Engaging in 
institutional reform can take many different forms. Writing letters to government 
representatives voicing concerns about structural injustice and ideas for how it can be 
rectified, donating money to activist groups aimed at political change, civil disobedience, 
consciousness-raising, and running for political office are only a few ways in which one 
might go about agitating for institutional reform. Which sort of activity is appropriate 
will depend on the person at hand and their circumstances.  
Insofar as fulfilling one’s negative duty not to be complicit in the imposition of 
unjust coercive social institutions requires engaging in institutional reform, the fulfillment 
of this duty therefore requires the fulfillment of an imperfect obligation. But since the 
obligation to engage in institutional reform is imperfect, it is not claimable in O’Neill’s 
sense. Ashford therefore concludes that, insofar as we accept that there is a human right 
not to be unjustly deprived, individually or institutionally, of access to the means for 
subsistence, we should reject the claimability condition.  
 I agree with Ashford that the obligations connected with institutional reform are 
imperfect until systems are in place for determining who is required to do what. I also !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
181 Pogge, ‘Human Rights and Human Responsibilities’, p.15: ‘The duty in question should(…) be 
formulated as a duty not to contribute to the coercive imposition of any institutional order that 
avoidably fails to realize human rights, unless one also compensates by working towards appropriate 
institutional reforms or towards shielding the victims of injustice from the harms one helps produce’ (my 
emphasis). This is because Pogge thinks that in most cases, it is better for the victims of injustice 
if those involved in its perpetration continue their participation in the institutions while 
simultaneously trying to reform them.  
182 I mentioned this distinction in Chapter 1, footnote 12. I do not observe this distinction, but it 
will be helpful here to consider how it might apply.   
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agree that duties to engage in institutional reform are entailed by the human right to 
subsistence negatively construed as well as other human rights. However, I argue that 
these duties do not correlate with the negative duty not to be complicit in the imposition 
of unjust coercive social institutions. The obligation to engage in institutional reform is, I 
argue, indirectly entailed by the human right to subsistence negatively construed, but it is 
not correlative to it.  
 There are two problems with Ashford’s account. First, like Pogge’s account, it 
runs together two duties that should really be kept distinct: The duty not to impose upon 
others unjust coercive social institutions and the duty to engage in institutional reform. I 
argue that engaging in institutional reform is not the correlate of the duty not to impose 
upon others unjust coercive social institutions. It might be owed in compensation for the 
violation of the duty not to impose upon others unjust coercive social institutions; but 
the fulfillment of the duty to engage in institutional reform is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for the fulfillment of the duty not to impose upon others unjust coercive social 
institutions. To conflate these two duties is akin to saying that the duty not to run people 
over with your car can be fulfilled by duly compensating those you have run over. The 
violation of the duty not to run people over with your car might justify duties of 
compensation to those harmed by the violation; but this does not entail that the duty not 
to run people over with your car is actually a duty not to run people over with your car 
unless you compensate them afterwards.  
A second and related problem with Ashford’s argument is that it presupposes 
that all those who are causally implicated in the imposition of a social institution are 
complicit in its imposition. But complicity and causation are different things. It is widely 
held that someone who is causally implicated in harm done to another but who could not 
have done otherwise has committed no injustice. It might turn out that mere causal 
implication is sufficient in some cases for remedial responsibility anyhow, but this is not 
what we are interested in here. What we want to know is whether someone who could 
not do otherwise is in violation of a negative duty not to harm others. It is widely 
thought not. Ashford is challenging this view by suggesting that those who cannot 
reasonably withdraw from an unjust institution are nevertheless complicit in the 
imposition of that institution on others if they are able to engage in institutional reform 
but choose not to. This, I argue, sets up a false dichotomy according to which a person 
who cannot withdraw from an institution is either engaging in institutional reform or is 
complicit in the imposition of the institution. This contradicts the conventional view that 
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someone who cannot help but be causally implicated in harm commits no injustice. I 
argue that the conventional view is ultimately right. A person who cannot help but do 
something cannot be said to have committed an injustice in doing that thing since they 
lack agency with respect to that action. This, however, is not to say that people should 
not withdraw from unjust institutions to the extent that they are able. Withdrawal from 
institutions need not be seen as all-or-nothing – we can disengage from certain aspects of 
institutions without withdrawing from them altogether. Nor is this to say that there is no 
requirement on people who cannot withdraw from unjust institutions to engage in 
institutional reform when they can do so.  For reasons I have already discussed, it is 
highly plausible to think that there are stringent moral obligations to engage in 
institutional reform. The failure to fulfil these duties, however, might well constitute a 
serious moral failing, it does not amount to a violation of the negative duty not to 
deprive people of access to the means for subsistence by being complicit in the 
imposition of unjust institutions.  
The duty to engage in institutional reform is indirectly entailed by the human 
right to subsistence negatively construed. This is because the reasons that underlie the 
right not to be unjustly deprived of access to the means for subsistence also support 
stringent moral requirements on others to work towards the goal of just institutions. As 
we have seen, there is a range of reasons offered in support of the human right to 
subsistence, but most refer to the tremendous importance for all humans of having 
access to the means for subsistence. Where people are systemically deprived of access to 
the means for subsistence, those who are in a position to work towards the institutional 
reform necessary to protect them therefore have very strong moral reasons which will in 
many cases yield duties to do so regardless of whether they are themselves complicit in 
institutional injustice.  
 But I have argued that failure to engage in institutional reform does not 
constitute a violation of the right against unjust deprivation. The fulfillment of this right 
requires only that, as a matter of fact, everyone forbears from unjustly depriving others 
of access to the means for subsistence, whether directly or indirectly. I have argued that 
an agent can only be complicit in unjust deprivation insofar as they have a reasonable 
choice whether or not to be part of it. If we accept that in some cases withdrawal from 
participation in institutional deprivations is too burdensome for it to constitute a 
reasonable option, then there will be cases in which agents participate in unjust coercive 
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social institutions, but are not complicit, and therefore commit no injustice in continuing 
to participate.  
 
I have argued that being complicit should be distinguished from merely being causally 
implicated in systemic injustice. Many agents who are causally implicated in systemic 
injustice cannot be reasonably required to do otherwise. As such, they are not complicit 
despite their causal involvement. Mere causal responsibility might, in some cases, be 
sufficient for holding someone remedially responsible for a bad situation. For example, if 
I accidentally knock over your drink, even if my action was not forseeable, preventable, 
or in any way the result of culpable behaviour, it is reasonable to think that I am morally 
required to replace your drink. It might also be the case in assigning remedial 
responsibility for global poverty that mere causal responsibility is sufficient in some cases 
regardless of a lack of complicity. This, however, is not the question we are interested in 
here. Recall that our interest is in whether the negative duties correlative to the human 
right to subsistence fulfil the claimability condition. I have argued that they do. But my 
argument relies on the distinction between mere causal involvement and complicity in 
institutional injustice, and this distinction implies that some people who are causally 
implicated are not complicit because they do not have a viable option to withdraw.  
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IMPLICATIONS, APPLICATIONS, CONCLUSIONS, 
AND FURTHER QUESTIONS 
 
 
 
 
On the minimal interpretation, the human right to subsistence is a universally-held moral 
claim on all moral agents at least not to be deprived of access to the means for 
subsistence. This does not preclude the human right to subsistence having positive duties 
as its correlates as well; but I have argued that a focus on the duty not to deprive allows 
us to circumvent controversy at the level of rights theory and to usefully employ the 
human right to subsistence in reasoning about the normative implications of global 
poverty. The purpose of this final chapter is to provide further support for this claim by 
showing how the minimal interpretation of the human right to subsistence might shape 
our reasoning about the normative implications of global poverty.  
On the conventional interpretation of the human right to subsistence, all poverty 
constitutes a human rights violation, and all poverty is therefore fundamentally unjust. By 
contrast, those who reject the human right to subsistence hold that poverty is not a 
matter of fundamental justice. The minimal interpretation I have proposed remains 
agnostic with respect to whether poverty as such constitutes a violation of the human 
right to subsistence and instead focuses on cases in which it is the result of a violation of 
the fundamental duty not to deprive. The advantage of this account is that it allows for 
progress in the discourse on the normative implications of global poverty despite 
longstanding disagreement at the level of rights theory. This is because it can (and 
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should) be accepted as at least a partial account of the human right to subsistence by 
those who endorse the conventional interpretation, and it can (and should) be accepted 
even by those who deny that human rights can have imperfect or positive duties as their 
correlates.  
 My claim is therefore that the minimal interpretation provides the strongest 
interpretation of the human right to subsistence because it avoids the claimability 
objection. I have argued that on the conventional interpretation, the human right to 
subsistence fails to make a distinctive contribution to reasoning about the normative 
implications of global poverty. This is because of its focus on the positive duties of 
protection and assistance which, as O’Neill rightly to points out, are not claimable. I have 
suggested that the claimability of the human right to subsistence is necessary for it to 
make a distinctive contribution to reasoning about the normative implications of global 
poverty, and that, therefore, we should seek an alternative account of the human right to 
subsistence according to which it is claimable. In the previous chapter, I argued that the 
minimal interpretation fulfils the claimability condition on account of correlating with a 
universal negative duty, namely the duty not to deprive. (For this reason it also avoids the 
liberty objection outlined in Chapter 2). We can identify anyone complicit in depriving 
others of access to the means for subsistence as being in violation of the human right to 
subsistence. Although assessments of the violation of this right will not always be 
straightforward, the point is that the relevant duty-bearers and the content of their duties 
are determinate – they can, in principle, be identified rather than assigned.   
 Although I have argued that claimability is a necessary condition on the existence 
of a human right to subsistence, it is not sufficient. For example, I argued in Chapter 4 
that the human right to subsistence interpreted as a right that others give due 
consideration to those in need when deliberating about how to act fulfils the claimability 
condition, but nevertheless fails to contribute anything distinctive to reasoning about the 
normative implications of global poverty. Although I have suggested that the human 
right to subsistence must be claimable in order to make a distinctive contribution to 
reasoning about the normative implications of global poverty, claimability will not 
guarantee that it will make such a contribution. In addition to making the case for the 
claimability of the human right to subsistence on the minimal interpretation, my case will 
be strengthened by evidence of the distinctive contribution that it can make to reasoning 
about the normative implications of global poverty. In what follows, I will begin by 
outlining two important ways in which the human right to subsistence on the minimal 
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interpretation contributes to reasoning about the normative implications of global 
poverty. I will then discuss an example of an actual case in which the minimal 
interpretation of the human right to subsistence contributes to shaping our normative 
assessment.  
 
6.1. Implications 
In Chapter 1, I outlined the central concerns in reasoning about the normative 
implications of global poverty. In this section, I revisit these in light of the minimal 
interpretation in order to show how the minimal interpretation contributes to reasoning 
about the normative implications of global poverty. We saw that the main normative 
implications of global poverty centrally concern which agents are responsible to remedy 
the situation (remedial responsibility). I also argued that the normative implications of 
global poverty include what first and third parties are morally permitted or required to do 
in case second parties fail in their remedial responsibilities. In this chapter, I argue that 
the human right to subsistence on the minimal interpretation makes important 
contributions both to reasoning about which agents are remedially responsibility for 
poverty worldwide and to reasoning about the morally permissible and required actions 
of first and third parties in case remedial responsibilities are shirked. I will discuss each of 
these in turn. 
 
(a) Remedial Responsibility 
On the minimal interpretation, the human right to subsistence makes an important 
contribution to reasoning about which agents bear remedial responsibility for poverty. I 
argue that we can infer remedial responsibility for global poverty from the violation of 
the duty not to deprive and the capacity to compensate for the resulting deprivations. In 
order to make the case for this view, it will be helpful to first consider how reasoning 
about remedial responsibility should proceed. I follow Miller in thinking that there are a 
number of considerations that may figure in the identification of remedial 
responsibility.183 Miller argues that six moral and non-moral considerations may figure in 
establishing remedial responsibility. These include four backward-looking and two 
forward-looking considerations. The backward-looking considerations Miller identifies 
are:  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
183 National Responsibility and Global Justice, pp. 100-104. 
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(i) Causal Responsibility: Having contributed in some way to the causal sequence 
resulting in the outcome in question. 
(ii) Outcome responsibility: Being causally responsible in a way that the outcome in 
question can be credited or debited to the agent. 
(iii) Moral responsibility: Being outcome responsible in such a way as to be the proper 
object of moral blame or praise. 
(iv) Benefit: Without having played a causal role in the process leading to the outcome 
in question, having nevertheless benefited from that process. 
The forward-looking considerations that Miller takes to figure in establishing remedial 
responsibility are: 
(v) Capacity: An agent’s ability to make a contribution to remedying the bad situation 
in question. Miller points out that there are two relevant components: effectiveness 
and cost. When we talk about an agent having the capacity to assist, we are generally 
concerned with both how effective he will be as compared to other agents, as well as 
how costly it will be for him as compared to other agents.  
(vi) Community: Being part of a community may yield special responsibilities towards 
other members of that community.  
Each of these considerations represents a different way in which an agent can be 
connected to a particular bad situation in which a person finds herself. Miller argues that 
remedial responsibility is based on the strength of the various connections that hold 
between agents and bad situations. According to his ‘connection theory’ of remedial 
responsibility, ‘A should be considered remedially responsible for P’s condition when he 
is linked to P in one of [the above] ways’ (p. 99). An important feature of Miller’s 
connection theory is his denial that there is any logical connection between any of the 
above considerations or any combination thereof and remedial responsibility. Miller 
holds that ‘we have to rely on our intuitions about the relative importance of different 
sources of connection’ in establishing which agents are remedially responsible. Although 
this leaves the application of Miller’s theory vulnerable to intractable disagreement, he 
argues that it is the best we can do.  
 Although I agree with Miller that no single consideration from among the 
abovementioned considerations alone entails remedial responsibility, I argue that the 
combination of moral responsibility and the capacity to remedy the situation together 
entail remedial responsibility. Because the violation of the human right to subsistence 
constitutes moral responsibility for the resulting deprivation, this will support my claim 
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that from the violation of the human right to subsistence and the perpetrator’s capacity 
to remedy the situation, we can infer remedial responsibility.  
 It is worth noting how the dialectic must proceed with respect to the question of 
whether there is a logical connection between any consideration or set of considerations 
and remedial responsibility. Much is based on our judgements about reasonable 
assignments of remedial responsibility. I cannot think of how to go about proving 
conclusively that we can infer remedial responsibility from any particular consideration 
or set of considerations. In order to support the claim that some consideration or set of 
considerations entails remedial responsibility, the best we can do is to explain away any 
apparent counter-examples. This is indeed how Miller proceeds. Reasoning about 
whether there is a logical connection between any particular consideration or set of 
considerations and remedial responsibility thus begins with the assumption that there is.  
We can begin, say, by supposing that the capacity to remedy a situation entails 
remedial responsibility. It is, however, fairly easy to come up with counter-examples to 
this claim. In many cases, there are multiple agents who have the capacity to remedy a 
situation, but it certainly does not follow that they all have the responsibility to do so. If 
both A and B are equally capable of rescuing P who is drowning, but it was A who 
pushed P into the water, it is A and not B who has remedial responsibility despite B 
being equally capable of remedying the situation. This suggests that remedial 
responsibility will not necessarily fall on an agent who has the capacity to remedy the 
situation. It will not even always fall on the agent with the greatest capacity to remedy the 
situation. Say, for  example, that B is a marginally better swimmer than A in the example 
above, but both are very much able to rescue P. Or say that A is wearing a very 
expensive pair of shoes that will get ruined by the water, while B is wearing only a 
swimsuit. In each of these cases, it still seems that A and not B has remedial 
responsibility. 
 The examples in the previous paragraph show that capacity on its own is not 
sufficient for remedial responsibility; and it turns out that neither is any other single 
consideration from among the abovementioned considerations. This is because the 
capacity to remedy the situation is always a necessary condition for remedial 
responsibility. There would be little point in attributing remedial responsibility to an 
agent who is incapable of remedying the situation in question.184 We can conclude, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
184 An important question concerns when an agent can be considered incapable of remedying a 
situation. Just how inefficient or costly does his contribution have to be in order to exempt him 
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therefore that no single consideration from among the abovementioned considerations 
alone entails remedial responsibility. My claim, however, is that moral responsibility for a 
bad outcome combined with capacity to remedy it together entail remedial responsibility. 
On the model of reasoning employed above, in order to disprove this, we need an 
example of a situation in which an agent bears remedial responsibility for a bad situation 
despite another agent being morally responsible for the outcome and having the capacity 
to remedy it. Miller provides the following alleged counter-example:185 Suppose that A 
pushes P into the river. Whereas A is a weak swimmer, B, who happens to be wandering 
by, is an experienced lifeguard. Miller’s suggestion is that it is at least not obvious in this 
case that it is A who is responsible to remedy the situation. There is, however, an 
important ambiguity in this example. It is not clear whether the claim that A is a weak 
swimmer is intended to express the unlikelihood of A succeeding in remedying the 
situation, or whether it is just meant to contrast A’s relatively small capacity as compared 
with B’s. If A is such a weak swimmer that he would almost certainly fail to rescue P, 
then we should conclude that A is not morally required to attempt to rescue P. But, as I 
argued above, if A and B are both equally likely to succeed in rescuing P, A is remedially 
responsible despite it being perhaps easier for B to carry out the rescue. I take it that 
Miller has in mind the former interpretation since he says that ‘Getting P out of the river 
seems more important here than enforcing the moral responsibility of the pusher’ (Ibid.). 
This suggests that A is likely to fail in his attempt to rescue P, or at any rate too likely for 
the risk to be justifiable given the availability of a more capable agent. But then this is a 
case in which the morally responsible agent seems to lack the capacity to remedy the 
situation. This, then, only provides a potential counter-example to the claim that moral 
responsibility on its own is not sufficient for remedial responsibility; and it is not entirely 
clear that it succeeds in this respect either.   
Miller’s own wording brings out an important point. He frames the question as 
one of ‘who should carry the primary responsibility for rescuing P’ (Ibid., my emphasis). 
Later, however, he characterizes remedially responsible agents as those ‘who should 
shoulder the burden of helping’ those who have been deprived. I argue that 
responsibility for the initial response in remedying a bad situation can usefully be 
distinguished from responsibility to bear the ultimate cost of remedying the situation. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
from remedial responsibility? I will not address this question here as it does not directly bear on 
the discussion at hand. We can note, however, that it relates to some aspects of the discussion of 
feasibility in Chapter 2. 
185 National Responsibility and Global Justice, p. 105. 
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Miller conflates these in his account of remedial responsibility. I argue that this makes at 
least some cases, including the rescue example just outlined, seem more perplexing than 
need be. Given that the description suggests that there is doubt as to whether A could 
succeed in rescuing P, it seems fairly clear in this example that B should rescue P. But 
why stop the enquiry there? Once the disaster has been averted, it seems reasonable to 
question whether B should bear the ultimate burden of the rescue. Say, for example, that 
it involved ruining an expensive pair of shoes, or missing a job interview. I argue that the 
burden in this case should not ultimately be borne by B, but rather by A in virtue of his 
moral responsibility, insofar as he has the capacity to compensate B.   
I agree with Miller that no particular consideration or combination of 
considerations – including moral responsibility plus capacity – entails remedial 
responsibility to initially respond to a bad situation (although capacity in the sense of 
greatest efficiency is likely to ground responsibility for initial response at least in 
emergency situations). I claim, however, that there is a logical connection between moral 
responsibility for a bad outcome combined with the capacity to bear the burden of 
remedying it and the responsibility to bear this burden. In order to provide a counter-
example to this claim, we need an example of a case in which an agent bears remedial 
responsibility for a situation despite another agent being both morally responsible for it 
and capable of remedying it. An example that comes to mind is the case in which the 
outcome responsible agent who is also capable of remedying the situation refuses to do 
so. Insofar as the situation is in dire need or remedy and another agent is capable of 
doing so, it seems reasonable to suppose that some such agent bears remedial 
responsibility. This sort of case is particularly relevant with respect to global poverty 
since poverty is often the result of local factors for which corrupt ruling elites bear 
outcome responsibility and yet refuse to remedy. Miller argues that in this sort of case, 
remedial responsibility does fall on other agents capable of remedying the situation 
(which ones in any given case depends on the various other connections).186 But keeping 
in mind again the distinction between remedial responsibility for the initial response and 
the responsibility to bear the ultimate burdens of remedying the situation, I argue that 
this does not provide a counter-example to the claim that moral responsibility and 
capacity together entail the latter. Although it might be the case that agents other than 
those who bear moral responsibility bear remedial responsibility in case the morally 
responsible agent refuses to remedy the situation despite the capacity to do so, I claim !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
186 National Responsibility and Global Justice, pp. 257-258. 
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that the ultimate burden in such cases nevertheless remains with the morally responsible 
agent insofar as that agent has the capacity to remedy the situation or to compensate 
those who do. This is true even if that agent persists in refusing to compensate the agent 
that initially remedied the situation.   
 
My claim is that we can infer from an agent being morally responsible and having the 
capacity to either remedy the situation (whether this involves acting so as to directly 
remedy to the situation or commissioning another agent to do so) or to compensate the 
agent who initially acts so as to remedy the situation, that that agent is responsible to 
bear the ultimate burdens of the remedy. Aside from the combination of moral 
responsibility and capacity, I am inclined to think that Miller’s connection model holds. I 
agree with Miller that in at least some cases in which someone is suffering from severe 
deprivation, ‘assigning remedial responsibility involves applying multiple criteria, which 
are also somewhat opaque’ (p.107). My point here has been to argue that we can infer 
from the moral responsibility of an agent for a situation in which a person falls below 
some minimum threshold below which it is morally intolerable that he be left in it, 
combined with the agent’s capacity to remedy the situation that the agent is remedially 
responsible for that situation at least in the sense that the agent is responsible to bear the 
ultimate burdens of the remedy.  
 As I have defined it in the previous chapter, the violation of the duty not to 
deprive constitutes moral responsibility for others falling below the threshold for 
subsistence – a threshold that is morally unacceptable to allow people to remain below. 
If this is right, and we can infer remedial responsibility from the moral responsibility and 
capacity of an agent, then we can infer from the violation of the duty not to deprive that 
the violating agent or agents are responsible to bear the ultimate burdens of remedying 
the poverty that ensues, insofar as they have the relevant capacity. This is therefore one 
respect in which the minimal interpretation of the human right to subsistence makes a 
distinctive contribution to reasoning about the normative implications of global poverty: 
we can infer from its violation and the capacity of the perpetrator to remedy the resulting 
deprivations that that agent is responsible to bear the ultimate burdens of doing so.    
 
(b) Justified responses to the neglect of duties 
A second way in which the human right to subsistence on the minimal interpretation 
contributes to reasoning about the normative implications of global poverty is with 
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respect to the sorts of responses on the part of first and third parties when remedially 
responsible second parties fail to fulfil their responsibilities or threaten to fail to fulfil 
their responsibilities. I argued in Chapter 1 that the duties correlative to rights are duties 
of justice, and that duties of justice are prima facie justifiably enforceable as such. We can 
infer from this that any duties to remedy the plight of those suffering from poverty that 
correlate with the human right to subsistence are duties of justice and therefore prima facie 
justifiably enforceable as such. As we saw in Chapter 3, this is the central way in which 
proponents of the conventional interpretation think that the human right to subsistence 
contributes to reasoning about the normative implications of global poverty. I argued, 
however, that this inference fails with respect to the positive duties thought to correlate 
to the human right to subsistence on the conventional interpretation because they are 
not claimable. Although these duties may be sufficiently important as to provide a reason 
in support of their enforcement, they cannot be justifiably enforced until specific duties 
are assigned to specific duty-bearers. Because this requires institutions, these duties are 
not fundamental duties of justice, and do not, therefore, correlate with the human right 
to subsistence, but rather with a special institutionally-determined right to subsistence. 
This provides strong moral reasons and, at most, stringent moral duties to create and 
support institutions that regulate the distribution of duties of assistance and protection; 
but these duties are not correlative to any fundamental right and therefore are not 
fundamental duties of justice. They are not, therefore, justifiably enforceable in the 
absence of institutional arrangements. 
 The duty not to deprive, by contrast, is a fundamental duty of justice. It stems 
from the legitimate demand of each person that no moral agent deprive him of access to 
the means for subsistence. Duty-bearers do not need to be assigned since we can identify 
all moral agents as bearing the duty not to deprive. When this duty is transgressed, we 
can identify, at least in principle, which agents are responsible for the resulting 
deprivation. I argued in the previous sub-section that the responsibility to bear the 
ultimate burdens of remedying the situation can be inferred from this and the capacity of 
the violating agent(s) to bear the relevant burdens. I add here that in such cases, namely 
where remedial responsibility is based on the violation of the duty not to deprive, bearing 
the burdens of remedying the situation is a duty of justice and is therefore prima facie 
justifiably enforceable as such. The human right to subsistence on the minimal 
interpretation therefore contributes not only to deliberations about which agents are 
remedially responsible, but also what sorts of actions are morally permitted on the part 
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of first and third parties when remedial responsibility is neglected. In particular, the 
human right to subsistence on the minimal interpretation entails that the use of coercive 
force is prima facie justifiable in ensuring that the duty not to deprive is fulfilled, and to 
exact compensation when it has been violated. 
 Note that the human right to subsistence does not itself contribute anything to 
reasoning about which agents are permitted or responsible to enforce it. This, however, 
poses no challenge since this is equally true of all other human rights. The right against 
torture itself entails nothing about who should enforce it. Its existence only contributes 
to providing constraints on how moral agents can permissibly act and on justifying the 
use of coercive force in ensuring their compliance. Which agents are permitted to use 
coercive force in ensuring that the duty not to torture is fulfilled and to exact 
compensation when it is violated is a separate question. The same goes for the question 
of which agents are permitted to use coercive force in ensuring that the duty not to 
deprive is fulfilled and to exact compensation when it is violated. I will not endeavour to 
address these questions here.  
 
6.2. Applications 
In this section I discuss an example of a concrete situation in which the human right to 
subsistence on the minimal interpretation contributes to reasoning about the normative 
implications of global poverty. The example concerns the recent massive increase in 
large-scale land acquisition by foreign investors in developing countries. My aim is not to 
provide a full-fledged normative assessment of this sort of case, but rather to provide a 
concrete example of how the minimal interpretation of the human right to subsistence is 
relevant to reasoning about the normative implications of global poverty. 
 
In the last few years, there has been a boom in the acquisition by foreign investors of 
agricultural land in developing countries. Although foreign investment in land is not itself 
new, since 2008 it has been happening on a much larger scale than it had previously.  The 
biggest investors in land in developing countries are Middle Eastern Emirate states and 
Saudi Arabia, but Japan, China, India, Korea, Libya, and Egypt are also big investors.  
A special report commissioned by the UN identifies six factors that contribute to 
explaining this new trend:  
(a) the rush towards the production of agrofuels as an alternative to fossil fuels 
(...); (b) the growth of the population by urbanization, combined with the 
 171!
exhaustion of natural resources, in certain countries which therefore see large-
scale land acquisition as a means to achieve long-term food security; (c) increased 
concerns of certain countries about the availability of fresh water (...); (d) 
increased demand for certain raw commodities from tropical countries (...); (e) 
expected subsidies from carbon storage through plantation and avoided 
deforestation; and (f) (...) speculation on future increases in the price of 
farmland.187 
According to the same report, developing countries have been targeted by foreign 
investors largely ‘because of the perception that there is plenty of land available, because 
the climate is favourable to the production of crops, because local labour is inexpensive 
and because the land is still relatively cheap’.188  
 In principle, foreign investment in land in developing countries is not 
problematic from a human rights perspective. In fact, it represents great opportunity for 
economic growth, and for improvements in the standards of living of residents. 
However, it also comes at considerable risk, particularly in light of the lack of regulation 
or lack of enforced regulation in many countries. Large-scale land acquisition carries a 
number of moral risks including the potential for the destruction of indigenous 
communities and traditional ways of life, environmental degradation, and increased 
foreign involvement in local politics and decision-making. My concern here will, 
however, be exclusively with the potential effect of large-scale land acquisitions in the 
developing world on people’s access to the means for subsistence. My claim is that the 
minimal interpretation helps to shape our thinking about the normative implications of 
poverty in case it results from the large-scale acquisition of land in the developing world 
by foreign investors. This provides us with a framework for deliberating about the 
responsibilities of governments, land-owners, and investors, in particular with respect to 
the justified reactions on the part of first and third parties, and in particular concerning 
the justified use of coercive force in regulation and in seeking reparations.  
 
Consider, for example, the situation in Ethiopia where, despite having one of the highest 
rates of severe poverty in the world, the government is offering at least 3 million hectares !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
187 Oliver De Schutter, ‘Large-Scale Land Acquisition and Leases: A Set of Minimum Principles 
and Measures to Address the Human Rights Challenge’, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
human right to food, United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council, 28 December 2009, p. 
7. 
188 De Shutter, ‘Large-Scale Land Acquisition and Leases: A Set of Minimum Principles and 
Measures to Address the Human Rights Challenge’, p. 6. 
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of its most fertile land to foreign investors who plan to use the land to grow food 
exclusively for export. While the government has insisted that the land they are offering 
is unused, this is hotly contested. According to a policy specialist for the International 
Land Coalition, 
If land in Africa hasn’t been planted, it’s probably for a reason. Maybe it’s used to 
graze livestock or deliberately left fallow to prevent nutrient depletion and 
erosion. Anybody who has seen these areas identified as unused understands that 
there is no land in Ethiopia that has no owners and users.189      
In Ethiopia, all of the land is at least partly owned by the government. In many cases, 
those who occupy land that they need in order to subsist do not have legal title to it. 
Pastoralists are particularly vulnerable since their livelihood requires that they have access 
to a lot of land for grazing their herds, and yet much of the land they use appears 
unoccupied and unused much of the time. When this land is handed over to a foreign 
investor, the local residents who previously relied on it are, in many cases, given no say in 
the exchange nor are they offered any compensation. This is not universally true: In 
some cases, small-scale farmers are given the option to refuse (although it is not always 
clear the extent to which this is a genuine option). In some cases, small-scale farmers and 
pastoralists whose land is taken over are offered decently-paying jobs on the new large-
scale establishments, and conscientious investors sometimes build new housing, schools, 
and medical facilities for those affected. These cases are, however, in the minority. In 
many cases those deprived of access to the land are left without access to the means for 
subsistence. 
 The human right to subsistence on the minimal interpretation makes an 
important contribution to reasoning about the normative implication of these 
deprivations. On the minimal interpretation, these cases constitute violations of the 
human right to subsistence. As such, we can infer that the perpetrators are responsible to 
bear the ultimate burdens of remedying the poverty in question insofar as they have the 
capacity to do so. We can also infer that there the enforcement of the relevant duties is at 
least prima facie justifiable. The human right to subsistence makes a distinctive contribution 
to reasoning in this and other similar cases in that the same work cannot be done by 
other normative concepts. While those wielding power to buy and sell land have moral 
responsibilities to take into account the interests and welfare of those who will be !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
189 Quotation from Michael Taylor in John Vidal, ‘How Food and Water are Driving a 21st 
Century Land Grab’, The Observer, 8 March 2010 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/mar/07/food-water-africa-land-grab> 
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affected by the transfer, the human right to subsistence on the minimal interpretation 
expresses a categorical prohibition on some actions, namely those that result in 
deprivation of persons of access to the means for subsistence. It is for this reason that I 
reject O’Neill’s conclusion that the right to subsistence should not be included among 
human rights. Although I am sympathetic to this conclusion with respect to the human 
right to subsistence interpreted as correlating with positive duties of assistance and 
protection, to reject the human right to subsistence on the minimal interpretation is to 
deny us an indispensible normative concept that is highly relevant in thinking about 
international relations, transnational economic interactions, and global institutional 
arrangements. 
 
6.3. Conclusions and Further Questions 
My purpose has been to offer a defence of the human right to subsistence against what I 
take to be the most forceful challenge to it, namely the claimability objection. I argued in 
the first half of this dissertation that the claimability objection poses a more serious 
challenge to the inclusion of a right to subsistence among human rights than is reflected 
in the way it has been treated in the literature. I offered an analysis of this objection, and 
a defence of the claimability condition. I argued, however, that although claimability is an 
existence condition on the human right to subsistence, we should not conclude from this 
that there is no human right to subsistence. This neglects interpretations of the human 
right to subsistence according to which it is claimable. Although I cast doubts on some 
interpretations of the human right to subsistence according to which the positive duties 
thought to correlate with it are claimable, I have left open the possibility of an alternative 
interpretation succeeding in this respect. I have focused instead on the minimal 
interpretation of the human right to subsistence according to which it is at least in the 
first instance a claim held against all moral agents not to be deprived of access to the 
means for subsistence. I have argued that this interpretation is claimable and also that it 
makes a distinctive contribution to reasoning about the normative implications of global 
poverty. I have not given a complete analysis of the human right to subsistence on the 
minimal interpretation; but I hope, nevertheless, to have shown that this provides a 
plausible interpretation of the human right to subsistence whose implications are well 
worth pursuing.  
 The example of large-scale land acquisitions by foreign investors in developing 
countries discussed in the previous section was intended to illustrate one way in which 
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the human right to subsistence on the minimal interpretation might contribute to 
reasoning about the normative implications of global poverty. It also serves to highlight a 
number of important questions that I have been unable to adequately address within the 
scope of the present work. For example, one question that remains is how to determine 
moral responsibility for deprivations. Thinking about the normative implications of 
poverty that results from the large-scale acquisition of land involves establishing which 
agents are morally responsible for the resulting deprivation. This will, in many cases, be 
difficult and controversial. When large-scale acquisition of land by foreign investors 
results in people being deprived of access to the means for subsistence, the harm is at 
once indirect and multiplicative. On the one hand, the harm is the result of the failure of 
the government of those deprived to respect the claims of those deprived to access to 
the means for subsistence which, in many cases will translate into a claim to land. On the 
other hand, some responsibility also lies with those purchasing the land from the 
government. Insofar as it is reasonable to expect them to be aware of the deprivations 
that will result from the exchange, I argue that foreign investors can be held partly 
responsible for the deprivation that ensues. A further question concerns whether those 
who benefit from the transaction bear any moral responsibility for the deprivations. My 
purpose here is not to provide a full-fledged assessment of this kind of case; rather, it is 
to draw attention to an important set of questions that requires more attention than I can 
afford it in the present work.  
 A further question, as we have seen, concerns which agents are permitted to 
enforce the duty not to deprive, and under what circumstances. Recall that duties of 
justice are only prima facie justifiably enforceable as such. An important question therefore 
concerns what other conditions must be fulfilled for their enforcement to be justified, all 
things considered. I argued in Chapter 3 that while the duty to enforce the duty not to 
deprive might not itself be a duty of justice in the conventional sense, it is at least 
indirectly entailed by the human right to subsistence. This is true of other duties as well. 
Another important question therefore concerns what other agents should be doing to 
protect against violations of the human right to subsistence.  
 These are questions that arise from thinking about global poverty at least in part 
from the perspective of the minimal interpretation of the human right to subsistence. As 
such, they are matters that can be pursued despite the persistence of the tensions at the 
level of moral theory that underlie the ongoing debates over the deontic implications of 
human right to subsistence. This, indeed, is the central appeal of the minimal 
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interpretation, namely that it allows for progress in the discourse on the normative 
implications of global poverty despite deep-rooted disagreement at more abstract 
theoretical levels. This, I think, is a virtue in light of the urgency of the current situation 
in which thousands of people are preventably suffering and dying each day of poverty-
related causes.  
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